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Kant
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی پاییز ۱۳۹۷ شماره ۲۴
55 - 82
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Carlo Cellucci has rightly pointed out that contemporary professional academic philosophy has a serious problem of irrelevance. Performance philosophy and public philosophy are two recent attempts to solve that problem and radically transform professional academic philosophy into what I call real philosophy. Nevertheless, performance philosophy and public philosophy have some prima facie problems. My goal in this essay is to make some headway towards solving these two prima facie problems, first, by briefly describing ways of conceptually clarifying and purposively unifying performance philosophy and public philosophy individually; second, by briefly presenting a mediating theoretical and practical framework that could solve the incoherence problem and the two solitudes problem, and also directly and reciprocally connect performance philosophy and public philosophy: a framework I call borderless philosophy; and third and finally, against the backdrop of that mediating framework, in response to a possible objection to my argument, by briefly proposing a way in which performance philosophy, via borderless philosophy, could significantly enrich public philosophy. The upshot is that borderless philosophy, together with performance philosophy and public philosophy, collectively yield a fully adequate solution to the problem of irrelevance.
Can Religion be the Basis for Dialogue at the Global Level?(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
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As human beings do we at all have a common ground for dialogue and mutual understanding? Yes: what we as human beings have in common, is that we can use and understand arguments. In other words: that we are rational beings. 2. Is our capability for argumentation the only ground we have in common as the basis for dialogue and mutual understanding? There is no argumentation against argumentation. Argumentation can´t be transcended. Thus argumentation, more precisely: the capability of argumentation – i.e. reason - is the only ground we have in common as human beings. 3. Does religion play a role in this respect? Isn´t religion superfluous for a rational human being? No, not in the sense Kant has ascribed to it. To know about the boundaries of knowledge (of reason) and to humbly marvel about the miraculous existence of world, life and reason can rightly be seen as the form of religion - as the form of attitude towards the "beyond" - which is adequate (and unavoidable) for a rational being. Religion is the source of truth and ethics if it means: humble acknowledgment of the un-knowable and hence of the fact that in our search for orientation we are relegated to ourselves as fellow human beings, as brothers and sisters.
The Origin of the Good and Our Animal Nature
منبع:
تأملات اخلاقی دوره اول تابستان ۱۳۹۹ شماره ۲
7 - 29
حوزه های تخصصی:
We use the term “good” in two contexts: as the most general term of evaluation, and to refer to the final ends of life and action. I start from the question what evaluative and final goodness have to do with each other. Do we use the same term because when we talk about final goods, we are evaluating ends and lives? If so, how do we go about doing that? Most things are evaluated with respect to their fitness to perform their function, but ends and lives do not have functions. I contrast three theories of the final good: the intrinsic value theory, the hedonist theory, and Aristotle’s account, which identifies a being’s final good with its well-functioning, a form of evaluative goodness. Aristotle’s theory suggests an illuminating relationship between evaluative and final goodness: a conscious being has a final good when she functions by having conscious states that track, and so enable her to pursue, her functional or evaluative goodness. It is therefore the nature of an animal to have a final good, and there are such things as final goods because there are animals. This theory explains the existence of final goods without any metaphysical appeal to intrinsic values.
Kant's Influence on Brouwer
منبع:
فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه ۱۳۸۴ شماره ۱
6 - 15
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There are at least three elemental parts in Brouuer's philosophy ef mathematics that mqy have their origin in Kant. These three parts are (1) the intuition ef time, (2) the synthetic a priority of mathematical kn01vledge, and (3) the inter-suf?jectiviry ef mathematical constructions. Brouwer borrowed the notion ef the movement eftime as an a priori intuition ef time, explicit!J expressed, from Kant. In Brouuer's philosophy ef mathematics, the intuition ef time is the on/y a priori notion, on wbicb the whole ef mathematics is built. Houeuer, their notions o] the "intuition eftime" are not the same in the genealogy ef mind As far as the second item is concerned, Brouwer believes that all ef mathematical kn01vledge is a priori and synthetic. His arguments are differentfrom Kant's arguments. The concept of ''inter-suf?jectiviry" ef mathematics in Brotouer's philosophy is very involved, and there is no reference to Kant in this respect. One mqy interpret it f?y the Kantian transcendental subject or even the Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. Both interpretations seem to be consistent. My suggestion is to read Brauner ry himse!f.
