درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is an international body established based on agreements reached in the Algiers Accords, tasked with resolving legal disputes between the parties and their nationals. The Tribunal’s contribution in reducing conflicts and the volume of cases handled demonstrates its effectiveness in peacefully settling disputes and implementing beneficial arbitration practices. However, controversies exist regarding the enforcement of the Tribunal’s awards, particularly as paragraph 7 of the General Declaration stipulates the establishment of a Security Account by Iran to secure the enforcement of financial judgments against the country, while no specific provisions are made for other awards. This situation has led to Iran’s objections regarding the absence of a similar mechanism for the enforcement of awards in its favor, deeming the recognition and enforcement framework of the New York Convention inadequate in this context. The present study aims to analyze the enforcement mechanism of the Tribunal’s awards through a descriptive-analytical method, focusing on the applicability of the recognition and enforcement framework of the 1958 New York Convention. The central research question is: What mechanism governs the recognition and enforcement of awards issued in favor of Iranian parties? The fundamental hypothesis posits that, according to existing practices, the New York Convention is applicable to the enforcement of these awards. Research findings indicate that the New York Convention possesses the necessary capacity for the enforcement of the Tribunal’s awards. Furthermore, the Tribunal’s dual nature, addressing claims from two states as well as claims from nationals of one state against another, does not create an obstacle in this regard.

This essay comparatively examines the systems of judicial review over the principle of proportionality in administrative law to identify how different countries balance governmental efficiency with citizens' rights. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, this article seeks to answer the fundamental question of how differences in legal and constitutional traditions affect judicial review and the application of the principle of proportionality, and what impact these differences have on the relationship between the state and its citizens. The research findings indicate that the principle of proportionality in European systems allows for more active judicial oversight through a structured test (suitability, necessity, balancing), whereas the United States, by emphasizing reasonableness and doctrines like Chevron deference, grants greater discretionary latitude to administrative bodies. Iran has a distinct approach that combines religious values with administrative efficiency. Developments such as Kenya’s move toward the proportionality test demonstrate a trend toward more structured oversight. The concept of the margin of appreciation, particularly in human rights law, combines national decision-making power with judicial review to ensure compliance with democratic principles. The results show that despite the diversity in approaches, the shared objective of legal systems is to ensure reasoned and balanced decision-making, which strengthens the rule of law and protects citizens' rights through judicial review.