درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

Postmodernism represents skepticism toward metanarratives and universal ideologies that dominated the modernist era. The study focuses on three key postmodernist concepts - alternative assessment, process syllabi, and self-directed learning. Alternative assessment emphasizes evaluating the learning process over summative testing. Process syllabi focus on the learning experience rather than rigid outcomes. Self-directed learning enables student responsibility in setting learning goals and processes. This paper examined the effects of postmodernist educational concepts on improving Iranian EFL learners’ autonomy. A quasi-experimental pre-test/post-test design was utilized with 60 intermediate level Iranian EFL students divided into an experimental and control group (n=30 each). The experimental group received instruction utilizing the three postmodernist concepts over 14 weeks, while the control group received traditional modernist instruction. Autonomy was measured using a validated questionnaire before and after the intervention. The results showed the experimental group demonstrated significant increases in autonomy compared to the control group. Paired sample t-tests revealed significant differences between pre-test and post-test autonomy for the experimental group across all three postmodern concepts - alternative assessment, process syllabi, and self-directed learning. This suggests postmodernist concepts that decentralize instruction and emphasize student process over outcomes can enhance Iranian EFL learners’ self-direction and responsibility for language acquisition. The study implies EFL syllabus designers and instruction should transition to postmodern models centered on individualized assessment, flexible syllabi, and student-guided learning to boost autonomy. Further research can expand sample sizes and explore additional postmodernist concepts across diverse demographics.

While Hegel would agree with existentialist philosophers that anxiety testifies to an existential condition, applying to any human being as such, he believes that the experience of anxiety is shaped by social and cultural institutions and changes over history. The paper offers a reconstruction of Hegel’s account of the social conditions of anxiety. While my focus is the modern period, I use Hegel’s comments on death in previous epochs—and especially in ancient Greece—to bring out the peculiarity of modernity. In the first half of the paper, I discuss the nature and conditions of anxiety. In the second half, I trace Hegel’s critique of a common way to avoid—of flee from—anxiety in modernity, which results in social isolation, boredom, and emptiness. As long as the modern individual is only an economic actor in civil society, she is prone to anxiety. To confront her finitude, Hegel argues, she must endorse her political affiliation, namely, be an active and sacrificing citizen of the state.

My aim in this paper is to show how Josiah Royce’s philosophy contains many themes that will be at the core of Husserl’s philosophical investigations. This paper is divided in two sections. The first one outlines the start point of these two philosophers, contextualizing their background and showing how they share a common purpose: put the experience at the center of their thought. For this reason, I want to analyze how they treat the concept of attention in relation to that of intentionality to argue that their philosophies are strictly anchored to the givenness of the experience. In the second one I deal with the rising of the precategorial dimension (prior to any objectivation), as a possibility of experience itself, making a parallel between the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt and that Roycean of World of Appreciation. Through this distinction they both criticize the scientific, naturalistic and objectivistic Weltanschaung, showing how its method is founded in an intuitive and non-thematic relation with the world experience that comes ontologically before the scientific description.

In some point of view, neither Michel Foucault nor Ibn Khaldun are considered philosophers in the conventional classifications, but both are very  important in intellectual and, of course, in philosophical contexts, especially for those who are interested in the deep study of human life from the perspective of political thought.The main concern of two thinkers, one in the 14 th century, the other in the 20th century, is the issue  of power, although neither of them provided a precise definition of it. In this article, an attempt has been made to show the place of power and domination in the political thought of both thinkers by examining the thoughts of two thinkers. And in search of an answer to this question, how did Asabiyyah and industry of religion in Ibn Khaldun's thought and social control through self-technology and discipline in Foucault's thought lead to the expansion of the domination of power? This article is written by analytically comparing the opinions of two thinkers based on Ibn Khaldun's most important book called Muqaddimah and Foucault's late works

Dēnkard  (Acts of the religion), written in Pahlavi, is a summary of 10th-century knowledge of the Mazdean religion and is described by Jean de Menasce on the title page of his translation as a ‘Mazdean encyclopedia.’ The  Dēnkard  VI (Book VI of the  Dēnkard ) is representative of late antique and early medieval Zoroastrian ethical ideas. This article analyzes Book VI of the  Dēnkard  based on modern moral philosophy and introduces it as a candidate for early consequentialism and capitalism. The first generation of Iranian studies scholars in the late 19 th  and early 20 th  centuries such as Buch, Darmesteter, and Menant were aware of these concepts and even explained some of them, but the next generation did not take them seriously. This article also analyzes paymān (the ‘right measure’), that is the ancient Iranian ‘golden mean,’ in Book VI of the  Dēnkard  and shows the similarities and differences between  paymān  and the Aristotelian ‘golden mean.’ Probably, due to the biblical tradition in the interpretation of ancient religious texts or the anti-utilitarianism and anti-capitalism atmosphere in the second half of the 20 th  century, many scholars like Shaked inclined to the view that  paymān  is the main ethical principle of the  Dēnkard  VI and neglected its consequentialist and capitalist concepts. 

A double ambiguity has been charged against Rawls’s difference principle (DP). Is it Maximin, Leximin, or something else? Usually, following A. Sen, scholars identify DP with the so-called Leximin. One argues here that one has to distinguish 1° the Leximin, 2° the Maximin (as rule of justice formally analogous to the maximin rule of decision), represented by the figure in L of the perfectly substitutable goods, and 3° the genuine DP. When the augmentation of inequality benefits the worse off, only Pareto-strong improvements are permitted. Leximin would also permit Pareto-weak improvements too (after the first maximum D), where only the richest improves: from (2, 3) to (2, 5), say. This is forbidden by DP. With two classes, unlike Maximin, DP has no curve of indifference and is always decisive, as Leximin is. For undecisive Rules of Justice, which admit indifferent curves, I propose to add a lexically secondary rule, to break ties. That move is able to clarify the links and the differences between on the one hand Maximin alone, with its typical indifference curves in L, and on the other hand, the DP properly understood and the Leximin, which both have no indifferent curves. With two classes of persons (best off/worse off), DP appears more egalitarian than Leximin, because it's secondary rule is MinIn (Minimization of Inequality). But the intuition behind the distinction is that it cannot possible “fair” that only the best off improves in a productive social cooperation.