Kant's Perpetual Peace and World Government
منبع:
فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه ۱۳۸۴ شماره ۱
15 - 28
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I can predict from the aspects and signs of our times that the human race 1vill... progressivefy improve without af!)l more total reversals.... The profit which will accrue to the human race as it works its wqy fonvard will not be an ever increasing quantity ofmorality in its attitudes. Instead the legality of its attitudes willproduce an increasing number of actions governed 0 duty, tuha tever the particular motives behind these mqy be.... Violence will gradualfy become less on the part of those in pouer and obedience tou/ards the la1vs 1vill increase... and this 1vi!I ultimatefy extend to the external relations between the various peoples, until a cosmopolitan society is created. Such developments do not mean , however, that the basic moral capacity ofmankind will increase in the slightest, for this would require a kind ofnew creation or supernatural influence. For we must not expect too much of human beings in their progressive improvements. " (Reiss, 19 70, 18 7)
Overcoming of Metaphysics: Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant's Thought and the Problem of Metaphysics
منبع:
فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه ۱۳۸۴ شماره ۱
52 - 62
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Heidegger tried to interpret Kant's "Critique ofpure reason" as the foundation of metaphysics in his "Kant and the Problem of Metapf.?ysics" and to indicate 'the problem of metaphysics' as 'the problem of basic ontology'. But in the preface of the second edition of that book, he asserted, 'on the thinking path of hvenryyearsfro m the first publication, the fatal mistakes andprivations of this stuqy have become so obvious for me that I have given up patching it up ivith complementary notes, an addition, or a postscript. ' It suggests that this book has the same 'mistakes andprivations' as his ''Sein und Zeit", and tue have to pqy attention to the fact that the 'mistakes and privations' are referred in the context of 'the problem of metapf.?ysics'. So I would like to distinguish the three dimensions ofproblems as following: (1) the problem of Kant's thought as the foundation of metaphysics, (2) the problem of metapl?Jsical thinking itse!f, and ( 3) the problem of Heidegger's ivqy of thinking, in which he cn'ticizes metapf.?ysics and Kant's thought. Then I 1vould like to make it clear the meaning of Heidegger's trial to overcome metaphysics and to bring it to fight that of his 'mistakes andprivations' are grounded in his wqy of thinking, which is, contrary to his intention, still in the range of metapbysica! thinking. And from thatpoint of viezv, I would like to reveal the problem of our wqy of thinking in contemporary philosopl?J, iuhicb is ouenuhelmed ry natural sciences.
Kant on the "A priori" Toward an Interpretation
منبع:
فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه ۱۳۸۴ شماره ۱
63 - 80
حوزه های تخصصی:
The a priori is the basic characteristic ofKant's theory of knowledge. Formaliz/ng the a priori, Kant appears to distinguish the a priorifrom the postriori and qffirms its purity. He insists that the a priori is prior to the a postriori and stqys independent!Jfrom it. The overall objectiue of this paper is, boueier; to present and to support this idea that the a priori, even prior, can be defined l?J its relation to experience; ifthe a priori is prior to the a postriori, and ifits validity is not depended on the a postriori, it is still not ivithout mry relation with it. The main thesis I u;iflfoll01v here is that the a postriori could be called the root of the a priori: the a priori has its principle in the a postriorijust because it is given to it. The a priori is given in the experience. Instead of conceiving the a priori as a formal or logical cond Ition of ol?Jectiviry, it uould be considered as immanent in the objea and apprehended during the very act of experience, although known implicit!J before experience occurs. If the a priori is indeed given in experience, we are not constrained to restrict it to the formal conditions of oijectiviry. However, before proceeding to substantiate this thesis, I 1vill reiien. Kant's analysis of the a priori quick/y. Then, I willpresent the main thesis and its proof to deformalize the a priori and implant it in the a postriori domain.
Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment
منبع:
فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه ۱۳۸۴ شماره ۲
18 - 30
حوزه های تخصصی:
The paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself the moral law (Korsgaard). According to this view, the logical inescapability of choosing alivqys already places us within the normative realm. I argue that there is a further function suppressed by this view, which can be termed as approval. This takes us to the further acknowledgement that the core of Kant's practical rationality, that is, the moral question itself, is not simply one of moral knowledge [Wissen], but a broader one of cognition in general [Erkenntnis].
Kant: Friend or Foe of the Believer? Plantinga and Other American Christian Responses to Kant's Epistemology
منبع:
فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه ۱۳۸۴ شماره ۲
49 - 65
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Plantinga, Wolterstorff and Westphal are three eminent Christian Philosophers in the United States today. This paper will examine Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and Westphal's response to Kant's anti-realist epistemology. While perhaps many Christian philosophers doing philosophy of religion in the United States follow the common-sense realism of Thomas Reid, some philosophers, like Merold Westphal, support a Christian-Kantian-Creative-Anti-Realism. I will criticize Plantinga's and Wolterstorff's position, and support Westphal's, arguing that Kant's epistemology does not harm religious belief but in fact supports it
Free Will as a Fundamental Basis of Moral Action According to Mulla Sadra and Kant(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
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Introduction: In this comparative research, while discussing free will as the basis of moral action, Mulla Sadra's and Kant's views were examined. In examining Mulla Sadra's views, his fundamental approach in relation to free will and the fruit of practical reason, i.e. the attainment of transcendental agency, has been considered as the main paradigm. Material and Methods: The research method is logical analysis on the use of library texts. Conclusion: From the comparison of these two theories, it can be concluded that Kant's theory has led to humanist ethics due to benefiting from the essence of human knowledge and using elements such as independence of will. Because according to Kant, man has a true identity and is free from all external and transcendental factors. According to him, independence of will is the highest principle of morality. Mulla Sadra's theory is an epistemological-divine theory and his epistemological basis is also rooted in the beyond. From his point of view, although man is a creator, but he is really the same as belonging, needing, and connecting with the origin of existence, that is, God, and Mullah Sadra's upward course is based on the movement of his essence, the originality of his existence, its skepticism, and the connection of man with the holy intellect and the active intellect, and finally it shows communication with God; that man has no independence from himself and his whole existence is mortal in the existence of the Almighty. Kant considered will and free will as the most fundamental bases, while Mulla Sadra considered theoretical reason to be the basis of human knowledge
Representation of Duty as an Object of Manipulation in The Bone Clocks and The Buried Giant(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
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Deontological ethics emphasizes the connection between duty and the morality of human conduct; nevertheless, Mitchell and Ishiguro touch on a different form of duty, which disagrees with the deontological theory and demonstrates that it is in one’s interest. Mitchell in The Bone Clocks suggests that one’s only duty in life is “to survive,” regardless of what may happen to others, but Ishiguro contends in The Buried Giant that failing to fulfill a duty that creates a hardship for others will result in downfall. Despite the differences, they both agree that performing one’s duty is affected by manipulation and deceit. The present article peruses the concept of duty in David Mitchell’s The Bone Clocks and Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Buried Giant and Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice provides the framework of the study. Bourdieu believes that accomplishing duty seeks a social strategy to maximize one’s profit; therefore, it can easily become manipulative. The research eventually concludes that fulfilling duty in these novels is an object of manipulation which is esteemed in self-centeredness. Moreover, it delves into the definition of habitus to elucidate that it is facing a transition that is entangled with manipulation.
