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This article develops a phenomenology of attentional care in platform-mediated education and advances the normative concept of attentional justice. Employing a phenomenological–hermeneutic method, it analyses composite vignettes derived from synchronous online teaching (2020–2024) in undergraduate and Master’s-level courses in philosophy of education, teacher education, and curriculum studies at a public university. The vignettes, based on field notes and reflective memos, condense recurring situations—such as latency-filled discussions, camera-off participation, and chat-based interaction—while preserving anonymity. Phenomenological analysis reveals three invariants of attention in this context: embodied tact (gesture and voice as holding), temporal generosity (protected intervals resisting acceleration), and recognitive address (naming, echoing, and confirmation). Read alongside critiques of the attention economy and technicity, these findings show that attentional care depends on minimally just conditions and cannot rely on individual virtue alone. The article therefore articulates two correlative rights—the right to protected intervals and the right to recognitive address—and specifies institutional duties concerning time, limits on surveillance, equitable access to bandwidth and quiet, and the governance of platform affordances. The study contributes a refined conceptual grammar of attention in education and proposes a normative criterion for platform pedagogy: a learning environment is adequate when learners can truly say, I was held; I was given time; I was recognised.

I take paraconsistent logic to be one of the most important and significant developments in logic and metaphysics in the last 100 years, challenging, as it does, one of the deepest dogmas entrenched in Western philosophy: that consistency is a sine qua non of rational thought. This paper looks back at the modern development of the subject. It is partial, in that it concerns only what one might call the formative years of the subject. It is personal, in that I describe my own involvement in some areas. The first part of the paper concerns paraconsistency as such. It starts with the name itself, its origin and its meaning. After a brief look at the history before the 20th century, it notes the work of the early pioneers: Orlov, Jaśkowski, Halldén, Smiley, Val and Richard Routley, and da Costa. For each of these, it describes both what motivated them, and the techniques they used in their constructions. It then describes the early reception of paraconsistency, and the way that it became a global movement. Next, the paper turns to dialetheism, again starting with the name itself and its meaning. After a brief look at the history of the notion before the 20th century, it describes the origin of the modern subject in the work of Richard Routley/Sylvan and myself. Finally, it turns to one of the major applications of paraconsistency: inconsistent mathematics—and specifically set-theory, arithmetic, and geometry. It notes the work of da Costa, Routley/Sylvan, Meyer, Mortensen, and others, describing some of the results concerning the mathematical theories they investigated.