درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

Gottfried Ploucquet, a teacher at the Tubingen seminary when Hegel was a student there, had been one of the few philosophers to take up Leibniz’s mathematized logic, including his project of reducing logic, and thought itself, to computational processes. In his Science of Logic, Hegel briefly discusses this project when expanding on his own “subjective” logic. The general tenor of the response is predictable. Computational logic seeks to mechanize conceptual processes, but conceptuality itself distinguishes free spiritual beings from machines. Beneath the surface, however, Hegel’s attitude to the relation of computation to conceptual reasoning is more complex. Here I argue that in Book I of his Logic, Hegel, following the approach of Plato in his late dialogues, treats a certain mathematical conception of number, the Neopythagorean triadic monad, as a model for the concept itself. In the section Quantity, Hegel focuses on the incommensurability between discrete and continuous quantities, the numbers of arithmetic and the lines, areas and volumes of geometry. This incommensurability had been discovered by the Pythagoreans and in his later writings, Plato had adopted a proposal for mediating it, attempting to generalize it to a solution of the conceptual incommensurability between the eternal realm of being and the transient realm of becoming. In line with Plato’s attempt, Hegel presents an account of the development of mathematical practices in which the concept of number from mere counting unit to a triadic form mediating numbers and geometric continua. This structure will in turn provide a model for his own later syllogism. This role for mathematics for Hegel is to be understood as in line with Plato’s later attempts to mediate being and becoming in ways in which eternal Ideas can be approximated in the form of worldly surrogates manifesting this triune structure. Conceptuality cannot be reduced to computation, but relations among computational processes nevertheless reveal much about the nature of conceptuality.

The break that Hegel introduces into the history of philosophy stems from the way that he transforms the basis for philosophical work from argument to drama. For this project, he takes Shakespeare as a paradigmatic figure and models his works on the structure of Shakespeare’s tragedies. Rather than asserting and defending concepts, Hegel places them in a drama. Whereas Shakespeare’s characters undergo a tragic denouement, Hegel’s concepts reveal their own inadequacy when Hegel reveals how they play out in the course of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic. By examining Hegel’s philosophy through the lens of Shakespeare’s plays, we can discover the nature of the epochal change that Hegel presents and what makes him such a divisive figure in the history of philosophy.

Cette étude analyse l’omission en traduction littéraire à travers la traduction persane de La Folle allure de Christian Bobin par Ghavimi, en mobilisant la typologie de Davies (2007). Les omissions identifiées peuvent être involontaires, résultant de différences syntaxiques et stylistiques, ou volontaires, motivées par un souci d’adaptation culturelle et de lisibilité. Elles influencent la fidélité et la fluidité du texte traduit, pouvant simplifier le style ou remodeler les représentations de l’original, tout en risquant d’effacer son étrangeté. Cette étude met en lumière la double responsabilité du traducteur, partagé entre la fidélité à l’auteur et l’attention portée au lecteur, et confronté à la tension inhérente entre la préservation de l’intégrité du texte source et son intégration dans la culture d’arrivée. Elle montre que l’omission en traduction littéraire ne relève pas seulement d’un ajustement technique, mais qu’elle engage un véritable positionnement éthique : chaque décision d’omission participe d’un choix interprétatif qui interroge la loyauté du traducteur, la place accordée au Soi ou à l’Autre et les finalités mêmes du projet traductif. Elle constitue également un outil stratégique dont la légitimité varie selon le contexte, le genre et les objectifs de la traduction.