پژوهش های فلسفی-کلامی

Axioms are crucial to epistemic frameworks, as several schools of the history of science have recognized. The issue of the current research is that in the validation of axioms, what defects does the intuitive approach entail, and how can the intersubjective approach (based on the ideas of Islamic philosophers) be explained as an alternative, less-known system? The former is dedicated to clarifying and criticizing what is called the intuitive approach to validating axioms: this approach is attributed to classical philosophers and consists of assuming that axioms are propositions whose truth is immediately evident upon taking into account the terms they are based on. The latter focuses on clarifying the alternative approach, called the intersubjective approach of validating axioms (IAVA): this approach is attributed to a specific Islamic tradition, developed by Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā, and consists of assuming that axioms are propositions that cannot be rationally proved, denied, or doubted, without being already assumed. In this article, we present the intersubjective approach from a historical point of view.

Mullā Sadrā interprets “correspondence” in the correspondence theory of truth as the identity of quiddity (ʿayniyyat-e māhūwī) between mental existence (wujūd-i dhihnī) and external existence (wujūd-i khārijī) of a known object. However, this view conflicts with his principle of the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd), which posits that mental and external existences occupy distinct existential ranks, making identical quiddities impossible. To resolve this, Sadrā proposes the theory of correspondence of existential realms (tatābuq-i ʿawālim-i wujūdī), arguing that the quiddity of external existence is identical to that of mental existence, and their correspondence arises from the identity of their higher and specific existences. This article argues that while Sadrā clearly explains the identity of quiddity, his theory of existential correspondence fails to resolve the inconsistency. For true knowledge of an external object, the mental form must distinguish it from other objects in a conditioned (bi sharṭ-i lā) manner, not merely through indeterminate, unconditioned (lā bi sharṭ) knowledge of its qualities. Thus, knowing an object’s qualities abstractly does not equate to knowing the object itself, as distinguishing it requires specific, conditioned knowledge, undermining Sadrā’s resolution of the conflict between his theories.

Sensory perception is a fundamental component of Islamic epistemology, playing a crucial role in human understanding of the external world. Sheikh Mufid, a prominent Twelver theologian, adopts a reason-centered approach to this subject, arguing that the senses alone are insufficient to produce certain knowledge; rather, valid knowledge emerges only through their interaction with reason. By distinguishing between simple and composite sensory perception, he clarifies the role of reason in analyzing and affirming sensory data, emphasizing the necessity of filtering illusions and imaginations through rational scrutiny. Moreover, while he upholds direct realism in perception—affirming a direct connection between the perceiver and the perceived—he also acknowledges its limitations. The findings of this study indicate that Sheikh Mufid presents a systematic framework for understanding the interaction between the senses, reason, and revelation, maintaining a firm stance against epistemic relativism. His rationalist approach has not only shaped Shiite theological epistemology but also offers valuable insights for contemporary epistemological analysis.

According to Kant, the lack of progress in metaphysics is due to the fact that philosophers tried to solve metaphysical problems without examining the limits of our reason, and the outcome of these endeavors has been a dogmatic metaphysics fraught with contradictions and tensions. Then, after examining the types of cognition, he concludes that in order to determine the limits of reason's capacity, one must answer the question: “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” Some contemporary Islamic philosophers have sought to answer this question inspired by the teachings of Islamic philosophy. One solution involves resorting to conceptual relations that make the synthetic a priori judgments possible, while another solution is to deny outright the a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic distinctions of cognition. In this paper, using a comparative-analytical method, I demonstrate that these two solutions are unsuccessful. The proposed alternative is to consider the possibility of such propositions as fundamental and in no need of further explanation. This suggestion seems to be simpler and fully consistent with the teachings of Islamic philosophy.

Considering the fundamental role of the intellectual foundations of every theologian in his opinions and theological thoughts, this article aims to examine the epistemological and methodological foundations of two influential theologians in the history of Islamic theology belonging to the two major theological schools, the Shiites (Imamīyyah) and the Muʿtazilites. This research has been done through the descriptive-analytical method, using library resources.  By analyzing the works and ideas of two thinkers, the researchers concluded that both theologians regard the knowledge of God as the primary obligation for every intellectually mature human being. This knowledge is intellectual and even pre-religious in nature. Furthermore, practical reason demands that every individual recognize the true Creator of themselves and the world. Morally, they are also bound to express gratitude to their benefactor.. Reason is not only the foundation of all religious knowledge but one must also seek guidance from the illuminating light of reason in understanding religion, for which the Book and tradition are the most important sources. These two thinkers align in their rational and narrative approaches to understanding religion; however, they differ regarding the function of reason, the relationship between reason and transmitted knowledge (naql), and specific instances within tradition, all of which are examined in this article.

