درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

"Interpretation (Taʼwīl)" is one of the key topics in Quranic literature that has had significant importance and a special place in the fields of religious knowledge. To study and understand the Holy Quran correctly, research and investigation on this subject are necessary. The extent of Sayyid Murtaḍā's knowledge and the value of his works have led many researchers to consider his perspectives and works as subjects of their own scientific research. The present study aims, using a descriptive-analytical method, to examine interpretation in the Quranic thought of Sayyid Murtaḍā through. The research approach shows that Sayyid Murtaḍā introduced interpretation in the field of exegesis; it has general (ʻĀm) meaning which encompass exegesis. Therefore, when explaining the clear (Muḥkam) verses and also explaining the unclear (Mutashābih) verses, he used the term interpretation (Taʼwīl). According to him, there is a difference between the credibility of interpretation (proof of possible aspects) and the correctness of interpretation. His exegesis is in line with scientific and rational principles and he has a scholarly understanding of the Quran. His beliefs include belief in the divine nature of the Quranic words, belief in the comprehensibility of the Quran, affirmation of the truths in the words and expressions of the Quran, and the discovery of reasonable meanings attributable to God in the unclear (Mutashābih) verses, among others. The result of this research is beneficial for understanding the Quranic views of Sayyid Murtaḍā and benefiting from his experiences and skills in Quran exegesis; also, it addresses the need for a comprehensive approach to interpreting unclear and difficult verses.

Avicenna’s floating man thought experiment has been examined and criticized for over a thousand years from various philosophical perspectives. While traditional and modern criticisms exist, the latter primarily focus on the confusion between epistemology and ontology. The ontological dimensions have received significant attention, but the epistemological aspects remain underexplored. I propose a modern critique suggesting that if valid, the thought experiment may not support substance dualism. However, some modest versions could bolster modest dualism, which posits that mental properties are distinct from physical ones, without adhering to Cartesian concepts. I present seven versions of the thought experiment. The first differs from Avicenna’s original and focuses on the individuation of self and body, but is vulnerable to modern critiques due to its conflation of ontological and epistemic aspects. The remaining six versions avoid this issue and do not assert that the mind is an immaterial substance. The second version examines epistemic differences between basic self-knowledge and knowledge of the body. The third addresses self-referential and self-verifying aspects of self-knowledge. The fourth explores modal properties, while the fifth highlights the self's necessary relationship to self-knowledge. The sixth emphasizes the environmental neutrality of basic self-knowledge, and the final version utilizes the self as a critical reasoner. I also support and revise these six versions with eleven general remarks.