Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Print ISSN: 2251-7960 Online ISSN: 2423-4419
Homepage: https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir

The Myth of AI, The Future of Human Intelligence, and The Role of Philosophy

Robert Hanna

Independent Philosopher, Canada. Email: bobhannahbob1@gmail.com

Article Info

Article type:
Research Article

Article history:
Received 27 December 2025
Received in revised form 05 January 2026
Accepted 10 January 2026
Published online 14 February 2026

Keywords:
Digital Technology, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Rational Human Intelligence, Existential Threats, Dignitarianism, Neo-Luddism Exist.

ABSTRACT

In this essay, I argue (i) for the thesis I call *dignitarian neo-luddism* with respect to digital technology, which says not all digital technology is bad and wrong, but instead all and only the digital technology that harms and oppresses ordinary people (i.e., people other than digital technocrats), by either failing to respect our human dignity sufficiently or by outright violating our human dignity, is bad and wrong, and therefore all and only this bad and wrong digital technology should be rejected but not—except in extreme cases of digital technology whose coercive use is actually violently harming and oppressing ordinary people, for example, digitally-driven weapons or weapons-systems being used for mass destruction or mass murder—destroyed, rather only either simply refused, non-violently dismantled, or radically transformed into its moral opposite, also (ii) that the members of what I call "the military-industrial-digital complex" are systematically harming and oppressing ordinary people like us by not only enabling but also effectively mandating our excessive use of and addiction to digital technology, which in turn systematically undermines our innate capacities for thinking, caring, and acting for ourselves, and therefore undermines our human real personhood, and thereby violates our human dignity—therefore, we ought to ban all giant AI experiments and LLM/chatbot technology while they are still in their infancy, just as we ought to have banned all atomic bomb experiments and nuclear weapons technology while they were still in their infancy.

Cite this article: Hanna, R. (2026). The Myth of AI, The Future of Human Intelligence, and The Role of Philosophy. *Journal of Philosophical Investigations*, 20(54), 39-52. https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2026.21215

Publisher: University of Tabriz.

Intruduction

No digital computing systems or digital technology, no matter how sophisticated or tricked-out with high-tech bells and whistles, will ever be able to equal or exceed the essentially embodied innate mental capacities or powers of rational human animals[1]—including, of course, the readers of this very sentence. Not even *in principle* can such systems or technology match or surpass our capacities or powers. To be sure, digital computing systems or digital technology can carry out certain operations *much faster* and *more accurately* than we can. But that's not a fact about *the nature, scope, and limits of our mental capacities or powers*, but rather only a fact about *the applications of those powers to certain mechanical tasks*, and no more philosophically exciting or significant than the quotidian fact that we can build machines that *move faster* than we do, *lift heavier weights* than we do, or *make more accurate measurements* than we do. In other words, digital computing systems and digital technology are artificial, but *not* intelligent in the sense in which we're intelligent; and to that extent, the term "artificial intelligence" is simply an *oxymoron*.

The widely-held yet profoundly false contrary belief—namely, that digital computing systems or digital technology can equal or exceed the essentially embodied innate mental capacities or powers of rational human animals—is what I call *the myth of artificial intelligence*, or "the myth of AI" for short. Tautologically, the myth of AI is a *myth*, with no causal powers of its own. Nevertheless, just as nuclear war technology and biological weapons technology aren't either intelligent or superintelligent, yet still pose an all-too-real dire threat to humankind in the brute, raw sense that their use can kill everyone and destroy the Earth as we know it, so too the myth of AI poses an all-too-real dire threat to humankind's *embodied* or *physical* existence, especially insofar as people *believe that* nuclear weapons technology and biological weapons technology should be controlled by "intelligent" or "superintelligent" digital computers that run or will run drones, killer robots, missiles, and other deadly machines. Their worry is that these superintelligent digital computers could, on their own, become morally satanic, run amok, and destroy humankind, which could then "survive" only by uploading the sets of algorithms that constitutes their so-called "minds" into shiny new digital technology. This "accelerationist" and "transhumanist" apocalytpic mindset is especially characteristic of very, very rich technocrats and their scientific lackeys:

> Google cofounder Larry Page thinks superintelligent AI is "just the next step in evolution." In fact, Page, who's worth about $120 billion, has reportedly argued that efforts to prevent AI-driven extinction and protect

