درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The conflict between sovereignty over parts of the sea and the necessity of "innocent passage" concept has been the most contentious field in the law of the sea." Two hypotheses in this field have collided in the history of international law of the sea. The first hypothesis is that every human possesses the seas together. "Navigation" and other operations are also allowed for all. Under the excuse of owning the sea, no state has the right to restrict other people's use. However, the second theory says that the sea is owned by someone who controls part of it, and its use can be limited. In international law, the "innocent passage" by foreign vessels from the territorial sea of a country is widely recognized. However, in some territories, the requirements for the "innocent passage" of military vessels include the need for prior notice or the coastal state's permission. Most forces, led by the US, believe in absolute freedom of the military vessel's "innocent passage." However, most Asian countries, including Iran, assume that they can prior notification or approval for a foreign military vessel passage. This activity was often resisted in operational as well as diplomatic phases by naval forces such as the United States. 

Many contemporary authors fear that the proliferation of rights-claims may cause human rights to fall victim to their own popularity. If every good that is desired by one or another group of people is cloaked in the venerable garbs of a human right, and there is no way to tell ‘real’ from ‘supposed’ human rights, this may generate scepticism towards the concept of human rights in general. However deplorable this situation may be, for moral philosophers it may be thought to involve an opportunity to reaffirm the importance of their discipline. After all, how else could we distinguish genuine from imaginary human rights than by building a theory about the subject? The aim of my paper is to show that this idea is exactly wrong — that the proliferation of human rights claims cannot be stopped even in theory. It is a mistake to think that the proliferation of rights claims results from a lack of awareness of the proper theoretical foundation of human rights. On the contrary, I will argue that the proliferation of rights mirrors a deep problem in secular theories of human rights, that these theories do not have the conceptual resources to limit ever larger rights claims. I will suggest that to understand the present situation, we need to look into the religious presuppositions of the culture in which natural rights to subsistence were first proclaimed. Specifically, I will argue that contemporary theories of human rights are secularized versions of a religious precursor.