Robert Hanna

In this essay, I argue (i) for the thesis I call dignitarian neo-luddism with respect to digital technology, which says not all digital technology is bad and wrong, but instead all and only the digital technology that harms and oppresses ordinary people (i.e., people other than digital technocrats), by either failing to respect our human dignity sufficiently or by outright violating our human dignity, is bad and wrong, and therefore all and only this bad and wrong digital technology should be rejected but not—except in extreme cases of digital technology whose coercive use is actually violently harming and oppressing ordinary people, for example, digitally-driven weapons or weapons-systems being used for mass destruction or mass murder—destroyed, rather only either simply refused, non-violently dismantled, or radically transformed into its moral opposite, also (ii) that the members of what I call “the military-industrial-digital complex” are systematically harming and oppressing ordinary people like us by not only enabling but also effectively mandating our excessive use of and addiction to digital technology, which in turn systematically undermines our innate capacities for thinking, caring, and acting for ourselves, and therefore undermines our human real personhood, and thereby violates our human dignity—therefore, we ought to ban all giant AI experiments and LLM/chatbot technology while they are still in their infancy, just as we ought to have banned all atomic bomb experiments and nuclear weapons technology while they were still in their infancy.

This essay is a critical study of Rutger Bregman’s 2020 book, Humankind: A Hopeful History, from a broadly Kantian point of view. I present and defend the main points and arguments of the book, and on that basis, articulate a doctrine in social and political philosophy, which I call realistic-optimist dignitarian humanism, aka RODH, that I think captures the essence of what Bregman is driving at. Among its various theoretical and practical virtues, RODH gets constructively and creatively between Hobbes’s excessive pessimism about human nature on the one hand, and Rousseau’s unrealistic optimism about human nature on the other.

What is the ultimate end of higher education? Giambattista Vico, echoing Socrates’s Delphic oracle, claimed that the ultimate end of all education is self-knowledge. I fully agree with Vico’s claim, but also radically extend his idea about education, in accordance with contemporary and futuristic Kantianism, and then apply it specifically to contemporary and near-future higher education. In 1784, Kant published an essay called “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” in which he argued that the fundamental thesis of “enlightenment” or Aufklärung is that all rational human animals are strictly obligated to think for themselves and to act freely, with resolution and courage, in accordance with sufficient respect for their own and everyone else’s human dignity. Taking together Vico’s Socratic idea about self-knowledge, with Kant’s idea about enlightenment, and then creatively revising-&-updating them both to fit the contemporary 21st century existential, moral, and sociopolitical predicament of humankind, then in my view, the ultimate end of higher education is not only (i) self-knowledge, but also (ii) rational autonomy in thinking, caring, and acting, (iii) authentic human creativity, and (iv) sufficient respect for everyone’s human dignity. In turn, the four-part conjunction of these ultimate ends is what I call radical enlightenment. Therefore, I’m saying that the ultimate end of higher education is radical enlightenment.

The future of philosophy and the future of humankind-in-the-world are intimately related, not only (i) in the obvious sense that all philosophers are “human, all-too-human” animals—i.e., members of the biological species Homo sapiens, and also finite, fallible, and thoroughly normative imperfect in every other way too—hence the natural fate of all human animals is also the natural fate of all philosophers, but also (ii) in the more profound and subtle sense of what I’ll call philosophical futurism. Philosophical futurism is a critical, synoptic, and speculative reflection on the fate of humankind-in-the-world, with special attention paid not only to what humankind-in-the-world (including philosophy itself) will most likely be, if things continue to go along in more or less the same way as they have been and are now going, or could conceivably be, as in science fiction or other forms of imaginative projection, but also to what what humankind-in-the-world (including philosophy itself) ought to be, and therefore (assuming that “ought” entails “can”) can be, as the direct result of our individual and collective free agency, for the purpose of rationally guiding humankind in the near future. In my essay, I very briefly present, defend, and strongly recommend a version of philosophical futurism that I call Kantian futurism.

In another essay, I’ve argued by means of a formal analogy between (i) the incompleteness of Principia Mathematica-style systems of mathematical logic (logico-mathematical incompleteness) and (ii) the incompleteness of the Standard Models in contemporary physics (physico-mechanical incompleteness), that (iii) just as the fact of logico-mathematical incompleteness entails the existence of mathematical creativity, so too the fact of physico-mechanical incompleteness entails the existence of natural creativity. Building on that line of thought, in this essay I present a new and empirically-testable strategy for completing quantum mechanics. More precisely, I argue that if we assume that the Standard Models in contemporary physics are incomplete, and if we also assume that all rational human animals are primitive sources of natural creativity via their free agency, then, by means of an appeal to Bohmian mechanics, together with the thesis that all rational human animals are primitive sources of natural creativity via their free agency, we can complete quantum mechanics.

On the supposition that one’s ethics and politics are fundamentally dignitarian in a broadly Kantian sense—as specifically opposed to identitarian and capitalist versions of Statism, e.g., neoliberal nation-States, whether democratic or non-democratic—hence fundamentally non-coercive and non-violent, then is self-defense or the defense of innocent others, using force, ever rationally justifiable and morally permissible or obligatory? We think that the answer to this hard question is yes; correspondingly, in this essay we develop and defend a theory about the permissible use of force in a broadly Kantian dignitarian moral and political setting, including its extension to non-violent civil disobedience in the tradition of Martin Luther King, Jr; and perhaps surprisingly, we also import several key insights from Samurai and Martial Arts ethics into our theory.