[1] Or of rational *non*-human animals, if there are any. For the record, the basic essentially embodied innate mental capacities or powers are: (i) *consciousness*, i.e., subjective experience, (ii) *self-consciousness*, i.e., consciousness of one's own consciousness, second-order consciousness, (iii) *caring*, i.e., desiring, emoting, or feeling, (iv) *sensible cognition*, i.e., sense-perception, memory, or imagination, (v) *intellectual cognition*, i.e., conceptualizing, believing, judging, or inferring, (vi) *volition*, i.e., deciding, choosing, or willing, and (vii) *free agency*, i.e., free will and practical agency. In human animals, the unified set of these capacities constitutes our *rational human mindedness*, which is the same as our *human real personhood* (Hanna, 2018).

> human consciousness are "speciesist" and "sentimental nonsense." In July, former Google DeepMind senior scientist Richard Sutton—one of the pioneers of reinforcement learning, a major subfield of AI—said that the technology "could displace us from existence," and that "we should not resist succession." In a 2015 talk, Sutton said, suppose "everything fails" and AI "kill[s] us all"; he asked, "Is it so bad that humans are not the final form of intelligent life in the universe?" Biological extinction, that's not the point," Sutton, sixty-six, told me. "The light of humanity and our understanding, our intelligence—our consciousness, if you will—can go on without meat humans (Lovely, 2024, 67).

But leaving aside accelerationist and transhumanist fantasies, the authentic, bottom-line worry is just that high-powered digital technology will be misused *by the people who create and control this technolology*—your Googles and your OpenAIs—against the interests of the rest of humankind.

Moreover, the myth of AI poses a different yet equally dire threat to humankind's cognitive, affective, and practical existence—in short, to humankind's *conscious* and *self-conscious* existence—even if humankind continues to exist in the embodied or physical sense. Digital computing systems or digital technology that can supposedly equal or exceed rational human animal intelligence are sometimes also called "Artificial General Intelligence" or AGI. Nevertheless, AGI is no more really possible than is Sonny the NS-5 prototype robot in the 2004 movie, *I, Robot*. Science fiction and futuristic fantasy are just fine as artistic genres—provided that we don't also start to believe them and act on that belief. But the myth of AI is *pernicious*, since it leads us not only to seriously to *depreciate* and *underestimate* our own mental capacities or powers, but also, by means of our excessive use of and reliance on digital technology, seriously to *neglect* and even *impair* our own mental capacities or powers—this is particularly true in the case of the recent roll-out of Large Language Models (LLMs) or chatbots like ChatGPT: *the invasion of the mind-snatchers* (Hanna, 2025)—and, to the extent that we knowingly or unknowingly disseminate and perpetuate the myth of AI, also seriously to *misapply* and *misuse* our own mental capacities or powers.

That all being so, in view of the two existential threats posed to humanity by the myth of AI, then the only remaining really important philosophical questions are: (i) why does the myth of AI *persist*? and (ii) what can philosophy *do about*? I'll offer answers to those hard questions later in this essay. But before we get there, let me now rehearse, briefly but in a step-by-step way, precisely why the myth of AI really *is* a myth, that is, why it is a widely-held yet profoundly *false* belief.

1. Why The Myth of AI Really is a Myth

The myth of AI can be explicitly formulated as a two-part philosophical thesis, *the strong thesis of artificial intelligence*, aka strong AI, which says (i) that rational human intelligence

can be explanatorily and ontologically reduced to Turing-computable algorithms and the operations of digital computers or digital technology (aka *the thesis of formal mechanism, as it's applied to rational human intelligence*), and (ii) that it's really possible to build digital computing systems or digital technology that are counterpart models of rational human intelligence, such that these systems or technology not only exactly reproduce (aka simulate) all the actual performances of rational human intelligence, but also outperform or surpass it (aka *the counterpart thesis*) (see, e.g., Block, 1980:part 3; Kim, 2011:ch. 6). I'll now describe ten distinct arguments against strong AI.

The first two arguments belong to what I'll call the *old-school, phenomenological* critique of strong AI—as originally developed by, for example, Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.

