Heidegger

In the classical Greek thought, the notion of “right” was concomitant with the “truth”. In the modern era, however, the notion of “right” became intertwined with the primacy of   “possessive individuality”. This primacy was, however, from the outset intellectually challenged. In the light of challenges posed, and by invoking the commonalities between Shahaboddin Suhrawardi and Martin Heidegger, the right to excellence is envisioned here as a maximal theory of “human rights”.

This research aims to investigate how Heidegger's thoughts are received in Iran and how the Iranian interpretation of Heidegger has influenced contemporary Iranian thinking. The significance of Heidegger’s philosophy for Iranian thinkers can be due to the fact that Heidegger is the most radical critique of the Western civilization, modernity, and modern rationality. On the one hand, Heidegger’s thought can provide Iranians with the theoretical foundations based on which the Eastern traditions can be reinterpreted and reconstructed. On the other hand, Heideggerian view of the history of philosophy can be used by Iranians as a mirror to see themselves and the whole tradition of Eastern thinking. I also try to provide a sketch of the thought of Ahmad Fardid as the first interpreter of Heidegger in Iran and his influence on some other Iranian thinkers. My main claim is that the religious-spiritual interpretation of Heidegger by Fardid is by no means a distortion of Heidegger’s thoughts but a necessary step towards the academically and scientifically true understanding of Heidegger as the greatest critique of the Western thinking. There are various historical, philological, and interpretive clues in Heidegger’s life and works that make the spiritual (but certainly not theological) interpretation of Heidegger possible. In my opinion, contrary to some claims by Iranian scholars and intellectuals, a secular Heidegger is by no means the true Heidegger, because the secular interpretation is in opposition to the main insight of Heideggerian thought that is overcoming nihilism and forgetfulness of being.

It is clear that every interpreter brings with him certain conceptions, in most cases unconsciously. But then question arises, which conceptions are right and adequate? Heidegger’s philosophy is concern with preparing the ground for understanding the meaning of The Being by carrying out a subtle and revolutionary phenomenology of the human mode of existence. Since in the Qur`an, too human existence is the object of attention, it should be possible to show that there is some affinity between the idea of human being made explicit by Heidegger’s phenomenology and the idea of human being that is implicit in the Qur`an. To confirm this, the present paper compares the structure which make possible to be human in Qur`an, and in Heidegger’s existentialism. As a result of this inquiry, there is a certain kinship between the Qur`an, and phenomenological approaches to human being, and that based on these similarities there would be two results. First, phenomenology is applicable in Islamic studies. Second, this method will provide us to learn from the Qur`an, what we need for our present life.

The concept of anxiety occupies a crucial position in early Heidegger’s writings. Most prominently, it appears in Being and Time (1927) and “What is Metaphysics?” (1929) as a structurally central concept. After 1920s, Heidegger began to use the term much less frequently, leading some scholars to suggest a change in Heidegger’s view of the significance of the concept of anxiety. In this essay, we argue that central to the understanding of the role of anxiety in Heidegger’s thought is the fundamental difference between Heideggerian and psychological anxiety. This distinction is crucial as it is directly connected to the idea of the ontological difference, i.e., the difference between the ontical and the ontological, between beings and the Being of beings. Psychological descriptions of anxiety remain at the level of the ontical and, therefore, fall short of comprehending the ontological meaning of Heideggerian anxiety, which is one of Dasein’s basic possibilities of Being. Equipped with such an ontological understanding, we argue that the concept of anxiety remained central to Heidegger’s thought, early and late alike. We also suggest that Heidegger’s less frequent use of the term anxiety after “What Is Metaphysics?” could possibly be associated with his recognition that its terminological similarity with psychological anxiety may become a source of misunderstandings. Moreover, in the last section of the essay which functions as an addendum, we engage with Freud’s analysis of the uncanny and examine its relation to Heidegger’s Being-not-at-home. We argue that although Freud’s analysis of the uncanny does, in a sense, open up horizons beyond the reach of empirical psychology, his quasi-scientific quest for causal explanation ultimately remains within the framework of an ontical analysis.

