درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

War’s historical relationship to the creation of territorial nation-states is well known, but what empirical and normative role does war play in creating the citizen in a modern democracy? Although contemporary theories of citizenship and human rights do not readily acknowledge a legitimate, generative function for war – as evidenced by restrictions on aggression, annexation of occupied territory, expulsions, denationalization, or derogation of fundamental rights – an empirical assessment of state practice, including the interpretation of international legal obligations, suggests that war plays a powerfully transformative role in the construction of citizenship, and that international law and norms implicitly accept this. <br />Dominant discourses on citizenship in the liberal and cosmopolitan traditions focus on the individual as the unit of analysis and normative concern, and on his rights against the state. At the same time, the choice of how to construct citizenship – to whom to grant it or from whom to withhold it, and what content to give citizenship – is closely linked to questions of security and identity: citizenship either presupposes or purports to create some measure of common identity among citizens, and implies obligations as well as rights. This chapter argues that, in assessing legal and moral positions, this role – if not necessarily approved – must be accounted for to achieve a fuller understanding of how peace, war and rights are related. <br />Human rights may be conceptualized as universal, but their application and specific content are often mediated through the state, and therefore understanding how states retain the ability to define the contours of citizenship, including through the effects of war, is critical to an understanding of the actual scope of human rights as a legal enterprise and a lived experience. <br />The article will examine the formal limits placed on war as an instrument that could affect citizenship; then it will examine the evidence for war’s continued effect (through means such as differentiation between citizens and alien residents, expulsion of aliens, assimilation of refugee flows, and border changes); then it will advance an argument about how the factual effects of war interact with legal doctrine (such as through selective definition and interpretation of wars, perfection of wartime changes in peace treaties, and novel demographic changes introduced by peace treaties). <br />The article considers the concepts of participation, loyalty, and treason; the evidence and implications of wartime propaganda; the rules and practice governing transfer of populated territory between sovereigns; the incentives that the laws of war create for individuals’ identification with the state; and the accommodation in peace plans of demographic change wrought by war. <br />Principal reference is made to changes in citizenship status following the wars of the former Yugoslavia, the Algerian decolonization, the postwar settlement of Europe, and to the debates about the contours of citizenship in Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Selective adaptation describes the process by which international legal rules are contextualized to local conditions. The institutional and cultural contexts for selective adaptation involve a process by which non-local institutional practices and organizational forms are mediated by local norms. This process can be illustrated by reference to the local implementation of international human rights regimes.<br /> Selective adaptation is made possible by ways in which governments, elites, and other interpretive communities express their own normative preferences in the course of interpretation and application of practice rules. Selective adaptation depends on a number of factors, including perception, complementarity, and legitimacy. Perception influences understanding about foreign and local norms and practices. Originally a principle of nuclear physics, complementarity describes a circumstance by which apparently contradictory phenomena can be combined in ways that preserve essential characteristics of each component and yet allow for them to operate together in a mutually reinforcing and effective manner.

Peaceful co-existence is a universal but elusive aspiration. Despite the search for tools to create a peaceful world, conflict remains between nations and within nations. The fostering of peace is a question to which scholars, religious leaders and politicians put their minds, but despite this attention the paradox remains that there is little evidence that local and global conflict have subsided. Ideally the key to providing solutions can be found in the tenets of the world’s major religions and cultural traditions and in the musing of some of the great philosophy voices of past and modern times. Regrettably these tenets are often absent in education systems where there are limited endeavours to encourage young people to think locally and globally about social justice, peace and human rights. Many of the current ways of imparting knowledge of human rights and peace are limited, with the emphasis on the legal aspect alone and on international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Although the UDHR is an inspiring document given that its creation stemmed from a commitment to all humanity, its uncritical acceptance negates the critiques about western dominance. Arguably, unless humankind can find a way to grapple with the tension between universal and relativist approaches to human rights by acknowledging diversity, the search for peace and social justice will be limited. This paper contemplates the creation of human rights understandings beyond legal constructs to explore how human rights concepts can be invoked through education to reduce ignorance, prejudice, religious intolerance and fear that detracts from the goal of peaceful co-existence. It explores the question of responsibility to ‘the other’, a form of responsibility that is not apparent in the clash of cultures and the conflict between nations. The paper suggests a schema for human rights understandings based on philosophical, political, historical, anthropological, legal and practical approaches to human rights. This includes forging the connection between theory and practice; engaging in critical pedagogy through a process of collaborative dialogue and inquiry; being familiar with the historical origins of human rights and their application; and understanding that concepts of human rights are found in every cultural and religious tradition.  In advocating such a schema it draws on examples that present barriers and prospects and in so doing outlines the endeavours that take place in the inter-disciplinary Master of Human Rights program at Curtin University in Australia as a model that may be adaptable to other contexts. The paper concludes by suggesting practical ways in which the schema could be enacted including through a lifetime educational commitment to human rights through historical and philosophical understandings, inter-faith dialogue and cultural exchanges.