First, according to Searle's *chinese room argument*, even assuming that a digital computing system or digital technology passes The Turing Test (Turing 1950), nevertheless it *cannot* have consciousness (or subjective experience) and intentionality (or mental directedness); but *all* human thinking of any kind is conscious and intentional and/or self-conscious, including *all* of its characteristic rational achievements; hence digital computing systems or digital technology *cannot*, even in principle, equal or exceed the characteristic achievements of *conscious intentional* human thinking (Searle 1980a, 1980b, 1984).

Second, according to Dreyfus's *heideggerian argument*, digital computing systems and digital technology *cannot* engage in unconscious, essentially non-conceptual, non-rule-based, non-inferential, pre-logical, context-sensitive, know-how-driven, skillful, intuitional, sensible activities; but at least *some* human thinking is of this specific kind, including all the characteristic achievements of unconscious affective/emotional, perceptual, and practical, *pre-rational* human thinking; hence AI *cannot*, even in principle, equal or exceed the characteristic achievements of *unconscious pre-rational* human thinking (Dreyfus 1972, 1979, 1992; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986).

Clearly, however, there's an inconsistency between these two phenomenological lines of argument, since those who use the first line of argument—the "Searlians"—hold that *all* human thinking, including its characteristic rational achievements, is *conscious and intentional*, whereas those who use the second line of argument—the "Dreyfusards" (yes, it's a pun)—hold that at least *some* of the characteristic achievements of human thinking, including its characteristic pre-rational achievements, are *unconscious*. This inconsistency, in turn, has allowed defenders of strong AI to drive a critical wedge into this unfortunate gap between the Searlians and the Dreyfusards (i) by endlessly *postponing* solving the problem of consciousness, insofar as the strong AI defenders treat it as a "hard" (Chalmers 1996) and perhaps even insoluble and "mysterian" (McGinn 1989) problem, but in any case an *open* problem, and (ii) by *also*, at the very same time, using the method of *reverse-engineering*, industriously and industrially designing, building, marketing, and rolling out new and extremely lucrative forms of digital technology, especially those based on "machine learning" systems—neural networks—and robotics, that more and more closely *behaviorally mimic* the characteristic achievements of *un*conscious human thinking.

My *new-school* and *neo-organicist* (Hanna and Paans 2020; Torday, Miller Jr, and Hanna 2020) critique of strong AI, however, closes this unfortunate gap in the old, phenomenological Searlian-Dreyfusard critique of AI, by holding, **first**, that consciousness and intentionality are necessarily and completely (i.e., essentially) embodied, yet neither logically nor naturally/nomologically dependent on or reducible to fundamentally material or physical properties, and also **second**, by rejecting the very idea of unconscious human thinking, and by asserting that all of the characteristic pre-rational achievements of human thinking, and indeed all mental activities of any kind, are *also* inherently conscious, even if only *pre-reflectively*, *non-self-consciously*, and *essentially non-conceptually* conscious (aka "first-order consciousness"): I call this *The Deep Consciousness Thesis* (Hanna and Maiese, 2009; Hanna 2011, 2015:esp. section 2.8). If The Essential Embodiment Theory and The Deep Consciousness Thesis are both true, then defenders of strong AI cannot justifiably endlessly postpone solving the problem of consciousness by treating it a hard or mysterian and in any case open problem, and in the meantime, using reverse engineering, create and sell—thereby reaping immense profits—machine-learning-based or robot-based simulations of the characteristic achievements of rational human minded animal thinking, marketing and disseminating them as if they somehow equalled or surpassed the characteristic achievements of human thinking. For essentially embodied deep consciousness constitutes a necessary and indeed essential component of the characteristic *pre-rational* achievements of human thinking, as well as being a necessary and indeed essential component of its characteristic *rational* achievements.

For these reasons, I think that contemporary and future critics of strong AI should rely instead on the following eight new-school and neo-organicist arguments against it.

First, according to *the inadequacy of the turing test argument*, passing The Turing Test, which relies on human judgments about whether a series of written outputs from a digital computing system inside a room manifest intelligence or thinking or not, that's comparable to what's manifested by the written outputs provided by a rational human interlocutor inside another room, clearly is insufficient to show that a digital computing system is intelligent in the sense in which we're intelligent, since human judgers in general are very gullible and therefore easily fooled on all sorts of recognition tests having nothing whatsoever to do with AI—for example, supposedly contacting spirits at séances and other faked mystical experiences—and this gullibility smoothly transfers to The Turing Test; hence the criterion of intelligence presupposed by strong AI is inadequate to capture the presence of intelligence in the sense in which we're intelligent (Hanna, 2025, section 2.3).

