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Today, it is very difficult to talk about the past and its history, let alone talk about the future, especially the philosophical future. However, since the futures studies movement has been formed in non-philosophical fields and has achieved relative success, it now seems that the time has come to address futures studies in the field of philosophy and test it in this area. This article acknowledges and addresses the availability of the objective ground and scientific background for the possibility of forming and developing a philosophical branch called the philosophy of life (of course, in a general sense and not solely focused on the purpose and meaning of life). The article's view is that life has gone beyond the limits of a scientific, social, economic, and cultural concept and has reached the level of a theoretical and philosophical concept. Also, due to the emergence of specific fields and the existence of a specific philosophical background in the last century, life has gone beyond the problematic level and has found the capacity to be at the level of a philosophical problem. Therefore, in the world of philosophy and philosophical discussion of life, it should be written with a capital L, meaning: Life, and we should wait for the emergence of a philosophical branch called philosophy of Life and also a tendency called Lifeism for it. Philosophy of Life is a reflection on life for the philosophical interpretation and expression of my life or I of life (my life/ego-life) or the subject of life, which in a way can be considered an idea for the sum of subject and Dasein. Philosophy of Life/Lifeism is distinct from realism, subjectivism, philosophy of life, vitalism, pragmatism, and existentialism. Philosophy of Life is philosophizing in the form of topics and categories such as understanding/defining life, distinguishing the subject of life from the pure subject and the dissolved Dasein in the world, important levels of life: “states”, situations, conditions”, my life among lives, interaction, language, the embodiment of life, acting and spectating in life, the authenticity and inauthenticity of life, ethics, meaning, success, model, health, livelihood, death, happiness, pleasure, style, consumption, well-being, life as a perspective, etc.

This study develops the Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering (AEMCE), a framework we introduce to address a critical and underexplored gap in conceptual engineering: the emotional dimension of concepts. While traditional normative conceptual engineering has focused on the application of concepts to moral and social applications, it has largely overlooked the overwhelming emotional impact a concept may have on individuals. These emotional resonances, whether harmful, isolating, or manipulative, are often ignored, creating ethical blind spots. The Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering rectifies this by introducing affective accountability and ethical adequacy as foundational criteria for conceptual success. This model is structured around four iterative and interdependent stages: Diagnosis, Design, Circulation, and Evaluation, which are operationalized through the Affective Performance Test. These rigorous mixed methods protocol empirically assesses both emotional engagement and harm reduction. The Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering demonstrates how concept revision, such as reframing the term “illegitimate child” in Algeria, can promote linguistic justice and social integration, transforming harmful labels into more neutral, inclusive language. This redesigns Conceptual Engineering not as an instrument of intellectual clarity but as a moral technology that has the capacity to transform the moral and emotional infrastructure of society. As a blend of emotional intelligence and philosophical accuracy, the Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering will provide a new concept of engineering, which improves the sense of moral quality in social life.

In this essay, I argue (i) for the thesis I call dignitarian neo-luddism with respect to digital technology, which says not all digital technology is bad and wrong, but instead all and only the digital technology that harms and oppresses ordinary people (i.e., people other than digital technocrats), by either failing to respect our human dignity sufficiently or by outright violating our human dignity, is bad and wrong, and therefore all and only this bad and wrong digital technology should be rejected but not—except in extreme cases of digital technology whose coercive use is actually violently harming and oppressing ordinary people, for example, digitally-driven weapons or weapons-systems being used for mass destruction or mass murder—destroyed, rather only either simply refused, non-violently dismantled, or radically transformed into its moral opposite, also (ii) that the members of what I call “the military-industrial-digital complex” are systematically harming and oppressing ordinary people like us by not only enabling but also effectively mandating our excessive use of and addiction to digital technology, which in turn systematically undermines our innate capacities for thinking, caring, and acting for ourselves, and therefore undermines our human real personhood, and thereby violates our human dignity—therefore, we ought to ban all giant AI experiments and LLM/chatbot technology while they are still in their infancy, just as we ought to have banned all atomic bomb experiments and nuclear weapons technology while they were still in their infancy.

