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Some of Donald Barthelme’s works have been undeniably influenced by Michel Foucault’s socio-political philosophy, however, few scholars have explored such concepts in his works, especially the theme of “panopticism.” The purpose of this article, which is library based, is to analyze and scrutinize the panoptic society of Barthelme’s “Subpoena” in the light of Foucauldian “panopticism” which is a segment of his more general concept of power. Keeping the Benthamite “Panopticon” in the back of his mind, Foucault outlines the “new physics of power” represented by “panopticism” as a modern or disciplinary power; he, then, draws our attention to its most important feature, i.e., the penetration into the most trivial and personal affairs of social subjects. It is worth mentioning that the basic characteristics of disciplinary power such as omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence can be discovered in panoptic society of “Subpoena.” In this society, there is always the possibility of resistance and rebellion because wherever power is found, resistance emerges as well, though, eventually, power prevails upon individuals. Barthelme creatively portrays a post-modern society in which disciplinary power, with its meticulous and permanent surveillance, on the one hand, has transformed the subjects into the men of modern humanism, and, on the other hand, has changed the traditional society into a panoptic one. Barthelme successfully finalizes the story with the message that modern society intends to make obedient and useful machines out of the subjects.

The relation of the many and the one, difference and identity, multiplicity and unity, particularity and universality, and finally that of negativity and negativity of negativity through reason and history is the core of Hegelian Absolute which is still an inevitable philosophical source to deal with most of the contemporary ontological problems. The article’s claim consists of two parts: Absolute is internally a retrospective totality of the System, on the one hand, and it is intertwined with a prospective negativity in a reciprocal relationship, on the other hand. Therefore, Absolute would be an absolute totality and an ongoing openness to the future at the same time. This article explains how Hegel’s articulation of the absoluteness is still a challenging ontological problem since it would simultaneously include both totality and negativity.

The purpose of this article is to examine the close connection between the science of psychology, especially Gestalt psychology, and phenomenology in the thinking of twentieth-century French philosopher and phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This philosopher established his own philosophy under the influence of significant advances in psychology on the one hand, and also under the influence of Husserl's phenomenology. Understanding the philosophy of this philosopher without understanding the close relationship between psychology and phenomenology, especially in the matter of the living body, will lead to a lot of misunderstanding in reading his views. In this article, we tried to show this close relationship in the thought of this thinker. We know, of course, that he criticized Husserl's phenomenology and Gestalt psychology, and argued that psychology fails to understand the nature of the human mind.

As generally accepted, consciousness or mind and material brain are closely related to each other; but how? Quantum mechanics is a new pathway to understand the hard problem of consciousness and its relation to the brain. Consciousness has specific properties such as unity, irreducibility, non-locality, etc. The completely different features of classical physics (locality, reducibility, determinacy, etc.) hindered the success of scientists to study consciousness. But quantum mechanics with its features (non-locality, irreducibility, indeterminacy, etc.) gave scientists hope to study consciousness. Several quantum approaches to consciousness have been proposed in recent decades; the most important point about these approaches is that each one has used its own philosophy to determine its viewpoint about the mind’s nature and even its quantum approach. In general, all scientific theories are based on some metaphysical principles which come from the worldview of scientists. In this article four contemporary approaches are discussed: The Eccles-Beck, Stapp, Penrose-Hameroff, and Avicenna-Bohm theories; philosophical and scientific points are highlighted for each of them. Finally, the theory of Top-Down Causation is discussed because we think it can provide a fertile philosophical ground for theories of “mind-brain relation” and “quantum consciousness”.

Since time immemorial, due to its metaphysically grounded perspective, western philosophy has not been able to detach itself from the egoistic outlook, and thus, the interaction with the "other” had no role in this philosophy. The world has always been interpreted from the perspective of "self" ignoring the "other". Reviewing this mode of thought from Ancient Greece to Modern Age, one can reveal a kind of repression and forgetfulness of "alterity" and difference which Levinas has well highlighted in his philosophy. The very foundation of this egoism can be traced back to the Socratic slogan "know yourself”. In the same spirit, a kind of self-centered moral philosophy has been developed, the clear example of which is Kant's ethics. In line with Hegelian tradition of recognition, contemporary thinkers have redefined ethics and politics and acknowledged the constitutional dependence of the “self” on the "other." Based on the coordinates of their thought as well as the historical condition of their own time in the formation of subjectivity, these thinkers have criticized the neglect of the “other”. Hegel's role in underlining the importance of the vital status of the “other” is unique. Hegel bridges all post-Hegelian currents on the concept of “Other”. Then, in the present essay, we seek to show that since Hegel’s time up to Derrida, we have been witness to the rise of “Other” and the fall of “Self”.