درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The seabed chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an authority for dispute settlement in seabed area cases. This chamber, in nature, is a specific judiciary for dispute resolution of this marine area in the tribunal. First, the governments must settle their disputes based on one of the peaceful resolution methods, and then should refer to the tribunal in case of agreement. Compared to the International Court of Justice in referring to dispute settlement, the most important feature of the tribunal and its chamber is the creation of a specific chamber and dispute settlement through arbitration and the presence of a special judge for dispute parties. Moreover, the seabed chamber can issue an advisory opinion, if required. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the chamber depends on two kinds of optional and compulsory jurisdictions of the tribunal, so that contractors and their guaranteeing states have joint liability for international seabed authority. It should be noted that states are responsible for an action and omission of the act causing harm in the seabed and under the seabed only in case of failure to apply their regulatory advice for contractors. The first and most important compensation for harm to the seabed is prevention from more hazards against seabed and under the seabed. Furthermore, immediate notification to coastal authorities and states, postliminium (restoration of the status formerly possessed), and complete compensation are forms of respective actions.

A person’s identity is their sense of who and what they are, of who stands in significant relations to them, and of what is valuable to them. This is inevitably very broad, an immediate implication of which is that the concept of identity taken alone cannot do significant normative work. In some cases a person’s identity is bound up with the evil that they do or wish to do, and cannot thereby give them any right to do it. In other cases very powerful elements of a person’s identity – such as their attachment to loved ones – is certainly related to important rights, but it is not entirely clear that one needs the concept of identity to explicate or justify these rights; the deep involvement of their identity is arguably a byproduct of other important values in these cases (such as love), and those values can do the grounding work of the rights by themselves and more simply and clearly. <br />Nevertheless, when suitably qualified, a person’s identity is central to accounting for important political rights. These ranges from rights to participate in cultural practices of one’s group, which sometimes implies duties on governments to support minorities threatened with extinction, to – at the outer limit – rights to arrange political administration. <br />These rights are connected to both autonomy and fairness. Cultural rights are often taken either to be opposed to autonomy, or at best instrumental to personal autonomy (by providing ‘options’), but in fact, the ideal of autonomy, expressed by Mill as being the author of one’s life, requires that one be in control of significant aspects of one’s identity. Significant aspects of one’s identity are collectively determined within a culture. Cultures are not static, and their development is particularly affected by political boundaries. A fundamental right of autonomy implies, therefore, that groups be allowed, within reasonable constraints of general feasibility and stability, to arrange political boundaries to enhance their control over their identity. This shows the fundamental link between individual and collective ‘self-determination’. The right of collective self-determination is also based on fairness, since cultural majorities in existing states enjoy advantages that minorities frequently lack. <br />Spelling out the basis of identitarian rights in autonomy contributes to determining both the upper and lower limits of this and other rights of universal scope. First, it is important to distinguish between two senses of ‘human right’. The first sense is a right that a person has simply in virtue of being a person, or simply by being a human being. A second sense is a right of cosmopolitan scope. Every right in the first sense is a right in the second sense but not vice versa. That is, every right that people have merely in virtue of being people is a right that everyone has. But not every right that everyone has (and should have) is a right that they have merely in virtue of being a human or a person. Some rights that everyone has or should have today people could not have had in the past because institutional, economic, technological or other prerequisites were lacking. Some that everyone has today they may not have in the future because other values will have superseded them in a different institutional, economic, or technological setting.

In American history, the ‘Black body’ has been commodified both during the slavery era and in the contemporary period whereby the private management of prisons has partly resulted to mass Black incarceration. The abolition of slavery some 150 years ago is still fairly recent compared to the 400 years it was practiced: thus some of the heinous treatments by slave owners were carried over into the criminal justice system, causing the police, jury, judges, etc., to treat Black people unequally and unfairly compared to their White counterparts. From the ‘proceedings of the rebellious negroes’ in the slavery era to the racialized media coverages of police brutality against Black people, Black protests, treatment of criminal suspects, etc., the American mass media have been identified as playing a major role in the maintenance of the deep racist structures that perpetuate mass Black incarceration. This paper links up some historical practices against Black people with the contemporary racist practices in order to show that slavery is still functionally alive in America and manifests concretely through the justice system: this paper aims at amplifying the ongoing debates toward obliterating the remnants of slavery in America.

As one of the most popular means of trade in the world, shipping by sea has always been subject to maritime hazards. Thus, the implicit commitment of a ship lease contract is that the transport operator provides a seaworthy ship. There is, however, no specific definition of the legal nature of this obligation in most conventions or international laws, and it is only in this regard that the statement of seaworthiness is cited as an implied obligation. Having been written in the descriptive-analytical method, this study attempts to explain the legal nature of this obligation, its position among absolutes or relatives, primaries or subsidiaries, implicit fundamentals or customs, its compliance with the conditions of article 234, the burden of proving seaworthiness, and the lack of performance guarantees caused by its absence. According to the results of the study, a transport operator is under a relative obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. The existence of this obligation can be mentioned both as a main condition and a secondary condition, and if there is no specification in the contract, it is referred to as a customary implied obligation. Additionally, the condition of seaworthiness would be close to the verb condition in accordance with Article 234 of the Civil Code of Iran. For a claimant (the owner of the goods) to prove a lack of seaworthiness, they only need to provide evidence that the loss has occurred. For the sea transport operator to be relieved of responsibility, s/he must prove that s/he took the necessary precautions at the start of the voyage. The owner, otherwise, is responsible for compensating the victim for the damages caused by the violation of unseaworthiness by restoring the previous situation by providing the property and if an excuse is provided, by supplying a substitute.