War from the Perspective of Nietzsche and Kant
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Kant believes that war should be considered a last resort with the utmost respect for human life and dignity. War should only be used when all other means of conflict resolution have been exhausted. Nietzsche considered morality as a human structure that has been used throughout history to suppress and control people, so peace is a sign of weakness and degeneration and a product of herd mentality. Real strength comes from conflict and struggle. Nietzsche considered peace as a necessary part of life, but only if it is based on power. Understanding and formulating the criticism of these two important thinkers on peace and what war is and how they interpret these concepts is the central issue of this article. Nietzsche believed that peace is not an end in itself, but a means to an end, and argued that peace is necessary for the development of higher forms of culture and civilization, but it should not be pursued at the expense of creativity and progress. On the other hand, Kant believed that countries should strive towards a more peaceful world order in which conflicts are resolved through dialogue instead of violence.
Kantian Futurism(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی تابستان ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۷
1 - 8
حوزه های تخصصی:
The future of philosophy and the future of humankind-in-the-world are intimately related, not only (i) in the obvious sense that all philosophers are “human, all-too-human” animals—i.e., members of the biological species Homo sapiens, and also finite, fallible, and thoroughly normative imperfect in every other way too—hence the natural fate of all human animals is also the natural fate of all philosophers, but also (ii) in the more profound and subtle sense of what I’ll call philosophical futurism. Philosophical futurism is a critical, synoptic, and speculative reflection on the fate of humankind-in-the-world, with special attention paid not only to what humankind-in-the-world (including philosophy itself) will most likely be, if things continue to go along in more or less the same way as they have been and are now going, or could conceivably be, as in science fiction or other forms of imaginative projection, but also to what what humankind-in-the-world (including philosophy itself) ought to be, and therefore (assuming that “ought” entails “can”) can be, as the direct result of our individual and collective free agency, for the purpose of rationally guiding humankind in the near future. In my essay, I very briefly present, defend, and strongly recommend a version of philosophical futurism that I call Kantian futurism.
Kant’s Humanism: A Loophole in the Principle of Sufficient Reason(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی تابستان ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۷
29 - 48
حوزه های تخصصی:
I consider the principle of sufficient reason (henceforth, PSR) as it functions in both Leibniz and Kant. The issue separating these thinkers is a modal status of absolute contingency, which is exempt from PSR insofar as it is neither logically necessary, nor does it necessarily follow from the given causal series. Leibniz’s ambitious metaphysics applies PSR even to God’s choices, which, since they must rest on a reason that makes sense of them, necessarily tend to the creation of the best of all possible worlds. Through PSR, the exercise of human freedom represents the unfolding of a concept God already has chosen, with an eye to the best possible world aligned with the universal intelligibility enjoined by PSR. PSR, in Kant’s critical period, is not a principle of being, but one of mere experience, since any extension of thought beyond possible experience can yield no knowledge. Human agency, for Kant, has an intelligible aspect that is beyond possible experience. Since PSR is only a principle of experience for Kant, the agent in its intelligible aspect is not subject to it. Human free will introduces a special modal category of absolute contingency. Kant provides impetus for a humanism that makes the absolute freedom of the human will a competitor with the sovereignty of God, and also liberates the human will from contemporary ideologies that would subordinate it to natural determinism or group dynamics.
Does Kantianism Imply Some Sort of Conceptual Creationism?(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی تابستان ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۷
49 - 62
حوزه های تخصصی:
I argue in the essay that the conceptualist understanding of the mind-world relation ultimately leads to the kind of view that Panayot Butchvarov calls conceptual or linguistic creationism. According to this view, “there is nothing we have not conceptualized”. In addition to being an antithesis of metaphysical realism, which maintains that there is a reality independent of us, the term refers to the kind of thinking that sees human cognitive experience (and reality itself) as thoroughly constituted according to our concepts. While it might be easy to attribute this kind of position to Kant as well, especially when read through a conceptualist lens, I argue that such a position is not in accord with Kant’s philosophical intentions. Using the Deduction and Schematism chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason as examples, I also argue that on the conceptualist understanding of the mind-world relation too much is read into Kant’s idea that sensibility and understanding must be cognitively compatible with one another.