Second, according to *the organicity argument*, rational human mindedness in all its modes, including intelligence and free agency, requires essential embodiment in organic and indeed organismic processes (Hanna and Maiese, 2009; Hanna, 2011, 2015, 2018), so since all digital computing systems and digital technology are mechanical and not organic or organismic, then they can't be intelligent in the sense in which we're intelligent (see also Landgrebe and Smith 2025).

Third, according to *the readability argument*, there are some illegible, meaningless, or nonsensical texts that no digital computing system or digital technology can parse or read, yet rational human animals can indeed parse and read, hence digital computing systems and digital technology cannot be intelligent in the sense in which we're intelligent (Hanna, 2025: section 2.5).

Fourth, according to *the it's-all-done-with-mirrors argument*, there are some well-specified sets of circumstances in which digital computing systems or digital technology cannot discriminate between left-handed and right-handed but otherwise identical (i.e., enantiomorphic) counterparts, yet rational human animals can indeed discriminate between them, hence digital computing systems and digital technology cannot be intelligent in the sense in which we're intelligent (Hanna, 2025: section 2.4).

Fifth, according to *the uncomputable functions argument*, digital computing systems or digital technology can't carry out functions or operations in the logico-mathematical sense over domains containing objects or other items that are either non-denumerably finite or non-denumerably infinite, vague, holistic, or entangled, or for which *the rule-following problem* holds, including *the halting problem*, yet rational human animals can indeed perform these very functions or operations, hence digital computing systems and digital technology cannot be intelligent in the sense in which we're intelligent (Hanna, 2025:section 2.6).

Sixth, according to *the incompleteness argument*, as a specific case of the uncomputable functions argument, no digital computing system or digital technology can carry out functions or operations in the logico-mathematical sense beyond the formal limitations determined by Kurt Gödel's two incompleteness theorems, yet rational human animals can indeed perform these very functions or operations beyond the limits of incompleteness, hence digital computing systems and digital technology cannot be intelligent in the sense in which we're intelligent (Gödel 1931/1967; Keller 2023; Landgrebe and Smith 2025).

Seventh, according to *the babbage's principle argument*, which is a maximally wide-scope generalization of the classical *garbage-in, garbage-out principle*, aka GIGO, no digital computing system or digital technology can perform categorical improvements or upgrades of the intrinsic specific character or quality of the informational inputs, premises, or materials with which they're supplied—for example, from meaninglessness to meaningfulness, or from falsity to truth—yet rational human animals can *creatively transform* these informational inputs, premises, or other materials into categorically improved or upgraded informational outputs, conclusions, or other products, in ten different ways, hence digital computing systems and digital technology cannot be intelligent in the sense in which we're intelligent, especially as regards our authentic human creativity (Hanna, 2025:sections 2.7-2.8; see also Chomsky, Roberts, and Watamull 2023).

Eighth, and finally, according to *the "it's a human thing, you wouldn't understand" argument*, our essentially embodied innate mental capacity for *affective intelligence* necessarily transcends the mechanical powers of any and all actual or really possible digital

computing systems or digital technology more generally, even when we also fully allow for our finitude, fallibility, and thoroughgoing normative imperfection (Hanna, 2023a).

So, to summarize, there are at least ten old-school or new-school arguments against strong AI: 1. the chinese room argument, 2. the heideggerian argument, 3. the inadequacy of the turing test argument, 4. the organicity argument, 5. the readability argument, 6. the it's-all-done-with-mirrors argument, 7. the uncomputable functions argument, 8. the incompleteness argument, 9. the babbage's principle argument, and 10. the "it's a human thing, you wouldn't understand" argument. Moreover, at least eight of these—i.e., arguments 3. through 10. —are *not* subject to the problems faced by the old-school chinese room argument and heideggerian argument, hence we can confidently conclude that strong AI is false.

2. Why Does the Myth of AI Persist?

I'm now in a position to re-raise the first of the two questions I posed at the outset of this essay: given the eight new-school and neo-organicist arguments against strong AI that I just rehearsed—which, when considered as a single collective package, surely has *knockdown* persuasive rational force—and in view of the further fact that the myth of AI has the pernicious consequences I also mentioned at the outset, then *why* does it persist?

