intuition

In this paper I propose an argument against the conciliatory view in peer disagreement. One of the most important grounds for conciliatory views is the assumption that the epistemic situation in peer disagreement between two peers is symmetri cal. Symmetry justifies the conciliatory views. If so, showing that the situation is actually asymmetric should count as a refutation to conciliatory views of disagreement. By appealing to the difference between the processes by which the beliefs of the two parties have been formed, I try to show that there is a difference between the reliabilities of the two beliefs. This means the asymmetrical situation between two peers in disagreement. Since the conciliatory and steadfast views are contradictory views, any argument against one of them should be considered as an argument for the other.

Aristotle is more concerned with sensory perception and experience than philosophers before him, treating it as a kind of knowledge. It seems that the role he assigns to senses in knowledge acquisition does not qualify him as an Empiricist, although it does for some commentators. Now we should see if there is sufficient ground for the attribution of Rationalism to him. Now can we attribute Rationalism to him? And if yes, then in what sense and to what extent is he a Rationalist? To answer the question, I begin by considering components of Rationalism (and those of Empiricism, for that matter), that is, innate ideas and intuition, and then discuss Aristotle’s position regarding these components given his various works, particularly the last chapter of his Posterior Analytics and with the focus on nous. Since there have been different interpretations of this chapter of Posterior Analytics, I deal with exegeses by commentators such as Jonathan Barnes and their claims as they concern my claim in this paper.

This article lays the groundwork for a defense of rational intuitions by first arguing against a prevalent view according to which intuition is a distinctive psychological state, an “intellectual seeming” that p, that then constitutes evidence that p. An alternative account is then offered, according to which an intuition that p constitutes non-inferential a priori knowledge that p in virtue of the concepts exercised in judging that p. This account of rational intuition as the exercise of conceptual capacities in a priori judgment is then distinguished from the dogmatic, entitlement and reliabilist accounts of intuition’s justificatory force. The article concludes by considering three implications of the proposed view for the Experimental Philosophy movement.

Time and perception are two major concerns of Woolf in many of her novels and short stories. Woolf as a modernist writer often tries in her fiction to find an epistemological solution to the problems of mortality and immortality, appearance and reality and diversity and unity and she succeeds, I think, by taking on a kind of perception that is intuitive and temporal. For her, true perception is time-bound, but like Bergson she divides time into mechanical and organic one. In her writing, she often associates symbolically the former with death and aridity and the latter with life and fertility, presenting them in the images, to name but a few of keyboard of a piano or alphabetical letters and tree or green shawl and dress, respectively. Evidently, in her views and the solution, she finds to the problems of time and perception Woolf is influenced by Bergson whose theory of time has also influenced so many other modernists. This paper elaborates on the relationship between time and perception in the works of Woolf, especially in her two major novels To the Lighthouse (1927) and Mrs Dalloway (1924) and her short story “An Unwritten Novel” (1921).

There are at least three elemental parts in Brouuer's philosophy ef mathematics that mqy have their origin in Kant. These three parts are (1) the intuition ef time, (2) the synthetic a priority of mathematical kn01vledge, and (3) the inter-suf?jectiviry ef mathematical constructions. Brouwer borrowed the notion ef the movement eftime as an a priori intuition ef time, explicit!J expressed, from Kant. In Brouuer's philosophy ef mathematics, the intuition ef time is the on/y a priori notion, on wbicb the whole ef mathematics is built. Houeuer, their notions o] the "intuition eftime" are not the same in the genealogy ef mind As far as the second item is concerned, Brouwer believes that all ef mathematical kn01vledge is a priori and synthetic. His arguments are differentfrom Kant's arguments. The concept of ''inter-suf?jectiviry" ef mathematics in Brotouer's philosophy is very involved, and there is no reference to Kant in this respect. One mqy interpret it f?y the Kantian transcendental subject or even the Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. Both interpretations seem to be consistent. My suggestion is to read Brauner ry himse!f.

