درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

Human rights, grounded in the protection of human dignity, have a normative nature transformed the traditional structure of citizenship rights. This transformation has extended citizenship rights into the realm of international law. Consequently, citizenship rights and their associated concepts are now defined more by universal human rights laws than by the national interests of states. This process suggests that human rights serve as a primary principle, governing over citizenship rights. It also implies that, through developments in the theoretical foundations of citizenship, there may be a need to revise state constitutions or demand narrow or broad interpretations of constitutional laws. The procedures of the International Court of Justice, including its efforts to redefine nationality and citizenship and to identify the customary law of international law in terms of human rights requirements, reflect this transformation. Accordingly, the traditional definitions of citizenship and related concepts, such as nationality, are evolving, highlighting the need for new interpretations. A reinterpretation of citizenship rights, informed by human rights values, suggests a shift in the legal principles that govern the traditional perspective on citizenship.

The claim of Russia’s humanitarian intervention in Ukraine serves as a legal justification for theuse of force. However, there is no evidence supporting allegations of genocide in the Donetskor Luhansk regions. While the majority of states oppose Russia’s invasion, this does not justifyoverlooking the rule of law, particularly the law of neutrality. In Ukraine’s struggle againstRussian aggression, the United States and its allies have provided weapons and military trainingto Ukrainian forces. This unprecedented support violates the prohibition of the use of force andthe law of neutrality. According to the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907, neutral countriescannot supply “war material of any kind” to belligerent powers. Consequently, Russia holdsthe right to take countermeasures against governments violating neutrality. Furthermore, underArticle 52 of the First Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949, Russia may target weaponsin Ukraine’s possession. However, if Russia targets these weapons before they are actively usedby Ukraine, such an attack could violate jus ad bellum, as the transfer of weapons alone cannotbe classified as an armed attack against Russia.

The importance of investment and the necessity for its legality, alongside the occurrence ofcorruption due to the involvement of multiple actors in the investment process, render itsexamination - especially in arbitration - unavoidable. Corruption may manifest through foreigninvestors and pressures from their home states or affiliated intermediaries, taking the form ofbribery and collusion with domestic officials of the host state or through threats against them.Furthermore, the emergence of corruption may stem from structural weaknesses or corruption-laden processes within the host state’s system. At times, a combination of all the aforementionedfactors, alongside the involvement of third parties, can create a corrupt and illegal investmentprocess. Given the private nature of arbitration, the primary question arises: does an arbitraltribunal possess the jurisdiction and authority to examine and determine the liability of each ofthe aforementioned actors? Through an analytical and documentary investigation, this articleestablishes that, firstly, arbitral tribunals generally do not have the power to investigate criminalbehavior and related inquiries; secondly, due to secrecy and threats against witnesses, collectingand maintaining the security of evidence within the sovereign territory of the host state ischallenging; thirdly, ICSID tribunals often rely on the “balance of probabilities” and significantlyon “red flags” and reports from anti-corruption organizations. Fourthly, the consideration of theinitiating factor of corruption, the degree of influence of participating actors (the prevalenceof corruption in the host state and the level of the host state’s involvement in the occurrenceof corruption), as well as the circumstances of “duress” and “hostage” situations and thenature of the bribe (transactional / variance), may lead, depending on the case, to the completecondemnation of the investor ( and a finding that the investment is unjust) or a reduction ofliability or immunity for the host state.