Ameri believes that knowledge is formed through matter and form. This matter either originates from religion or does not. If the matter comes from a religious source, it constitutes religious sciences in the specific sense, including disciplines such as hadith studies and similar fields. However, since religion requires not only matter but also form, and since the general form of all sciences is shaped by the universal intellect that is the source of religion—namely, the intellect of the Prophet—while their details are discovered by ordinary human intellects, it can be said that the true form of all sciences is religion and knowledge takes shape under a form called religion. In this sense, all real sciences,inasmuch as they correspond to reality,are religious, and it is religion, through its teachings, that leads to the existence of real sciences. In other words, since the combination of religion and human intellect, which is called wisdom, forms the structure of real sciences, it can be said that the main paradigm for the formation of real sciences is wisdom.

Avicenna’s floating man thought experiment has been examined and criticized for over a thousand years from various philosophical perspectives. While traditional and modern criticisms exist, the latter primarily focus on the confusion between epistemology and ontology. The ontological dimensions have received significant attention, but the epistemological aspects remain underexplored. I propose a modern critique suggesting that if valid, the thought experiment may not support substance dualism. However, some modest versions could bolster modest dualism, which posits that mental properties are distinct from physical ones, without adhering to Cartesian concepts. I present seven versions of the thought experiment. The first differs from Avicenna’s original and focuses on the individuation of self and body, but is vulnerable to modern critiques due to its conflation of ontological and epistemic aspects. The remaining six versions avoid this issue and do not assert that the mind is an immaterial substance. The second version examines epistemic differences between basic self-knowledge and knowledge of the body. The third addresses self-referential and self-verifying aspects of self-knowledge. The fourth explores modal properties, while the fifth highlights the self's necessary relationship to self-knowledge. The sixth emphasizes the environmental neutrality of basic self-knowledge, and the final version utilizes the self as a critical reasoner. I also support and revise these six versions with eleven general remarks.

Discussions on the works of lesser-known philosophers in history can illuminate various issues, helping to establish historical connections between various thinkers. One such philosopher is Abū al-Hasan Kāshānī (d. 1558), a 16th-century figure whose views have not yet been thoroughly studied. He authored numerous works in the field of philosophy and logic, many of which remain unpublished or unedited. His treatise on mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī) contains detailed and profound contributions. Mullā Ṣadrā (c. 1571-1635/40 AD) authored several works on mental existence based on Kāshānī’s views. For example, it was Kāshānī who first used the distinction between primary predication (al-ḥaml al-awwalī) and common technical predication (al-ḥaml al-shāyiʿ al-ṣanāʿī) in solving the puzzle of mental existence. Mullā Ṣadrā adopted Kāshānī’s terminology in his magnum opus Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah. We demonstrate Kāshānī’s influence on Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of mental existence, utilizing a comparative and descriptive methodology. The material of this research includes Kāshānī’s manuscript on mental existence as well as Mullā Ṣadrā’s works on this issue. The authors edited and revised Kāshānī’s manuscript and during the editing realized this important influence by comparing it with Mullā Ṣadrā's works.

Atheists have long advanced arguments against the existence of God, challenging the claims of theists. Among these, John L. Schellenberg has proposed an argument known as “divine hiddenness,” which has garnered significant attention from philosophers of religion. Therefore, the subject of this paper is to critique and examine this argument based on the ontological foundations of Avicenna, one of the greatest theist philosophers and prominent figures in Islamic philosophy. The methodology of this article is descriptive-analytical, based on an ontological examination of the rational possibility of connection and the occurrence of connection with the transcendent through religious and mystical experiences. Through a careful examination, it will be demonstrated that Avicenna’s ontological foundations not only support the possibility of relational experiences with the divine but also, when considered within the framework of logical argumentation and the epistemological certainty of mutawātirāt (mass-transmitted hadith), establish the reliability and certainty of such transcendent relations. Consequently, the argument from divine hiddenness—and by extension, atheism—is effectively refuted.