درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The heart is the moral and affective center of the person, and plays a crucial role in spirituality. I examine the work of Dietrich von Hildebrand on the heart, in particular his call to restore the heart after its millennia-long neglect by Western philosophy. Von Hildebrand accounts for the neglect of the heart in terms of a Stoicism that views it as non-intentional, i.e. as disclosing nothing about reality. Instead of responding to objective values, the heart delivers an internal turbulence that distracts from the intellectual task of cognizing what is truly good. Stoicism reduces affective states to a preliminary sensation (propatheia) and a propositional belief that the intellect must evaluate. There is no disclosive capacity intrinsic to affective states that is untranslatable to intellectual propositions. Stoics stress conformity to an objective teleology of the person rather than feeling, through the cultivation of logic. The Epicurean embraces the opposite extreme, giving internal sensations of pleasure and pain pre-eminence over logic. Feeling pleasure supersedes any conformity to an objective standard. The binary of Stoicism and Epicureanism is a lens to understand the neglect of the heart, and to restore the heart. The heart both generates internal sensations, but also provides an evaluative disclosure of reality that is not translatable to intellectual propositions, and so the heart can unite both the objective and subjective domains emphasized by Stoicism and Epicureanism.  

The primary aim of this article is to critically examine the feasibility of integrating neuroscience and education from the perspective of the philosophy of education. It addresses the question of what kind of relationship between these two fields can be regarded as philosophically justifiable and educationally acceptable. This question is explored through conceptual analysis and a critical review of relevant interdisciplinary literature. Although neuroeducation has been institutionalized in several universities worldwide, it has also been criticized by philosophers of education, some of whom have dismissed it as another form of “neuromyth.” In response, this study examines major proposals for relating neuroscience and education and identifies three possible models: subservient, oppositional, and interactive. The article argues that the interactive approach provides the most defensible framework. To support this claim, it engages with key objections raised by philosophers of education concerning the epistemological and normative limits of neuroscience. Drawing on the work of Sidney Hook, Harry Broudy, and William Frankena, the study emphasizes the importance of grounding the philosophy of education in the scientific dimensions of educational practice. Through selected examples, the article illustrates how neuroscientific findings can contribute to clarifying educational aims, improving learning processes, and refining core concepts such as cognition and thought. Adopting a “soft dualism” perspective, it argues that philosophy of education necessarily involves both descriptive (“is”) and normative (“ought”) dimensions. The article concludes that neuroscience, by illuminating the descriptive aspects of learning and cognition, can meaningfully inform educational theory and practice without undermining their normative foundations.

This essay is a critical study of Rutger Bregman’s 2020 book, Humankind: A Hopeful History, from a broadly Kantian point of view. I present and defend the main points and arguments of the book, and on that basis, articulate a doctrine in social and political philosophy, which I call realistic-optimist dignitarian humanism, aka RODH, that I think captures the essence of what Bregman is driving at. Among its various theoretical and practical virtues, RODH gets constructively and creatively between Hobbes’s excessive pessimism about human nature on the one hand, and Rousseau’s unrealistic optimism about human nature on the other.

Through a critical auto-ethnographic account of miscarriage and grief, I explore what it means to inherit Islam as a tradition through care-based modes of knowing. Through Muslim-feminist theorizing, I blend Quranic narratives of care with maternal lineages of Islam I have inherited through care, that not only guide how I think about care Islamically, but also, how I practice care in my relations as a Muslim. I also illustrate the value of intertextuality of care as it is experienced across lived time, and across generations, within systems of kin and the need to let go of monolithic senses of tradition, and moral epistemology, within our practice of comparative care ethics. I draw a parallel between colonial, and white-orientated modes of knowing Muslims, and Islam, and grounded care-based modes of knowing by which we come to know and inhabit our practices of Islam in caring as, and being cared for , as Muslims.