Moral responsibility is a fundamental component of ethics, shaping our understanding of accountability, blame, and praise. Responsibility-internalism, which holds that moral responsibility is grounded in some internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, represents a novel yet radical departure from traditional frameworks that focus on the outcome, circumstances, and interpersonal relationships to draw the moral line. While this theory presents a simple, self-contained picture of moral responsibility, it faces serious theoretical problems that challenge its coherence and practical utility. It specifically cannot adequately explain cases of negligence, culpable ignorance, and the relational aspects of moral responsibility that are central to human interactions. This paper offers a critical-analytic examination of responsibility-internalism and its theoretical and practical shortcomings. It examines positions that would incorporate both internalist assumptions, emphasizing the control agents possess over their actions, and externalist and interpersonal factors, aiming to offer a more complete and nuanced conception of moral liability. Some of the paper is devoted to discussing case studies in which the limitations of responsibility-internalism relative to its alternatives are illustrated. And it concludes that although responsibility-internalism offers a novel take and a new tool in the discussions of moral responsibility, such an internalist approach ultimately fails to provide a full and usable theory of moral responsibility.

Gilles Deleuze argues that in Samuel Beckett’s Film the perception of self by self, though agonizing, opens onto a promising vision: for one confined to the personal reduction of life, it discloses a transcendental expansion of LIFE. In cinematic perception, this transformation marks the shift from the classical cinema of movement, where protagonists made films, to a modern cinema of time, where the camera becomes the protagonist, inviting actors, like the audience, to watch the film enriched by its transcendental perspective. This article shows what appears in Deleuzian time-cinema as a proliferation of life, by sustaining the audience’s belief in transcendental time as a horizon of perpetually emerging life-events, is, in fact, an entropic eventization of the audience’s memory, a process that, according to Bernard Stiegler, entails the loss of savoir-faire. Thus, the revelatory shock-images in Beckett’s Film signify an entropic loss of memory’s ground, becoming pathological shocks that require therapeutic care and invention of new life-therapies, anticipating a negentropic reinvention of time the transcendental camera must watch and read its film from. Here, E is seen as a therapeutic camera, healed out of transcendental time through O’s analysing the pharmacological shock.

The term “island disease” refers to the isolation and fragmentation of academic disciplines, a phenomenon prevalent in Iranian universities and research institutions. Specialization, while enhancing precision and depth within individual fields, often results in limited interdisciplinary interaction, leaving each discipline functioning as an isolated “island.” This fragmentation manifests in curricula that separate related subjects, minimal collaboration among faculty, and disciplinary languages that hinder cross-field understanding. Philosophical perspectives from Rumi, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset highlight the importance of holistic knowledge and the university’s role in integrating education, research, and culture. Globally, universities increasingly adopt interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, and transdisciplinary approaches to address complex societal problems, foster innovation, and prepare students for the demands of the twenty-first century. In Iran, recent initiatives—including the University of Tehran’s College of Interdisciplinary Sciences and Technologies, interdisciplinary engineering programs at Amirkabir University, and national interdisciplinary journals—illustrate growing efforts to overcome the “island disease.” This study examines the origins, manifestations, and consequences of academic isolation in Iranian higher education and argues that interdisciplinary thinking is a necessary remedy for cultivating integrated knowledge, collaboration, and problem-oriented education.

This paper revisits the famous 1922 debate between Einstein and Bergson on the nature of time, outlining its central philosophical and scientific points of contention and re-evaluating them in light of developments in quantum physics. Einstein’s conception of time is that of an objective, measurable, and relative dimension within a static four-dimensional “block universe.” In contrast, Bergson conceives of time (durée) as a qualitative, continuous, and creative flow of consciousness that resists reduction to quantitative measurement. The emergence of quantum mechanics, particularly the Heisenberg time–energy uncertainty principle, introduces new complexities that challenge this dichotomy. Quantum features of time, such as intrinsic uncertainty, the indeterminacy of precise moments, and the relational role of the observer, undermine the deterministic framework of classical and relativistic physics and appear, at least superficially, to resonate with Bergson’s critique of spatialized, discrete conceptions of time. However, a closer examination reveals that quantum time remains a quantitative, physical construct distinct from Bergson’s qualitative durée. Drawing upon modern theories such as loop quantum gravity (as articulated by Carlo Rovelli and Lee Smolin) and the insights of contemporary philosophers, this study argues that neither a purely physical nor a purely philosophical approach can, in isolation, account for the multifaceted nature of time. Rather, a comprehensive understanding requires a synthesis of both, recognizing them as complementary perspectives on a single underlying reality.

