درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

SUBJECT & OBJECTIVES: With the development of technology, it is expected that artificial intelligence will be able to analyze models of emotional relationships, such as love, and respond to users’ requests to create a personalized intelligent beloved with a physical body; a phenomenon named in this study as Intelligent Artificial Beloved (IAB). It can be designed and used as a dedicated companion aligned with the characteristics of the human user. The research's main question is: what philosophical and ethical consequences will the development of IAB entail? METHOD & FINDING: The research benefited from a descriptive-analytical method. Notably, this phenomenon has positive and negative consequences. The advantages of IAB include the ability of a personalized intelligent beloved to adapt to an individual’s variable and fluid requests, and expanding the boundaries of realizing ‘human desires’, i.e., the ability to create features in the artificial beloved that cannot occur or be externally realized in natural humans. The following items might be considered as challenges of IAB: 1. Weakening genuine romantic relationships among ‘natural human individuals’ 2. Immersion in an ‘intelligent artificial life’ and weakening the ‘natural lifestyle’ 3. The guidance and management of the ‘wants and lives of romantic users’ by the AI 4. Developing a competitive space between natural and artificial lovers or beloveds. CONCLUSION: Although IAB has advantages, neglecting its philosophical and ethical consequences can overshadow these benefits and cause individual and social harm. Proper cultural awareness and macro-level policymaking can be useful in responsibly managing this phenomenon.

SUBJECT & OBJECTIVES: Ontological inquiry constitutes one of the central concerns of metaethics. Within this field, theories are commonly divided into two main categories: realist and non-realist. While this primary distinction is well established, the secondary classifications and internal variations within realism have received comparatively little attention. Many of the enduring ambiguities in moral philosophy arise from the lack of a precise differentiation among realist positions. This study aims to address that gap by re-examining the ontological foundations and typological distinctions within moral realism. METHOD & FINDING: Using an analytical–descriptive method, this study differentiates between two distinct forms of moral realism—rationalist realism and sentimentalist realism—and explicates their respective implications. Representative approaches of sentimentalist realism include hedonism, Isaiah Berlin’s notion of negative liberty, Karl Popper’s reduction of suffering, and Benthamite utilitarianism. In contrast, MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, scientism, and perfectionism exemplify rationalist realism. The implications of rationalist realism can be summarized as follows: 1. The possibility of rational justification for moral judgments; 2. The dependence of moral values on ontological realities; 3. The possibility of moral preference in cases of ethical conflict based purely on ontological grounds; 4. The capacity to identify and prioritize the virtuous individual; 5. The derivability of “ought” from “is” on rational premises alone; 6. Monism is grounded in a single rational proposition; 7. Absolutism grounded in an absolute rational principle. CONCLUSION: While sentimentalist realism shares certain structural features with other realist frameworks, it diverges from rationalist realism in several essential respects, particularly regarding the role of sentiment, taste, and individual inclination in grounding moral value. This distinction underscores the need for a more nuanced typology of moral realism within contemporary metaethical discourse.