I think that the persistence of the myth of AI can be explained by a combination of six essentially *ideological* causal factors: (i) a dogmatic or at least irresponsibly uncritical commitment to the false doctrine of Cartesian dualism, whether substance dualism or property dualism (Hanna and Maiese, 2009), (ii) a dogmatic or at least irresponsibly uncritical commitment to the fantasy of post-humanist or trans-humanist spiritualism (Hanna, 2025), (iii) a dogmatic or at least irresponsibly uncritical commitment to the false doctrine of intellectualism about the nature of rational human animals and rational human cognition (Hanna, 2015), (iv) a dogmatic or at least irresponsibly uncritical commitment to false (reductive or non-reductive) materialist/physicalist views about the rational human mind, especially including computational functionalism (Hanna and Maiese, 2009), (v) more generally, a dogmatic or at least irresponsibly uncritical commitment to the false *mechanistic worldview* (Hanna and Paans, 2020), and finally (vi) the hegemony of what I call *the military-industrial-digital complex*[1] (see, e.g., Harper's 2024), which amasses and

[1] This riffs on a famous phrase in US President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Farewell Address" in 1961:
[The] conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together. (See, e.g., Wikipedia 2025, underlining added)

reaps immense wealth and political power precisely by means of effectively and relentlessly disseminating and perpetuating the myth of AI, while at the same time hypocritically issuing public warnings about the dangers of runaway AI (see, e.g., Lovely, 2024, 67-68).

The first five factors are classically philosophical factors, so they're at least in principle open to critical rational argumentation, refutation, and correction. But the same isn't the case with respect to the sixth factor, which is essentially social-institutional and political in nature. Sadly, however, I think it's more than merely reasonable to hold that the hegemony of the military-industrial-digital complex is the *principal* cause of the persistence of the myth of AI, as Garrison Lovely cogently and crisply puts it:

> The debate playing out in the public square may lead you to believe that we have to choose between addressing AI's immediate harms and its inherently speculative existential risks. And there are certainly trade-offs that require careful consideration. But when you look at the material forces at play, a different picture emerges: in one corner are trillion-dollar companies trying to make AI models more powerful and profitable; in another, you find civil society groups trying to make AI reflect values that routinely clash with profit maximization. In short, it's capitalism versus humanity (Lovely, 2024, 79).

Nevertheless, radical social-institutional and political change for the better, or even the best, is in fact really possible, by means of what Michelle Maiese and I have called *the mind-body politic* and *the enactive-transformative principle* (Maiese and Hanna, 2019). So to end this section on an upbeat note, there's at least *some* rational hope for debunking the myth of AI, by devolving and enactively transforming the military-industrial-digital complex.

3. What Philosophy Can Do About the Myth of AI: Dignitarian Neo-Luddism With Respect to Digital Technology

Now, to address the second question I raised at the outset of this essay, what is to be done?

I strongly believe that *we ought to ban all giant AI experiments and LLM/chatbot technology while they are still in their infancy*, just as *we ought to have banned all atomic bomb experiments and nuclear weapons technology while they were still in their infancy.* My strong belief, in turn, is a direct expression and logical implication of the philosophical doctrine I call *dignitarian neo-luddism with respect to digital technology*, which I'll now explain and justify.

For clarity's sake, I'll start with some definitions. According to *The Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary*, the term "Luddite" means this:

> 1. *hist.* a member of the bands of English craftsmen who, when their jobs were threatened by the progressive introduction of machinery into their trades in the early 19th c. attempted to reverse the trend towards mechanization by wrecking the offending machines…. 2. a person opposed to increased industrialization or new technology …. [perh. f. Ned

> *Lud[d]*, an insane person said to have destroyed two stocking-frames *c.* 1799] (Hawkins and Allen, 1991, 856)

Generalizing from that, and also precisifying a little, I'll say that classical or modern *Luddism* says that all mechanical technology is bad and wrong, because it harms and oppresses ordinary people (i.e., people other than technocrats), and therefore all mechanical technology should be rejected and destroyed, and this may also include using violence or other terrorist tactics against technocrats.