The Kantian Self versus Pattern Theory of the Self(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی تابستان ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۷
89 - 110
حوزه های تخصصی:
In the history of philosophy, the concept of the self has long been a subject of intense debate and scrutiny. Within Kant's critical philosophy, the self holds a significant position and is deemed essential for the very notion of experience. This article aims to clarify Kant's viewpoint on the concept of self. Kant posits the existence of an inner sense faculty, through which he introduces the empirical or phenomenal self, a concept that aligns with Hume's stance on the self. Furthermore, Kant introduces the idea of a noumenal self through the faculty of understanding and apperception, suggesting that this noumenal self is the foundation upon which all our experiences are made possible. Our primary objective is to clarify the distinctions between the two forms of self, which will be succeeded by an assessment of each. Although numerous scholars tend to view Kant's perspective on the self as a negative concept, an alternative viewpoint emerges, proposing a potential positive interpretation of Kant's concept of the self. Subsequently, we present Gallagher's Pattern theory of the self and conduct a comparative analysis between the Kantian self and the components that constitute the self.
A Kantian Solution for the Freedom of Choice Loophole in Bell Experiments(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی تابستان ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۷
189 - 202
حوزه های تخصصی:
Bell’s theorem is based on the assumptions of local causality and measurement independence. The last assumption is identified by many authors as linked to the freedom of choice hypothesis. In this sense the human free will ultimately can ensure the measurement independence assumption. The incomplete experimental conditions for supporting this assumption are known in the literature as “freedom-of-choice loophole” (FOCL). Although there is no consensus among the scientists that the measurement independence is linked to human choices, in a recent paper, published in a prestigious journal, signed by more than a hundred authors, this assumption was seriously taken for the first time in an experiment known as Big Bell Test (Abellán et al. 2018). Using photons, single atoms, atomic ensembles and superconducting devices, this experiment was performed in five continents, and involved twelve laboratories, adopting human choices to close the FOCL. Nevertheless, the possibility of human freedom of choice has been a matter of philosophical debate for more than 2000 years, and there is no consensus among philosophers on this topic. If human choice is not free, this solution would not be sufficient to close FOCL. Therefore, in order to support the basic assumption of this experiment, it is necessary to argue that human choice is indeed free. In this paper, we present a Kantian position on this topic and defend the view that this philosophical position is the best way to ensure that Big Bell Test can in fact close the loophole.
Shame and ‘Shame Instinct’ in Kant’s Pre-Critical Texts; RH(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی تابستان ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۷
265 - 280
حوزه های تخصصی:
This paper corrects a historical injustice that has been perpetrated against Kant for some time now. Mostly on good grounds, Kantian ethics has been accused of neglecting the role played by the emotions in moral deliberation and in morally informed action. However, the contemporary moral philosophers who have put forth such a claim tend to bypass textual sources, on the one hand, and to downplay the role played by the anthropological writings on Kant’s practical philosophy as a whole, on the other. Relying on highly relevant pre-critical texts in which Kant sketches future argumentative patterns and discusses the role of a negative emotion like shame on the improvement of the human species, I address a mistaken conclusion about Kantian ethics as a whole that is common in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. I also raise paradoxical conclusions that follow from Kant’s argument, once its implicit premises have been brought to light. I conclude that Kant did indeed think seriously about a so-called ‘shame-instinct’, however much his central ideas diverge from contemporary readings of the emotion, and fall short of fulfilling the ultimate target one can assume his insights would be drawing at