درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

Practical reason is the use of reason to decide how to act and perform in a social reality. When someone deliberates about what to do, one puts all the reasons for the action, and then all the reasons against the action will determine the outcome of the action. In that situation, we can describe that practical action with reason because we will determine reason with the weight of different reasons not on the weighing reasons. In this paper, we analyze that reasons have weight against the theory that weights of reasons have no role in a theory of reasoning, and defend that reasons have weight with the evidence of practical reasons. The aim of this paper is to argue that weight of reasons has a role in the process of reasoning. In every situation of life, we can use have reason and weight of reason according to the practical situation of life.

This article clears a path for employing the affirmative way of interpreting Kant's general theory of religion as a guidepost for twenty-first century religious practitioners. Before attempting such an employment, I correct several misconceptions regarding the affirmative way of interpreting Kant's theory that, if adopted as mainstream, would risk weakening its universal applicability. With this purpose in mind, I consider and respond to a misplaced criticism of my interpretation of Kant's theory of grace, advanced by Douglas McGaughey in 2013. I then assess the current state of a debate that has arisen between several key affirmative interpreters, concerning Kant's reference to the two "experiments" that guide the argument in his Religion. I give special attention to Lawrence Pasternack's 2017 attempt to "dismantle" this whole line of interpretation as one that "may very well not be worth our time." After identifying several serious flaws in Pasternack's argument, I conclude by backing a better alternative developed by Brandon Love. By clearing away two very different sorts of potential roadblocks that could stand in the way of a reader of Kant gaining a fair understanding of the affirmative approach to interpreting his theory of religion, these arguments prepare the way for a concluding attempt to catch a glimpse of how Kant's theory of religious judgment (especially his four guidelines for designing the constitution of a church), if adopted widely by practitioners of various historical religions, could benefit the fractured world we find ourselves in, a quarter of the way through the twenty-first century.

This article examines Flann O’Brien’s The Third Policeman in the context of Object-Oriented Ontology, and argues that the novel transports the structural paradigm of reality and being towards a never-ending limbo, highlighting a circular transference of meaning from known toward unknown horizons and vice versa. In so doing, it explores the ways in which The Third Policeman engages with the concept of metaphor in its proportionality or analogous nature, revealing a contrapuntal form of narrative that produces an odd reality wherein objects maintain a self-referential position while introducing the subject as that which must oscillate between its metaphorical and literal integrity. The object, therefore, not only enjoys an independent existence in O’Brien’s narrative but also maintains a singular and independent ontological composition inside or outside such circular vortex. The article concludes by presenting the object as the most stable entity with multifarious functionalities that complement the axis of the narrative, cementing its presence as the mature object.