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To date, the world has witnessed five instances of the use of force against States' nuclear programs: the U.S. response to the Cuban missile crisis (1962), Israel's attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor (1981), the coalition States’ military strike on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction program (2003), Israel’s attack on the Al-Kibar in Syria (2007), and most recently, the June 2025 Israeli attack—carried out in cooperation with the United States—on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The attacking States claimed that their actions were justified on the basis that the nuclear programs of the targeted States, having allegedly deviated toward military purposes, had become an existential threat. Regardless of the accuracy of such claims, can the deviation of a State’s nuclear program from peaceful purposes—and even the acquisition of nuclear weapons—be considered per se a threat to international peace and security, capable of justifying a preemptive attack aimed at destroying or halting that program? This article examines existing State practice and, the ICJ’s case law to conclude that although the formerly consistent State practice rejecting such attacks has fragmented, the current divergence among States does not yet permit the emergence of a new exception to the peremptory norm of the prohibition of the use of force.

In June 2025, the U.S and Israel took extensive military action against Iran which resulted in inflicting severe damage on country’s infrastructure. The primary question of the research is, from the standpoint of international law, whether the actions of Israel and United States of America were legitimate, and what legal response does Iran have. The hypothesis of the research is based on the premise that the aforementioned attacks are illegal and constitute multiple violations of international law, neither falling within the framework of legitimate self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter nor within the framework of anticipatory self-defense. According to the Caroline doctrine, Iran was not planning to attack at any level whether at initial stages or other levels therefore the imminence of self-defense would lose its function and there was no practical and immediate threat against Israel. Therefore, Israel's attack in the form of preventive self-defense also lacked legal legitimacy and constituted military aggression. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and library document review. The findings indicate the attacks constitute a clear violation of Article 56 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 1977, which prohibits attacks on installations containing dangerous materials, Articles 35 and 55 regarding prohibition of environmental destruction, Article 85(3)(c) which considers such attacks as war crimes, violation of the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets by attacking targets such as the Evin Prison and numerous hospitals, Article 8(2)(b)(4) of the Rome Statute, and Article 2 of the UN Charter regarding peaceful settlement of disputes, while Iran was engaged in negotiations. The article's findings prove that Iran can file complaints based on violations of established principles of international law if the U.S and Israel accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and can also pursue justice through Declaration under Article 12(3) of the ICC and other legal remedies, as the practice of the ICC shows that its judicial policy regarding issuing arrest warrants for heads of state has undergone significant developments

This article critically evaluates the legality of pre-emptive self-defence under contemporary international law, focusing specifically on Israel’s June 2025 airstrikes against Iran. By analyzing the legal framework established by Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, the central argument contends that pre-emptive force remains unlawful absent an actual armed attack. However, an incremental accumulation of scholarships and national military manuals, primarily limited to certain western States, has fostered a self-referential cycle. This cycle projects the misleading appearance of an emerging customary norm authorizing pre-emptive or preventive use of force. This doctrinal ‘snowball effect’, whereby successive publications uncritically cite and amplify predecessors, generates an artificial sense of legal evolution. Nevertheless, rigorous analysis drawing on doctrine, International Court of Justice jurisprudence, general practice of States and even the Caroline criteria itself, often invoked by States justifying pre-emptive self-defence, reveals a clear distinction: lawful self-defence is strictly confined by necessity and proportionality, while anticipatory or preventive self-defence falls outside accepted legal boundaries. The article concludes that Israel’s justification, based on non-imminent and speculative threats, fails to meet even the lower threshold of the Caroline doctrine for pre-emptory self-defence – let alone the stricter contemporary jus ad bellum standards under the UN Charter. Recognizing a unilateral right to pre-emption would gravely undermine the jus cogens character of Article 2(4), erode the UN’s collective security system, and incentivize destabilizing unilateral initiatives and resorts to force. Consequently, absent Security Council authorization or a manifest armed attack, pre-emptive self-defence remains fundamentally incompatible with the current international legal order.

The extensive aerial operation and armed attack by Israel against Iran on the 23rd Khordad 1404 [corresponding to June 13, 2025] may be characterized as a violation of the fundamental principle prohibiting the use of force, constituting an act and crime of aggression. Beyond other legal dimensions of the act of aggression, the purpose of this article is to examine the complex issue of the possible jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) over the alleged committed crime, as well as the jurisdictional challenges facing this institution. While Iran's legal system lacks an appropriate normative and structural mechanism for applying complementarity jurisdiction concerning core international crimes, including the crime of aggression, the non-membership of both Iran and Israel in the ICC, the lack of willingness by Security Council (SC) to refer the situation to the ICC, and normative deficiencies regarding the acceptance of ad hoc declaration ( per article 12(3) of the Rome Statute) by Iran, render the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction difficult and even impossible. A question can be raised in this regard, does the ICC possess jurisdiction, pursuant to the principle of complementarity, to adjudicate upon the act of aggression committed by Israel against Iran? This article, after recounting the events, descriptively and analytically examines the possibility of the ICC exercising jurisdiction in light of trigger mechanism. Ultimately, it demonstrates that the ICC's jurisdiction is confronted with numerous and particular challenges, thus rendering it unable to exercise jurisdiction; an issue that both highlights the necessity of criminalizing core international crimes within domestic law of Iran, and indicates the fundamental reforms to the ICC's Statute, particularly concerning the role of the SC in activating the ICC's jurisdiction.

In June 2025, Israeli airstrikes on Evin Prison in Tehran killed more than 80 civilians, including detainees, staff, and visiting family members. The attack provoked strong international condemnation, notably from France, due to its civilian toll and the absence of a credible military justification. The present article examines the strike's legality under international humanitarian law (IHL), with particular emphasis on the principles of distinction and proportionality as codified in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, this paper argues that the Evin attack lacked a legitimate military objective and violated the fundamental requirement of Article 48 to distinguish between civilian and military targets. Israel’s claim of “symbolic” intent falls short of IHL standards and highlights the absence of lawful military necessity. While detention facilities may, in some contexts, be misused as human shields, no such justification existed in this case. The strike appears politically and psychologically motivated, potentially amounting to acts of terror against civilians. In accordance with Article 8 of the Rome Statute and relevant IHL instruments, the attack constitutes a war crime due to breaching the principles of proportionality and distinction. Rigorous legal analysis and comprehensive documentation are essential to advancing individual criminal responsibility, including through mechanisms such as universal jurisdiction.

This study reconsiders the normative boundaries of legitimate military intervention through the lens of the recent twelve-day international armed conflict between Iran and Israel and the controversial involvement of the United States Or in a more legal sense, the twelve-day armed aggression of Israel and United States of America against Islamic Republic of Iran. The central research questions ask: The central idea of the present research is to find an appropriate answer to the question of whether existing international legal frameworks, including the UN Charter, customary international law, and ICJ jurisprudence, can sustain their regulatory authority over state conduct in asymmetric conflicts. Moreover, can interventions that are justified as anticipatory or collective self-defense be reconciled with the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter? The hypothesis posits that existing legal instruments inadequately address the realities of contemporary conflicts, where political expediency often eclipses legal restraints. Adopting a doctrinal and case-based methodology, the present article examines relevant ICJ cases, UN records, and state practice. It finds a growing divergence between legality and legitimacy, revealing an urgent need to redefine intervention standards through enforceable norms and coherent adjudication.