This study aims to examine the philosophical foundations of governance paradigms reflected in the election discourses of Iranian presidential candidates between 2005 and 2025, highlighting how these paradigms shape governance styles. The research employed a qualitative document analysis approach, focusing on primary sources such as campaign statements, election manifestos, interviews, and media reports. A comparative method was used to evaluate the ontological, epistemological, and methodological dimensions of each presidential discourse. Theoretical frameworks from the philosophy of science, particularly regarding positivist, interpretivist, and critical paradigms, provided the lens for analysis. The study found that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s discourse embodied an interpretivist paradigm with positivist elements, emphasizing cultural narratives and measurable developmental policies. Hassan Rouhani’s discourse reflected a hybrid of critical and positivist paradigms, balancing structural reforms with evidence-based governance. Ebrahim Raisi’s approach was primarily interpretivist with critical elements, focusing on revolutionary ideals and social justice. Masoud Pezeshkian’s emerging discourse aligned most closely with the critical paradigm while incorporating positivist techniques for policy development. Across the period from 2005 to 2025, a gradual philosophical shift was observed, moving from symbolic mobilization toward structural critique and pragmatic governance strategies. These evolving paradigms significantly influenced policymaking priorities, citizen participation models, and governance structures in Iran. The philosophical roots embedded in election discourses play a decisive role in shaping governance approaches in Iran. Understanding these paradigmatic orientations offers deeper insights into the evolution of political practices and state-citizen relations. Future studies should further explore the relationship between electoral rhetoric, governance implementation, and the broader socio-political transformations within Iran.

For Edmund Husserl, the crisis of the modern sciences consists in the reduction of beings and the world to the mathematically measurable. Yet the lifeworld with its things that we fashion and use with our hands is no less real than the objects of science, and the scientific attitude is always nested within this lived world. Martin Heidegger by contrast finds the major source of our crisis in the Cartesian conception of subject and world. This has culminated in Nietzschean theory of the will to power, which in its unity with technology has despoiled our environment. In all of this Heidegger retains a tenderness for the small-scale products of human handiwork, which are preferable to machines and machine tools. In his own philosophy of technology Gilbert Simondon shares some of these concerns, whilst contending that technological objects have untapped potentials in relation to those who invent, use and develop them. Common to all these philosophies is a worry about abstract theory and mechanization reducing our direct engagement with things. This worry is compounded by a sociocultural tendency identified by Matthew Crawford, a tendency to denigrate a career in the practical trades. Drawing on Crawford’s experience of manual engagement in the world, I argue that a revalorization of such skilled work and of caring and repairing would help to ameliorate the climate and pollution crises and improve our lives. Many of our problems come from the discarding of things through our carelessness or through planned obsolescence by their makers.

In Hegel’s Philosophy of History, one encounters the idea of the “cunning of reason” [List der Vernunft], which describes the unintended (universal) consequences of (particular) individual actions. However, the Philosophy of History is one of the most (if not the most) maligned of Hegel’s works, attacked by non-specialists and anti-Hegelians who use it to easily stereotype and dismiss Hegel, for instance, as a teleological anti-individualist, while most serious Hegel interpreters avoid this work at all costs. To redress the lack of serious attention to Hegel’s Philosophy of History, this paper aims to offer the strongest possible reading of Hegel’s weakest “text,” reading it alongside his strongest, the Science of Logic, thereby bringing together two seemingly contradictory instances of the cunning of reason in Hegel’s corpus. In the Logic, the cunning of reason shows how the universal emerges through the means which individuals use toward their particular ends. However, in the Philosophy of History, the cunning of reason describes how the universal acts through individuals, as it were, behind their backs and, problematically, Hegel goes on to claim that the universal (spirit [Geist]) ultimately sacrifices individuals on the “slaughter bench” of history to advance its own purpose(s). This paper’s two-part thesis is: (1) the cunning of reason in the Philosophy of History is an internal illusion of the structure of cunning of reason in the Logic, and (2) this illusion is absolutely necessary. In particular, this paper builds upon the Hegel interpretations of Todd McGowan and Slavoj Žižek.

While one version of belief in inspiration, for which the inspired human passively receives inspired deliverances, precludes human creativity, another, for which inspired compositions reflect human agency and ingenuity, presupposes it. Margaret Boden, however, suggests (in The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (2004)) that creativity is continuous with generic human powers, and also arises through infringing recognised rules. While the former suggestion (about continuity) is argued to be readily acceptable, problems are raised for the rule-breaking account of creativity. Accounts of creativity need to be supplemented with awareness that creativity commonly involves participation in traditions of skill or craftsmanship, and in a creative community, whether rules are broken or not. Further, the continuity approach is argued to be consistent with at least one particular variant of belief in inspiration, according to which God, as the universal Creator, can communicate through the imagination of receptive minds that reflect his/her creative imagination, as suggested by Austin Farrer in ‘Inspiration: Poetical and Divine’ (1963). Other faculties as well as the imagination are held to be involved, in a manner consistent with the continuity approach: perception, memory, reflectiveness, historical awareness and artistic ingenuity.

