درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The aim of this study is to examine Allama Tabatabai’s account on faith and analyze it within the framework of Daniel Howard-Snyder’s non-doxastic approach. Faith is one of the key concepts in the epistemology of religion, and recent analytic approaches has increasingly distinguished it from belief. Allama Tabatabai describes faith as being based on two main components: "al- i'tiqad" and "tamakkun fi al-qalb“. This paper employs a comparative method to evaluate Allama’s account, interpreted as a form of doxastic faith, with the core components of Howard-Snyder’s non-doxastic model, in order to address the ambiguities in the concept of faith and the challenges associated with doxastic faith. Based on Howard-Snyder’s non-doxastic analysis of faith, the upshots show that the concept of "al- i'tiqad" in Allama’s account, as a cognitive attitude, is ambiguous and lacks the essential characteristic which is constituent for belief. Additionally, the failure to explicitly define the conative and evaluative components of faith in Allama’s account is another challenge. Drawing on Howard-Snyder’s model, which emphasizes faith amid doubt, this article argues that the non-doxastic framework provides conceptual resources for clarifying these ambiguities and for constructing a meaningful bridge between classical Islamic thought and contemporary discussions in the epistemology of religion.

The present article examines the possibility of attributing personhood to artificial intelligence agents, a concept central to determining moral status. The debate on personhood has long been central in applied ethics, particularly in discussions on abortion, where philosophers such as Mary Anne Warren proposed five criteria—consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, capacity for communication, and self-awareness—as key indicators of personhood. The present study applies these criteria to artificial intelligence systems and asks whether their cognitive and functional capacities are sufficient for moral consideration. While certain features such as memory, goal-directed behavior, and limited moral interaction are identifiable in some AI systems, the absence of self-awareness and subjective experience remains a fundamental obstacle to full personhood. The article further engages with the views of Kant, Locke, DeGrazia, and Searle, assessing the possibility of AI’s moral standing—whether direct or indirect—through ethical frameworks such as deontology and virtue ethics. It concludes that although attributing personhood to AI remains highly problematic in its current state, addressing this issue is an urgent necessity for contemporary moral philosophy.

Contemporary critical reflections of violence immensely focus on an `ever war-like condition’ that makes the state of exception a permanent possibility. Most popular perspectives of western political philosophy seem to look at a bigger picture; a bird’s eye-view of the world – looking at violence as violence of war and genocides. Every reflection is directed toward war, violence, here and there, and its effects on various human societies. Having a bigger picture is imminent. Besides this big picture we cannot overlook several micro-pictures. The bigger picture will lose its moral and political justification, this paper commits to argue, unless the claim of a permanent emergency locates itself in the manifold normalizations of everyday life that not just distort political objectivity, corrupt human nature, and create intolerant internal civic culture[s]. These instill in the civil society a dangerous indifference to the pain of the socially/politically vulnerable that greatly threatens the latter’s political sense. The single line of argument here is only when the pathologies of everyday lives is grasped only then we can comprehend more deeply the reality of war and/or violence as a permanent condition.

In the contemporary world, education is recognized as a fundamental tool for fostering active, responsible, and capable citizens who require processes that strengthen participation, mutual understanding, and rational dialogue. The present study aims to examine the application of Rousseau’s participatory democracy and Habermas’ communicative action in the teaching of spatial sciences, with a particular focus on geography. The research adopts an action research design with an applied orientation. The study population consisted of 24 undergraduate geography students enrolled in the course Urban Geography of Iran. Data were collected and analyzed across 14 instructional sessions through observation, evaluation, and the interpretation of lived experiences within an interpretive framework. The research process followed a cyclical pattern, including problem identification, theoretical review, formation of focus groups, and dialogue-oriented consensus building. Findings indicate that democratic, participatory, and communicative approaches to spatial education emerge gradually and require a process-oriented foundation. Accordingly, the integration of Rousseau’s participatory democracy with Habermas’ communicative action demands active facilitation by instructors and the reinforcement of intra- and inter-group interactions. The results further reveal that combining these two approaches in geography education—particularly in spatially oriented courses—creates a pathway for transitioning from teacher-centered learning to participatory–discursive learning. This shift enhances skills of spatial analysis, critique, collaboration, and debate, thereby deepening learning and understanding of spatial concepts. Ultimately, the study proposes a practical framework for democratic, interactive, and active education, serving as an illustrative example of implementing these philosophical approaches in higher education.

The emergence of postmodernism has noticeably redefined the notion of the “self,” presenting it as a deconstructed postmodern subject. In this context, the postmodern self appears polysemic and decentered, embodying prominent characteristics of postmodernism. Donna Haraway’s concept of the “cyborg,” characterized by its synthetic and hybrid nature, offers a framework for understanding this postmodern self. Haraway portrays the cyborg as a distinctly female figure which is constructed from a collage of fragments. The goal of this article is to explore the construction of the postmodern self in the context of cyborg feminism to illustrate how technology and cybernetics serve as tools for women’s empowerment and to demonstrate how women can confront patriarchal systems and restore their rights by embracing the hybrid and synthetic aspects of the postmodern female identity. Succinctly, this article aims to exemplify how redefining female identity through the notion of the cyborg allows women to transcend male dominance and reject binary oppositions characterizing them as “the Other” and to surpass a society that has consistently endeavored to marginalize them. Thus, this essay maintains that cyborg feminism serves as an insightful lens for examining the construction of postmodern selves, challenging traditional distinctions between gender, technology, and identity.