درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The foundation and corner stone ef Mulla Sadra's attitude toiuards man depends on his whole philosophical system of Transcendent PhilosopfD, tuhich is plunged deep!J into his metapysical vieiv efman as a microcosm in whom creation returns to its source and multiplidty to its uniry; The prindples of his stttcfy provide, therefore, the last link in the rycle of his cosmology and a kry for the understanding ef the macrocosm in a ivqy that it stands between all things, and all things have appan'tions and signs uitbin it and in a wqy that the elements are best mixed and all the faculties ef the Soul assembled and potentia!!J it can adopt every attribute and quality in existence. It is in the same spirit that Mui/a Sadra tells us that God has placed everything that is in the Universe in man and he is considered to be Divine vicegerent, epiphatry of divine name, and macrocosm that extends its relevanry toiuard its source, the Divine, on the one hand, and toiuard the immeasurable cosmos, on the other. Also he insists thatpotential!J every man is Universal Man but in actuality on!J the prophets and the saints can be called l?J such a title and can be foll02ved as prototypes ef the spiritual life and guides on the path ef realization. This article intend to represent a fe1.v ef Mtt!la Sadra 's teachings on man as one small example with Knmvledge and nnsdo»: as the highest attributes that caused the superiority of him 'to the others. The soul is a part andparcel ofhim that accompanies him from the highest station to the lowest level of being. Nian cannot know all that is in the Universe ry going around and stucfying because life is too short and the world too large; on!J ry stucfying himse!f can he come to the knoivledge of all things which already exist within him. This article also treats various dimensions of the knowledge of the soul and its role in the knowledge of God and the divine act (macrocosm).

Heidegger tried to interpret Kant's "Critique ofpure reason" as the foundation of metaphysics in his "Kant and the Problem of Metapf.?ysics" and to indicate 'the problem of metaphysics' as 'the problem of basic ontology'. But in the preface of the second edition of that book, he asserted, 'on the thinking path of hvenryyearsfro m the first publication, the fatal mistakes andprivations of this stuqy have become so obvious for me that I have given up patching it up ivith complementary notes, an addition, or a postscript. ' It suggests that this book has the same 'mistakes andprivations' as his ''Sein und Zeit", and tue have to pqy attention to the fact that the 'mistakes and privations' are referred in the context of 'the problem of metapf.?ysics'. So I would like to distinguish the three dimensions ofproblems as following: (1) the problem of Kant's thought as the foundation of metaphysics, (2) the problem of metapl?Jsical thinking itse!f, and ( 3) the problem of Heidegger's ivqy of thinking, in which he cn'ticizes metapf.?ysics and Kant's thought. Then I 1vould like to make it clear the meaning of Heidegger's trial to overcome metaphysics and to bring it to fight that of his 'mistakes andprivations' are grounded in his wqy of thinking, which is, contrary to his intention, still in the range of metapbysica! thinking. And from thatpoint of viezv, I would like to reveal the problem of our wqy of thinking in contemporary philosopl?J, iuhicb is ouenuhelmed ry natural sciences.

Aestheticians and moralphilosophers alike are inclined to the view that there is no particular!J beneficial effect on moral life ofa developed aesthetic sensibility. The usual supporting witness is the pitiless Nazi SS officer with a refined tastefor Mozart and torture. But though his testimony can hard!J be gainsaid, there is an unnoticed and unwarranted narro1ving of the scope ofaesthetic sensibiliry implicit in the very production ofsuch a witness. In a word, aesthetic sensibiliry is reduced to a matter of iabat Kant called taste, wbicb, for him, iuas a matter ofjudgments ofthe beautiful, whether in art or nature. What is neglected is the parallel Kantian notion of the sublime. Kant charges those who remain unciffected by the sublime not with a want oftaste but a want of feeling,, and he makes it clear that if we are to be moved by the sublime we must already be furnished with moral ideas. In that case, our question should not be tuhetber there is a beneficial effect on moral life ofa developed aesthetic sensibility, but whether moral life can have an ciffect on aesthetic sensibiliry. But before ne can address such questions we need to examine Kant's conception of sublimiry, which appears to connect it, not just to the moral life andpoetry but also to religion, in such a wqy that we mqy come to the conclusion that the relationship between moral life and aesthetic sensibiliry is reciprocal, in the sense that whereas we mqy need to befurnished with moral ideas to be moved by the sublime, this andpoetry (or the arts more general!Y), turn out to be a means ofextending our conception ofwhat constitutes moral life. I make no attempt in whatfolloivs to offer a systema tic account ofwhat Kant writes about sublimiry, ideas and art in the third Critique, and nor do I attempt to show af!)' general cultural influence on the poet whose work I appeal to from time to time, W:B. Yeats. It is rather that I have been both moved and perplexed l?J Kant's account of aesthetic ideas over a number ofyears1 and though I have written about these issues elsewhere, (McGhee1 2000) further reading shows me the inadequacy of my previous understanding. Over the same number of years, and indeed for much longer, I have also been moved and perplexed ry the greatpoems of Yeats's The Tower and The Winding Stair, and I have sometimes thought that the poet and the philosopher can shed light on the meaning ofeach other's work.