درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The emerging right to democracy (e.g. Franck, T) within international law favors a liberal, democratic packaging. Yet as Abedolkarim Sourash argues, there has been a conflation of liberalism and democracy, which must be decoupled.  It is from this point of departure that this paper will examine the international legality of militant democracy and interrogate when and how a constitutional democracy can legally act in an anti-democratic manner to combat threats to its democratic existence.  Militant democracy was a term introduced in 1937 by Karl Lowenstein. It refers to a form of constitutional democracy authorized to protect civil and political freedom by pre-emptively restricting its exercise. Lowenstein’s writings, at the time, were concerned with the limitations of democratic institutions in containing fascism. Militant democracies stand in contrast with the principles of legal pluralism, but the extent to which international law authorizes transformative political agendas that seek to implement forms of religious, cultural, or national autonomy is unclear.

With the help of Islamic principles, it is possible to critique the mainstream and the dominant paradigm in International Relations. Still, the capability of the Islamic tenets is higher and does not remain at the level of rejection and criticism. Instead, it can provide alternatives by having specific ontological, anthropological, and epistemological foundations. The present study enumerates theoretical foundations and assumptions of the dominant paradigm in international relations. It describes four critical perspectives and then refers to a distinct view in the Islamic approach. After that, address this fundamental question: 'where is the turning-point of this approach for alternative presentation and construction of an alternative order in International Relation?’ The results indicated that according to the Meta-theoretical foundations of the dominant paradigm, they had created contradictory concepts. They are including material/meaning, nature/metaphysics, and reality/truth but by prioritizing truth (over material objectivity), those dualities become invalid and new dualities are drawn, such as the weak / the arrogant, which can design an alternative to the current dominant system. According to these principles, the effects of originality on the necessity and the priority of creature on nature is emphasized, and truth-seeking generally replaces materialism.

honor of William Wainwright, this article takes up his interest in interreligious dialogue. It pursues two goals simultaneously: One is to provide a better model for understanding philosophy of religion. Terrence Tilley claims that there is the standard model which is mistaken in that it takes arguing for religious beliefs to be equivalent to justifying commitment to a religion. He promotes a practical model , which has its ancestry in the writings of Michel de Montaigne and Blaise Pascal. This model begins with the lived practices of religion and justifies its intellectual content as explanation for the rightness of this way of life. Wainwright’s work fits into the practical model, but Tilley provides a description and a stronger basis for it. The second goal is to provide much more adequate epistemological resources than those used by the standard model, with contributions from Catholic modernist theologian George Tyrrell, recent philosopher of science Imre Lakatos, and Alasdair MacIntyre, who became interested in evaluating traditions, in science, in moral reasoning, and finally what he came to call large-scale traditions. The problem he needed to overcome is the fact that such traditions carry their own, often different, concepts of reasoning. The possibility of fruitful rational conversation between religions is illustrated here by an account of dialogue between Christianity and Shi’ia Islam, as exemplified in David Burrell’s ability to use conversation with Islamic thought to clarify for Christians their own doctrines of the Trinity, the mediation of Christ, and original sin.