For example, Ted Kaczynski, aka The Unabomber, was a modern Luddite and indeed also a terrorist modern Luddite.

By an important contrast, however, as I'm understanding it, modern *neo-Luddism* see, for example, says that

> not all mechanical technology is bad and wrong, but instead all and only the mechanical technology that harms and oppresses ordinary people (i.e., people other than technocrats) is bad and wrong, and therefore all and only this bad and wrong mechanical technology should be rejected but not—except in extreme cases of mechanical technology whose coercive use is actually violently harming and oppressing ordinary people, for example, weapons being used for mass destruction or mass murder—destroyed, rather only either simply refused, non-violently dismantled, or radically transformed into its moral opposite (Glendinning, 1990).

Now, by *digital technology* I mean all mechanical technology that inherently involves computers, algorithms, digital data or information, so-called artificial intelligence/AI, or robotics. Then, *neo-Luddism with respect to digital technology* says that not all digital technology is bad and wrong, but instead all and only the digital technology that harms and oppresses ordinary people (i.e., people other than digital technocrats) is bad and wrong, and therefore all and only this bad and wrong digital technology should be rejected but not—except in extreme cases of digital technology whose coercive use is actually violently harming and oppressing ordinary people, for example, digitally-driven weapons or weapons-systems being used for mass destruction or mass murder—destroyed, rather only either simply refused, non-violently dismantled, or radically transformed into its moral opposite.

Finally, *dignitarian neo-Luddism with respect to digital technology* says that not all digital technology is bad and wrong, but instead all and only the digital technology that harms and oppresses ordinary people (i.e., people other than digital technocrats), by either failing to respect our human dignity sufficiently or by outright violating our human dignity, is bad and wrong, and therefore all and only this bad and wrong digital technology should be rejected but not—except in extreme cases of digital technology whose coercive use is actually violently harming and oppressing ordinary people, for example, digitally-driven weapons or weapons-systems being used for mass destruction or mass murder—destroyed,

rather only either simply refused, non-violently dismantled, or radically transformed into its moral opposite.

It needs to emphasized and re-emphasized that just as I'm *pro-science* while also being *scientistic*, so too dignitarian neo-Luddism with respect to digital technology is *also* committed to the *positive* dignitarian moral doctrine that *some* digital technology is permissible and good, and therefore *ought to be used*, precisely because it's morally unobjectionable and promotes the betterment of humankind, and more generally sufficiently respects human dignity. For example, in my opinion this is true of writing books about dignitarian digital/AI ethics on personal computers, and then publishing and disseminating them in digital format as well as hard-copy format (Hanna, 2025, chs. 3-5). Why else would I be doing it here? But in the context of this essay, I'm focusing primarily on the negative dignitarian moral doctrine.

So much for the definitions, and now for some moral imperatives. What I strongly believe is that *we all ought to be dignitarian neo-Luddites with respect to digital technology*. Why? To be sure, there are many ways in which digital technology can be bad and wrong in the dignitarian sense, including invasive digital surveillance, digitally-driven weapons and weapon systems, algorithmic bias, and digital manipulation and nudging. And of course, there are also ways in which digital technology can be bad and wrong in the utilitarian sense, for example, putting many people out of work. But the principal reason for being a dignitarian neo-Luddite with respect to digital technology is that *our excessive use of and indeed addiction to digital technology is systematically undermining our innate capacities for thinking, caring, and acting for ourselves*. This is *preeminently* true with respect to the new chatbots—for example, ChatGPT and LaMDA—and what, in sections 1 to 3 above, I've called *the myth of AI* more generally, but also *to an increasingly important degree* true for our excessive use of and addiction to smart-phones, desktop and laptop computers, the internet, social media, and so-on and so-forth. When you combine our excessive use of and addiction to chatbots and AI with our excessive use of and addiction to smart-phones, desktop and laptop computers, the internet, social media, etc., the result is nothing less than *an all-out existential attack on our rational human mindedness or intelligence.*

By "our rational human mindedness or intelligence" I mean the essentially embodied, unified set of basic innate cognitive, affective, and practical capacities present in all and only those human animals possessing the essentially embodied neurobiological basis of those capacities, namely: (i) *consciousness*, i.e., subjective experience, (ii) *self-consciousness*, i.e., consciousness of one's own consciousness, second-order consciousness, (iii) *caring*, i.e., desiring, emoting, or feeling, (iv) *sensible cognition*, i.e., sense-perception, memory, or imagination, (v) *intellectual cognition*, i.e., conceptualizing, believing, judging, or inferring, (vi) *volition*, i.e., deciding, choosing, or willing, and (vii) *free agency*, i.e., free will and practical agency. This unified set of capacities constitutes our *human real personhood*, which in turn is *the metaphysical ground of our human dignity* (Hanna 2023b, 2023c). Therefore, this all-out existential attack on our rational human mindedness or intelligence is also an all-out existential attack on our human dignity.

