Liberalism

The emerging right to democracy (e.g. Franck, T) within international law favors a liberal, democratic packaging. Yet as Abedolkarim Sourash argues, there has been a conflation of liberalism and democracy, which must be decoupled.  It is from this point of departure that this paper will examine the international legality of militant democracy and interrogate when and how a constitutional democracy can legally act in an anti-democratic manner to combat threats to its democratic existence.  Militant democracy was a term introduced in 1937 by Karl Lowenstein. It refers to a form of constitutional democracy authorized to protect civil and political freedom by pre-emptively restricting its exercise. Lowenstein’s writings, at the time, were concerned with the limitations of democratic institutions in containing fascism. Militant democracies stand in contrast with the principles of legal pluralism, but the extent to which international law authorizes transformative political agendas that seek to implement forms of religious, cultural, or national autonomy is unclear.

This paper examines the liberal society that Popper lauds, that aims to be truly open, and discusses why another, more communitarian kind of society, particularly societies in Africa, may also reflect the quest for intellectual openness that is Popper’s ideal. Moreover, this paper avers reasons why Popper should be comfortable with such a liberal-communitarian mix. The inter-subjectivity in his critical rationalism is a balance of an explicit individualism, and an implicit social element (Afisi, 2016a). Popper is indeed an author of such a balance. For a society to be truly open requires the careful recognition and protection of individual freedom. However, the extent to which individuals are free to perform actions that they desire without external constraints, and the level of their individuality in relation to others when performing such actions, remain a contentious issue between liberals and more communitarian thinkers. Popper’s critical rationalism provides the necessary impetus to this contention through his view of freedom that I contend can best be viewed as carefully balanced, a view which combines individuality with a social element that upholds community values necessary for openness of society. With this combination, Popper’s politics of liberalism provides an effective model of how a truly open society can be achieved. The values inherent to Popper’s liberalism including those concerning intellectual openness, individual freedom, mutual respect, measured self-respect, welfarism, humanitarianism, accountability, critical debates and feedback from the citizens, together concern the conditions for a society to be truly open. There are many competing thoughts as to what openness might be in Popper’s philosophy. The present study of Popper does not presume to address them all. The focus here is specifically on using Popper’s idea of critical rationalism to balance relations between liberal politics of individual rights and freedom, and communitarian politics of the common good, as it relates to situations about how socio-economic and political conditions in Africa societies should be structured. While I contend that Popper’s works in political philosophy focused centrally on Western political tradition, and not about Africa in its strict sense, significant lessons can be distilled from Popper that can offer suggestions on social reforms in Africa. This paper explores Popper’s project of the open society across the plurality and differences of societies, so that his liberal ideas of individual freedom are not undermined, and the progress of the communitarian idea of the common good, that Africa societies are built upon, is also well enhanced. Liberal individualism and community values inherent to communitarianism are both well accommodated within Popper’s critical rationalism.

The present article demonstrates the interaction between republicanism and Islamism as the major political doctrine in the Islamic Revolution towards its confrontation with the globalization of liberalism. It centers on detecting the true nature of the political thought of liberalism and analyzing the instruments adopted by the Islamic Republic in its attempt to achieve both goals simultaneously. Thus it seeks to indicate why and how the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken steps towards a new civilization maintaining its independent identity.

Skepticism and fear caused serious flaws in liberalism. Skepticism made liberalism resort to reason as an Archimedean point for resolving disagreements. But reason like opinions and affections is subject to social contingencies. Liberal fear of human nature has led it to a negative notion of rights that is harmful to social solidarity. Islam can help liberalism resolve these problems

Freedom is an abstract concept which is more understandable by its limitations. The question is that, is there a comprehensive concept of freedom in western idealism? For this purpose, this study created some conceptual research in the poles of western idealism. Accordingly, freedom in framework of Socratic philosophy had no context except virtue orientation. Then, it was reduced to security and property in the new period. The present study used the discourse analysis of freedom to show why and how the concept of freedom has an underlying and philosophical concept in old and new schools. Thus, a single and undeniable attitude to freedom in western idealism is non-scientific and non-historical. The present study selected the analytical comparative method to discuss the concept of freedom discourse in western political thought in old and new periods, indicating why and how freedom is a discourse concept; or at least belongs to its specific community, and cannot be necessarily compared in a generalized, universal way.

Islam has a specific approach to the nature of international relations, which is different from two main international discourses, namely, realism and liberalism. In terms of ontological and epistemological foundations, schools in international relations differ from one another and as a result, their approach to international relations is different. This paper intends to compare the ontology foundations of the Islamic approach to international relations in comparison to both realism and liberalism approaches. However, two questions are discussed in this article: First, what are the ontological foundations of the international relations approach? Second, what is the difference between the Islamic theory of international relations and liberalism and realism approaches?  The method of the research is analytical and the way of collecting is a documentary type. 

