درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

One of the most significant issues concerning territory in both international and domestic law is the question of islands. Islands, whether as subnational political units or as extensions of the mainland, give rise to various legal complexities. Among these, the issue of sovereignty over islands linked to the mainland remains a crucial topic in international law and politics. In recent years, some of the most notable territorial disputes have centered on sovereignty over islands between different States. A prominent example is the long-standing dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, which, although rooted in the past, has entered a complex form between the two States since the early 1980s. This article aims to review one of the most reliable and authoritative books on Iran’s sovereignty over these islands in the Persian Gulf, titled Historical, Political, and Legal Foundations of Iran’s Sovereignty over the Islands of Tunb and Abu Musa, authored by the late Davoud Hermidas Bavand (1934–2023). Bavand was a distinguished Iranian diplomat and an expert in foreign policy and international law. The book was first published in English in 1994, followed by the first Persian translation by Bahman Aghaei, published by Ganj-e-Danesh Library Publishing in 1998. The following review is based on the first edition of the book.

The term "soft law" represents a comparatively recent conceptual development in international law, denoting rules and principles that are currently non-binding, inchoate, or predominantly politically motivated. The nature and extent of such norms are intrinsically shaped by political contexts and developments, which may appear to lie beyond the legal domain. Nevertheless, the term of soft law is not used in a vacuum devoid of a legal community and system; to do so would it strip of meaning and applicability. Instead, it is invoked in contexts where it has been scrutinized within the fabric of the international community and the international legal system. A pivotal issue in analyzing these norms is whether such a designation corresponds to a genuine legal category or is, in fact, illusory. In this article, we carefully examine this term, the context underpinning the proposal and establishment of such norms in international law, and assess it through the lens of general principles. We contend that the designation "soft" is inapposite and argue for its unreal character under certain conditions. The central thesis advanced herein is that no substantive distinction exists between "soft law" and "hard law"; rather, the rules and principles in question should be analyzed through modern insights and interpretive methods stemming from societal developments. Consequently, the use of dichotomous terms such as "soft" or "hard" - and the demarcation between rights and laws - becomes otiose, highlighting the significant role of general principles and their interplay with such norms. Although certain doctrinal approaches and schools (such as the New Haven School) have not engaged in the etymological and pathological analysis of this concept, they have nevertheless treated it as a component of a political governance system, resulting in a blurring of the precise boundary between law and politics.