A person’s identity is their sense of who and what they are, of who stands in significant relations to them, and of what is valuable to them. This is inevitably very broad, an immediate implication of which is that the concept of identity taken alone cannot do significant normative work. In some cases a person’s identity is bound up with the evil that they do or wish to do, and cannot thereby give them any right to do it. In other cases very powerful elements of a person’s identity – such as their attachment to loved ones – is certainly related to important rights, but it is not entirely clear that one needs the concept of identity to explicate or justify these rights; the deep involvement of their identity is arguably a byproduct of other important values in these cases (such as love), and those values can do the grounding work of the rights by themselves and more simply and clearly. <br />Nevertheless, when suitably qualified, a person’s identity is central to accounting for important political rights. These ranges from rights to participate in cultural practices of one’s group, which sometimes implies duties on governments to support minorities threatened with extinction, to – at the outer limit – rights to arrange political administration. <br />These rights are connected to both autonomy and fairness. Cultural rights are often taken either to be opposed to autonomy, or at best instrumental to personal autonomy (by providing ‘options’), but in fact, the ideal of autonomy, expressed by Mill as being the author of one’s life, requires that one be in control of significant aspects of one’s identity. Significant aspects of one’s identity are collectively determined within a culture. Cultures are not static, and their development is particularly affected by political boundaries. A fundamental right of autonomy implies, therefore, that groups be allowed, within reasonable constraints of general feasibility and stability, to arrange political boundaries to enhance their control over their identity. This shows the fundamental link between individual and collective ‘self-determination’. The right of collective self-determination is also based on fairness, since cultural majorities in existing states enjoy advantages that minorities frequently lack. <br />Spelling out the basis of identitarian rights in autonomy contributes to determining both the upper and lower limits of this and other rights of universal scope. First, it is important to distinguish between two senses of ‘human right’. The first sense is a right that a person has simply in virtue of being a person, or simply by being a human being. A second sense is a right of cosmopolitan scope. Every right in the first sense is a right in the second sense but not vice versa. That is, every right that people have merely in virtue of being people is a right that everyone has. But not every right that everyone has (and should have) is a right that they have merely in virtue of being a human or a person. Some rights that everyone has or should have today people could not have had in the past because institutional, economic, technological or other prerequisites were lacking. Some that everyone has today they may not have in the future because other values will have superseded them in a different institutional, economic, or technological setting.

The emerging right to democracy (e.g. Franck, T) within international law favors a liberal, democratic packaging. Yet as Abedolkarim Sourash argues, there has been a conflation of liberalism and democracy, which must be decoupled.  It is from this point of departure that this paper will examine the international legality of militant democracy and interrogate when and how a constitutional democracy can legally act in an anti-democratic manner to combat threats to its democratic existence.  Militant democracy was a term introduced in 1937 by Karl Lowenstein. It refers to a form of constitutional democracy authorized to protect civil and political freedom by pre-emptively restricting its exercise. Lowenstein’s writings, at the time, were concerned with the limitations of democratic institutions in containing fascism. Militant democracies stand in contrast with the principles of legal pluralism, but the extent to which international law authorizes transformative political agendas that seek to implement forms of religious, cultural, or national autonomy is unclear.

As Human Rights are supposed to be equal for all human beings leaving any social differences away there must be ways found to educate the population in Human Rights matters. One of the ways for Human Rights education is Religion. Religion is the link between the people of one society that does not care for social and educational differences. There is no need for high education to believe and to confess to a religion. But also in times of insecurity, e.g. wars or catastrophes, people tend to be more religious than in times of peace and are seeking help and moral advice from their religious leaders. <br />By attending religious ceremonies people get informed not only about religious matters but also about political ones as religious institutions are also a place for exchanging knowledge. An important role plays the religious leader as he can have a great influence esp. on the masses with lower education. By using effective methods he can contribute to implementing Human Rights in society. As there are already different methods of intercultural training on Human Rights affairs existing I would like to explain how, in analogy to that, an inter-religious training on Human Rights Affairs, esp. anti-discrimination, could work. The basis is the anti-bias concept which was originally developed in South Africa and which aims at the general removal of discrimination like sexism, racism, north-south-hierarchy, etc. The focus is on the sensibilization of oneself and starting a life-long-learning process of living aware of existing prejudices and developing tolerance in society. The anti-bias concept starts working directly at the mechanism of discrimination and is therefore useful and appropriate for the pedagogical fields which include religious institutions. The religious leader is enabled by this training to work with groups, e.g. children and adults or men and women, and lead those people to their emotional self-experience. Developing on this, non-discriminating conducts for the personal life- and the working situation is produced. Religion that works together with the anti-bias method shows how many chances a society has with less discrimination for all and helps finally to implement Human Rights.