A Reviving Rationality Theory offers a knowledge-based and practical framework to rebuild rational thinking in response to the complex crisis of our time. This crisis comes from the limits of traditional rationality, modern instrumental rationality, and postmodern relativism, which have led to stagnation, alienation, environmental destruction, and theoretical paralysis. Reviving Rationality defines rationality as an evolving system of knowledge and action based on three principles: coherent epistemic pluralism, constructive criticism, and evolutionary responsibility. Using multilayered critical realism, it examines reality at four levels (empirical, event-based, structural, and evolutionary) and draws knowledge from five sources (logical reasoning, empirical experience, practical intuition, social dialogue, and historical wisdom). By solving the paradox of fallibilism through distinguishing between the content, method, and purpose of knowledge, and emphasizing human dignity as a core principle for both knowledge and action, this theory moves beyond classic dualities like structure versus freedom or individual versus society. It systematically critiques instrumental rationality, postmodern relativism, and static traditionalism, proposing a three-stage process (analysis, synthesis, decision) and four criteria (logical coherence, alignment with evidence, practical effectiveness, and ethical consistency) to evaluate beliefs and decisions. Reviving Rationality is not a return to traditional or modern rationality, nor a full acceptance of postmodern critiques; instead, it provides an evolutionary, responsible, and inclusive framework that combines the strengths of scientific methods and logical analysis with diverse knowledge sources and ethical considerations to tackle complex issues like climate change and social inequality. This framework is a theoretical tool for rational and humane thinking, open to critique and improvement.

Today, we encounter a question that has rarely been treated as a serious or provocative issue: women and sexuality as a philosophical problem. This theme now acts as a critical marker—an axis that divides entire fields of thought into a before and after. The beginning of this epistemic shift can be traced back to a Freudian question: What does a woman really want? In this article, we follow this question through the lens of Lacanian theory, in which he introduces the concept of sexuation and illuminates the foggy, ambiguous terrain of femininity through the formulation of the hysterical discourse. Moving beyond a purely hysterical approach to womanhood, the French psychoanalyst carved a path for the re-inscription of her historically ambivalent and fragmented image. For Lacan, woman is a symptom—an embodiment of the fundamental contradiction and rupture within the symbolic order. The Woman does not exist; rather, la femme is a rebel who struggles to exist

This study aims to compare the ethical systems of Aristotle and Al-Biruni. The former was built in the ‘West’, but the latter was on the ‘Middle’ toward the ‘East’. Reviewing their literature and introducing the new concepts, this study found that while Aristotle’s system influenced Al-Biruni’s in the application of a scientific frame to ethical issues, the two systems shared a concern not for the moral judgment but for the moral agent. However, they differ from each other in the conceptualization of the agents. Aristotle’s model is the person of virtue evaluated by the golden mean, but Al-Biruni’s is the person of manliness rated by the reversibility of others. This comparison advanced the differentiation that the moral pragmatic is devoted to Aristotle’s and the moral practical to Al-Bruni’s. The study would contribute to resolving the current moral confusion and would demonstrate a model to integrate the systems of the western and eastern worlds.

This paper explores the structure of time and the possibility of the future within it, challenging conventional linear representations of temporality. The central thesis argues that the future does not lie on a vertical line above or to the eternally far right of a horizontal timeline; rather, the it emerges logically, not merely sequentially, following the past and present. For the future to fully manifest, the past and present must be thoroughly processed and, in some sense, exhausted. However, catastrophes, which have occurred and will presumably continue to occur, disrupt the flow of time by halting the past and indicating future occurrences in unpredictable ways. Therefore, to truly engage with the future, it is sometimes necessary to revisit the past, much like in psychoanalysis, where exploring repressed experiences helps illuminate present and future trajectories. This brings us to a crucial idea of this article: history and historiography are not solely concerned with understanding past events but also with anticipating and shaping future possibilities. In this light, many future catastrophes have their roots in the past. Recognizing this dynamic allows us to see that many future catastrophes have their origins in unresolved past events, reinforcing the necessity of engaging with history not only as retrospective analysis but as a mode of future-oriented thinking.