The dissolution of the Western-dominated Postwar Order, and the Eurocentric myths that sustain it, presents a unique opportunity to ponder an old question posed by every new generation: How can philosophy, which Islamic and ancient Greek learning traditions have long defined as the pursuit of “wisdom,” resume its millennial civilizing role? This paper looks beyond passing political events to reconsider why philosophy was viewed in this role. As different as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Khaldūn, Mullā Ṣadrā, Hegel and Heidegger are from each other, they all approached the question of civilization philosophically by way of the fundamental question of beingness (mawjūdiyya) and existence (wujūd). Moreover, they strove for “completeness” of thinking with the “practical,” where, however, they resisted the temptation to reduce man to his practical or biological functions. Given the magnitude of the present challenges we all face, no dialogue across cultural boundaries can ignore the caution with which philosophical tradition has laid out the terms of this completeness in being.

Sadra and Heidegger share a common fundamental concern, i.e. the retrieve of the question of Being. Their whole philosophical career in one sense has been devoted to the accomplishment of this single task. They belong to different philosophical traditions and have lived in different worlds and have had different spiritual and intellectual ideals. However, their ontological concern have numerous points of similarity and can be comparatively assayed. The mystical dimension of the philosophical discourses of these two philosophers of the Truth of Being is one of the significant comparative issues that can be studied in view of a certain set of mystical concepts. One of the key mystical concepts is Yaqzah or mystical awakening that refers to the existential awareness that occurs in the mystic following a Divine enlightenment. The current essay seeks to comparatively study the mystical relevance of the notion of Being-Mindfulness of Sadra and Heidegger in view of the mystical concept of Yaqzah. It has been shown that despite undeniable differences we can discern significant similarities in both notions and take a constructive step for more integrative understanding of human condition as a whole.

Based on Aristotelianism, philosophies in Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and traditional phenomenology, Martin Heidegger and late Max Scheler, shared a conceptual understanding of the soul. The plant’s soul – a worldly stage of the individualization of universal creativity - unfolds via the animal towards the human and beyond. The Phenomenology of Life philosophy (Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka) enmeshed the ontopoiesis of the vegetative beingness into the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive, thereby overcoming the discommunicative hierarchization of the soul. An eco-cosmological following of „the plant’s“ ontopoiesis will have to base its understanding not only on the communicative creativity of „the plant“ but on its inseparable interwovenness into the web of life, thereby also taking into consideration newest botanical studies which brought to light insights into so far unknown „intelligence“ of plants.

Heidegger tried to interpret Kant's "Critique ofpure reason" as the foundation of metaphysics in his "Kant and the Problem of Metapf.?ysics" and to indicate 'the problem of metaphysics' as 'the problem of basic ontology'. But in the preface of the second edition of that book, he asserted, 'on the thinking path of hvenryyearsfro m the first publication, the fatal mistakes andprivations of this stuqy have become so obvious for me that I have given up patching it up ivith complementary notes, an addition, or a postscript. ' It suggests that this book has the same 'mistakes andprivations' as his ''Sein und Zeit", and tue have to pqy attention to the fact that the 'mistakes and privations' are referred in the context of 'the problem of metapf.?ysics'. So I would like to distinguish the three dimensions ofproblems as following: (1) the problem of Kant's thought as the foundation of metaphysics, (2) the problem of metapl?Jsical thinking itse!f, and ( 3) the problem of Heidegger's ivqy of thinking, in which he cn'ticizes metapf.?ysics and Kant's thought. Then I 1vould like to make it clear the meaning of Heidegger's trial to overcome metaphysics and to bring it to fight that of his 'mistakes andprivations' are grounded in his wqy of thinking, which is, contrary to his intention, still in the range of metapbysica! thinking. And from thatpoint of viezv, I would like to reveal the problem of our wqy of thinking in contemporary philosopl?J, iuhicb is ouenuhelmed ry natural sciences.

Parmenides' Poem, though expressed in an allegorical manner to the extent that it has been preserved and handed down to us, without at!} doubt, shows his in-depth and profound insight into the question of Being. After a concise representation of his thought, the main purpose has been to show that, with regards to 'The Wcry of Truth" and Parmenides disregard for the realm of sense perception, tno different approaches mcry be accounted for. One mcry be that of an ana/ytz'cal/y• oriented mind to read through and understand Parmenides perplexing scryings, and the other mcry pertain to someone ivho tries to see through and contemplate upon the existing Fragments in pursue of a much deeper meaning, not necessarily that of a discursive mind.

