درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The influential physicist Richard Feynman became interested in the relationship between religion and science during a mid-career phase. He proposed that their interface was embroiled in unresolvable difficulties. He felt that science demanded an attitude of uncertainty for its claims, while religion contrarily required certain belief in its core doctrines. Though possessing several non-contradictory dimensions, Feynman felt that the nature of the truth claims of science and religion suffered from insurmountable elemental conflicts. This was by contrast to Karl Popper, the leading critical rationalist of the 20th century, who argued that there could be no tension between science and religion. This paper will argue that the ‘Feynman Problem’ is not as insoluble as it appears. Rather, several solutions exist within critical rationalism. Two will be presented-the first revolves around the conjectural basis of knowledge and is already a well characterised critical rationalist notion. The second is a novel solution based on the separate categorisation of psychological, pragmatic, and epistemological attitudes to religion and science. Karl Popper’s view of religion-science dissimilarity was a minimalist point of departure for critical rationalists, who have developed increasingly sophisticated frameworks for investigating the relationship between faith and reason. Critical rationalism represents an equally inspirational methodology for the pursuit of scientific and religious truth. Though both Feynman and Popper’s views on religion were underdeveloped, they foreshadowed the religion-science frameworks advocated by many late 20th century scientists, especially in the form of New Atheism and Gould’s NOMA theory. 

Neuroscience and its attendant subdisciplines, including, so it supposes, philosophy, hold that there is nothing more to self and society than what is in the brain. Yet two centuries have not resolved the philosophical objections to such claims, much less resolved the binding problem that would link mind and brain, or arrive at a general, materialist explanation of consciousness. Just as ideological and economic blinders beset this discipline, so they limit philosophy to account for the nature of this ‘thinking organ’ – what that means and if it can even exist. Taking the work of Hegel, Heidegger, Deleuze, neuroscientific results, I consider the phenomenology of the organ. I argue that an understanding of this object requires distinguishing concepts such as function and activity, capacity and regulation, surface and recognition. Results show that the ability to arrive at a thinking organ as organ is uncertain but worth the pursuit for the services done to science and ethics.

Nature has aesthetics of its own, what can provoke the human mind into better recognizing the concept of beauty via mental perception. As such, human mind can interact with the nonverbal expressions of nature only to better his/her primitive aesthetic knowledge and reach a more novel recognition of aestheticism via the practice of interpretative deduction. This article has been the result of a series of discussions and dialogues between the authors on the nature of aesthetic geotouring and exploring the natural phenomena based on the Dialectical Method of Socrates and modelled after the Platonic dialogues. The outcome of this dialectic study brings to light the fact that touring in nature through providing the due opportunity for mental perception of aesthetic phenomena can provide a clearer definition of ‘beauty’ in its rich variety. Aesthetic search as such will culminate in forming a more illuminated mental concept of beauty in mind, what can influence human rationale for aesthetic judgment and enrich even more the texture of human aesthetic creation. Such aesthetico-interpretative endeavor might lead to a higher potential for creating more original works of literature and art and culminate in a better judgment about such aesthetic creations.