Commentators oft cite the rather grand claim that for Hegel there was no concept of individual personality, subjectivity nor personal autonomy in Ancient Greece. Hegel’s claim is either taken as orthodox and making sense in the Hegelian historical system as a whole and so little discussed; or is flatly ignored as the worst kind of metaphysical obfuscation; a response a little too comfortable for liberal thinkers. Neither reaction is entirely satisfying. Not enough attention has been paid to it, especially for the vast majority of social and political thinkers who would find it at least contentious, so the present paper aims to assert its significance both for Hegelian politics as a whole and to pay enough attention to it in order to make it very difficult for those who find it a contentious statement to continue to ignore it. One wants to ask what it might mean for one’s self-understanding to be so radically different that, as a human being, I understand myself as first and foremost (and perhaps completely) not as a subjective individual. It is conceptually very difficult to be a self-conscious individual -- in even a minimal sense -- without some idea of being an atomic, individual unit. It is the claim of the following argument that a full understanding of this distinction, between ancient and modern self-understandings, would lead to a revision of Hegel’s liberal credentials, though not entirely for liberal reasons.

For over three decades, sanctions have been a consistent feature of United States policy towards Iran. Following the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, in 2018 the United States withdrew from the agreement through Executive Order 13846, reinstating previous sanctions. Consequently, Iran decided to bring its case against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based on the 1955 Treaty of Amity. The present article analyzes the ICJ's substantive jurisdiction (Merits) over this case, as well as the political and legal implications of the United States' unilateral sanctions against Iran. The research employs an analytical methodology, utilizing library research and note-taking to collect data. The research findings indicate that the ICJ's opinion is based on the illegality of comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on national security grounds, and that the Court has substantive jurisdiction over this case. Furthermore, the findings reveal that the United States' unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions not only violate Iran's sovereignty, but also infringe upon the human rights of the Iranian people. The United States' sanctions policy aligns with liberal and realist theories of international relations.

All theories of political science and international relations are inevitably based on specific ontological foundations that one of the main sub-branches of their ontology is anthropology (history). However, anthropological foundations have been neglected in the evaluation of international relations theories (problem). Therefore, it seems necessary to strengthen the approaches interested in examining the anthropology of international relations theories in view of the conceptual gap in the background of this issue (background and necessity). Therefore, this question can be raised: How can the perception of human nature provide an Islamic basis for rethinking the intellectual approach of the main theoretical approaches in international relations (including realism and liberalism)? (Question). It seems that from the Islamic point of view, any stagnation and dogmatism in the absolute pessimistic or optimistic conception of human nature can be considered as a common weakness of idealism and realism in international relations (hypothesis). This article aims to provide a serious rethinking of the anthropological foundations of these two schools, as two major theoretical approaches in the analysis of international politics (goal). The present paper, within the framework of the non-theoretical approach, emphasizes an Islamic reflection on the anthropological foundations of the idealist and realistic paradigms (method). Understanding the difference between the anthropological foundations of the Islamic approach on the one hand and the realistic and liberal approaches on the other hand can be one of the results of the article (finding).

Today, the approach of separating spirituality from religion in modern spirituality, in competition with spirituality derived from established religions, is prevalent. One of the key foundations of this approach is the liberalism towards Western readings. The present study aims to critique the basis of liberalism in separating spirituality from religion in order to clarify the fundamental flaws of this approach and the inadequacy of its results in providing for human spiritual life. In this regard, the works of Allamah Tabataba’i, as one of the greatest interpreters of Islamic teachings, have been extensively utilized. To this aim, data collection was done through library research and information processing using descriptive-analytical method with a critical approach. According to the findings, liberalism towards Western readings, rooted in individualistic humanism, is ineffective in the foundation of human spiritual life regarding the three major criticisms. Firstly, absolute freedom, which is the basis and component of the approach of separating spirituality from religion, is unattainable and non-existent. Then, freedom is not the ultimate goal but a tool to achieve genuine and true spirituality, and finally, rights-based approaches, considered as consequences of liberalism, are in contrast and on the other hand, duty-based approaches are the crucial basis for achieving true spirituality and without it, it is unimaginable.

Introduction: Social responsibility from an ethical point of view includes the obligations and duties of natural and legal persons towards society and the environment. The moral behavior of people, like understanding of social responsibility, depends on their liberal ideology, beliefs and human values. Therefore, the aim of the current research is to study the relationship between liberalism and human values with the moral understanding of social responsibility. Material & Methods: The research method is applied in terms of purpose and descriptive-correlational survey. The statistical population includes the financial managers of the companies admitted to the stock exchange, and the questionnaire was randomly distributed among them and 110 questionnaires were received. The sampling method is random. The research tool is a questionnaire and multivariate regression using SPSS software was used to analyze the data. Results: The research results show that human values based on public interest have a significant and positive relationship with the moral understanding of social responsibility. But the thinking of liberalism does not have a meaningful relationship with the moral understanding of social responsibility. Conclusion: Based on the findings of this research, human values based on public interest can be considered as a tool to strengthen the moral behavior of company managers regarding corporate social responsibility. Also, improving the thinking of liberalism in managers can strengthen their social responsibility. In this case, the policy makers of Stock Exchange can direct the managers of the listed companies to comply more with the social responsibility of the company, through teaching human values and strengthening those values, as well as monitoring the implementation of ethical regulations