D’un point de vue sémiotique l’art est un effet de sens ; l’ effet de l’art , le saisissement artistique, est un événement esthétique, affectif, cognitif, présent dans toute œuvre d’art. Cet effet résulte d’un processus que nous pouvons reconstruire, l’ artistisation . Nous devons donc circonscrire un objet (l’ œuvre ), qui induit un effet (l’ art ), en exprimant un processus (l’ artistisation ). L’œuvre picturale ne se résume donc pas à des images : c’est un objet sémiotique composite, un hybride composé de processus, supports, matières, énergies, et tout ce qui lui confère un mode d’existence social et culturel. C’est précisément le cas des œuvres de Mehdi Sahabi ; nous ne pouvons examiner ici la totalité de ce qui en fait des œuvres, et nous nous limiterons au fait essentiel : une œuvre , pour Sahabi, est toujours une série , c’est sa manière de faire œuvre d’art . Nous examinerons donc dans ses séries picturales (1) les tensions caractéristiques de la « nouvelle figuration », et les manifestations d’une pratique inter-picturale ; (2) les isotopies et allotopies transversales de l’expression sérielle et multilinéaire ; (3) le travail des strates picturales et des couches actantielles, et l’expérimentation des dynamiques imaginaires. Le processus d’artistisation, en production comme en interprétation, est celui de l’ intuition (impression > synthèse > anagogie > imagination).

The work of architecture is believed to depend on the governing thought in the process of architectural designing. This thought can be analyzed, developed, experienced, and interpreted. Creativity is the only domineering force in the idea of designing which is in quest for freeing architecture from the routine methods, and also finding the novel systems to answer the questions in architecture. Therefore, a special fixed and stable place is considered for creativity. However, the background and history of research and clash of ideas in recent years explains for the change in reconsidering the general ideas, and interpretations on creativity in the process of designing. Today, the approach that considers the process of designing an outcome of responding to the demand on creativity in architecture through logical and analytic methods is no longer credited. Instead, the process of designing is considered in a creative and intuitive way which is metaphysical rather than argumentative. This change in attitude and the relevant interpretations have introduced clear evidence; however, there remain many questions involving the identity and quality of the creative occurrences in the process of designing. Therefore, the intuitive approaches and interpretations about creativity have been so over generalized and complicated that have left a lot of obscurities behind. This article is an attempt to respond to some of these questions by identifying the ways the intuitive creativity occurs and also to present a descriptive stream in the emergence of creativity which means creating ideas only happen according to intuition.

Current theories argue that decision making is largely based on quick and intuitive processes.The results of study on topping organizations show that successful decision-makings are intuitive rather than rational. Therefore in recent years the issue of intuition and intuitive decision making as an effective management has attracted increasing attention in scientific circles and world-class research. Identify the components and designing intuition conceptual model in decision making based on the Islamic approach is the main purpose of this article. In the main stage of article which is Qur'anic approach, concepts and issues related to intuition were identified using data-based grounded theory strategy and Tafsir al-Mizan. The results of the study is emergence of 86 concepts which were categorized in 18 subsidiaries and 7 main concepts using the seminary and academic expert&rsquos perspectives.

I argue in the essay that the conceptualist understanding of the mind-world relation ultimately leads to the kind of view that Panayot Butchvarov calls conceptual or linguistic creationism. According to this view, “there is nothing we have not conceptualized”. In addition to being an antithesis of metaphysical realism, which maintains that there is a reality independent of us, the term refers to the kind of thinking that sees human cognitive experience (and reality itself) as thoroughly constituted according to our concepts. While it might be easy to attribute this kind of position to Kant as well, especially when read through a conceptualist lens, I argue that such a position is not in accord with Kant’s philosophical intentions. Using the Deduction and Schematism chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason as examples, I also argue that on the conceptualist understanding of the mind-world relation too much is read into Kant’s idea that sensibility and understanding must be cognitively compatible with one another.

The paper concentrates on the philosophical discourses of four thinkers – Soren Kierkegaard, M. K. Gandhi, R. D. Ranade and B. R. Ambedkar on Ethics and Religion. Soren Kierkegaard, whose journey in philosophy made him pass through the aesthetic stage to ethical stage and ultimately religious stage landing in the realm of “faith”; where an individual arrives at without any rational commitment. M. K. Gandhi, whose journey in life encompassed politics, economics, and social realms where the underlying paradigm has always been religion. He did not consider ‘truth’ and therefore ‘morality’ as segregated from religion. R. D. Ranade, while mentioning the criteria of mystical experience, very empathetically mentions that a mystic (a saint) has the element of universality, is intellectual, emotional, has the intuitive experience of ‘spiritual realization’ and cannot be devoid of morality. B. R. Ambedkar, instead of accepting Christianity or Islam, consecrated into Buddhism; that befitted Indian contextual situation critiquing the popular Brahmanism, believed that religion must be in amalgamation and consonance with reason and scientific temperament. And this criterion was fulfilled by Buddhism (indeed with other criteria).  His adopting Buddhism was more of a political movement rather than spiritual; therefore, his Buddhism in the transformed format, is called Neo-Buddhism. The research article concludes by comparing these masters’ views and ideologies in the context of ‘a possibility of ethical religion’ that has appealed my conscience.