Philosopl:y in its broad sense constitutes the origin and foundation of almost each and every discipline ive observe in today's world. Despite the focal influence philosophical unde1pinnings have on an ensemble of ideological and epistemological issues in our life, this branch of human knowledge is not welcomed the 1vqy it deserves f?y the administrators of a number of disciplines. One such field o.f stucfy is the area of language teaching in ivhich philosophical concerns are left near/y intact. The present article is aimed at recapitulating the mqjor impact a partial acquaintance nitb philosopl!J can have on our general conceptualizations particular/y as it concerns Language and pedagogy. In so doing, a brief introduction is made, at the outset, to the tuo principal divisions of philosopl:y, i.e. ana/ytical and continental philosopl?J. The concept of bermeneutical thought is then presented as an issue relevant to the school of continentalphilosopl?J, and the vieivpoints of several celebrated progenitors and pioneers of this sub-branch of philosopl:y, i.e. hermeneutics are dimmed. An attempt is made, aftenaards, to introduce some traces of hermeneutics in linguistics and some of its main sub-branches inclttding pragmatics, critical discourse analysis andp.rychological studies.  In the encl  a brief account is given  of some practical  advantages  of a .familiarity  with  these philosophical concepts in pedagogical terms

Neuroscience and its attendant subdisciplines, including, so it supposes, philosophy, hold that there is nothing more to self and society than what is in the brain. Yet two centuries have not resolved the philosophical objections to such claims, much less resolved the binding problem that would link mind and brain, or arrive at a general, materialist explanation of consciousness. Just as ideological and economic blinders beset this discipline, so they limit philosophy to account for the nature of this ‘thinking organ’ – what that means and if it can even exist. Taking the work of Hegel, Heidegger, Deleuze, neuroscientific results, I consider the phenomenology of the organ. I argue that an understanding of this object requires distinguishing concepts such as function and activity, capacity and regulation, surface and recognition. Results show that the ability to arrive at a thinking organ as organ is uncertain but worth the pursuit for the services done to science and ethics.

The purpose of the present study is to explore the two concepts of time and space in postmodern lyric poetry of the two poets of the 1950s through the lens of the Heideggerian existential theory of time and space, which regards time as a horizon for understanding Being and distinguishes three different types of space: (1) world-space, (2) regions , and (3) Dasein's spatiality. To fulfill this objective, some selected poems of the two poets, including Allen Ginsberg and Ted Hughes, were analyzed temporally and spatially. The findings suggested that the two poets tend to treat time and space existentially and reject eternality. It was revealed that they are existential poets whose existence is manifested in their quest for identity within the immediate world or the global world as well as their concerns for their homeland and ideals. In their poems, time and space are intermingled with Being and reflect each individual’s relationship with the world. The result of the analysis of poems showed that their poetry is not just the language of imagination and perception, but also the language of existence. The world is regarded as an existential space-time continuum and being-in-the-world is the fundamental ontological situation for Dasein. Accordingly, the world, like poetry, is a disclosure of things in nearness or distance, which matters to human beings

The present study aimed to compare Heidegger’s and Āl-e-Ahmad’s views on technology; first, the close relationship between subjectivism and modern technology was analyzed based on Heidegger, and subsequently, it was pointed out that Heidegger’s approach towards technology is a critical confrontation based on engagement/disengagement dialectics. Then Jalal Āl-e-Ahmad’s view on technology was analyzed, emphasizing that, unlike Heidegger, with a philosophical, ontological, and anticipatory approach to modern technology, Āl-e-Ahmad took a selective and voluntarist approach towards modern technology by adopting a political and social stance. Āl-e-Ahmad, like Promethean and leading intellectuals and reformers, believed that a Westoxificated society is a society that has not yet achieved technology and is technologically dependent on the West. Therefore, to deal with Westoxification, it should become a technological power by adopting a will-based approach-- a machine must be built and owned; however, at the same time, one should not be got caught by the machine because it is a means and not a goal. Unlike Āl-e-Ahmad, Heidegger considered technology not a mere tool but a kind of ontology and way of thinking that affects all humans’ areas and affairs, so it is not easy to escape modern technology’s grip.