The Cassandra-like prophecy and warning that I'm issuing, however, is *not* that chatbots or AI more generally could ever become rational, super-intelligent, and morally satanic, and then run amok. In fact, it's *metaphysically impossible* for computing machines ever to be rationally minded or intelligent in the sense that *we're* rationally minded or intelligent, because (i) it's *metaphysically necessary* that all creatures possessing the seven basic innate capacities I listed above are complex living organisms, i.e., *animals* (Hanna and Maiese, 2009; Hanna, 2011), hence not *machines*, hence not *computing machines*, and (ii) it's also *metaphysically necessary* that our rational mindedness or intelligence includes (iia) an innate non-basic ("non-basic," in the sense that it essentially depends on the seven basic innate capacities listed in the just-previous paragraph) capacity for *spontaneous creativity*, and also (iib) an innate non-basic capacity for either conceptual or essentially non-conceptual *a priori intuition* of (iib1) innately-specified universal, unconditional, a priori or non-empirical moral principles such as *everyone ought always to choose and act with sufficient respect for everyone's dignity, including their own*, (iib2) universal, unconditional, a priori or non-empirical logical principles such as the minimal principle of non-contradiction, namely, *not every statement is both true and false*, and (iib3) the universal a priori or non-empirical formal structures of the orientable, three-dimensional space and the forward-directed, processual, purposive, asymmetric organic time in which our minded animal bodies are ineluctably embedded (Hanna 2006, 2015, 2018), *none of which can ever exist in digital computing machinery*. And, closely related to these metaphysically necessary modal facts, there are also various other linguistic, logical, mathematical, and metaphysical reasons why computing machinery can never be rationally minded or intelligent in the sense that *we're* rationally minded or intelligent, as per the ten arguments I presented in section 2 above (see also Chomsky, Roberts, and Watamull 2023; Keller, 2023; Hanna 2025; Landgrebe and Smith 2025).

On the contrary, the Cassandra-like prophecy and warning that I'm issuing about this all-out existential attack on our rational human mindedness or intelligence is instead directed at *the global technocratic capitalist corporations—especially those that supply weapons and surveillance systems for military and government use—millionaires, and billionaires* who reap immense profits and wield immense political power by designing, producing, marketing, and above all *controlling* our use of and reliance on digital technology: namely, the members of the military-industrial-digital complex. Correspondingly, my Cassandra-like prophecy and warning is simply this:

> the members of the military-industrial-digital complex are systematically harming and oppressing ordinary people like us by not only enabling but also effectively mandating our excessive use of and addiction to digital technology, which in turn systematically undermines our innate capacities for thinking, caring, and acting for ourselves, and therefore undermines our human real personhood, and thereby violates our human dignity—therefore, we ought to ban all giant AI experiments and LLM/chatbot technology while

they are still in their infancy, just as we ought to have banned all atomic bomb experiments and nuclear weapons technology while they were still in their infancy.

Conclusion

Perhaps dignitarian neo-Luddism with respect to digital technology will become a worldwide, world-changing social and political movement, comparable to the Ban-the-Bomb, anti-nuclear weapons movement: I wholeheartedly hope so. Indeed, there are already some positive indications (Guardian 2024; Lovely 2024). If we ban all further giant AI experiments and LLM/chatbot technology right now, when it's already obvious what their existential threat to humankind is, then the world will be a substantially better place, just as the world would have been a substantially better place if we had banned the A-bomb and nuclear weapons technology immediately after its initial test on 16 July 1945, when it was already obvious what their existential threat to humankind would be. Therefore, philosophy's role in the future can be to lead the way forward for humankind, by vigorously defending and publicizing dignitarian neo-Luddism with respect to digital technology.

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