درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

Many SADC countries host foreign offenders in their prisons. One of the measures adopted by these countries to deal with this challenge is to transfer the foreign offenders to serve part(s) of their sentences in their respective countries. This has been achieved through enacting domestic legislation on the transfer of offenders and signing bilateral and, to a small extent, multilateral prisoner transfer agreements. In August 2019, the “SADC Protocol on the Inter-State Transfer of Sentenced Offenders” (the Protocol) was adopted. The Preamble to the Protocol states that the underlying reason for the transfer is to “contribute towards the social reintegration” of the transferred offenders. As of the time of writing this article, the Protocol had not yet come into force. In this article, the author highlights some of the human rights issues that are likely to be contentious in the implementation or enforcement of the Protocol, especially in the light of the prisoner transfer legislation in different SADC countries. These issues are: grounds for transfer of foreign offenders (under this sub-theme, the author discusses the persons eligible for transfer, application for transfer and consent to transfer); enforcement of the sentence; pardon, amnesty, commutation of sentences and parole; cost of transfer; monitoring the enforcement of the sentence; access to information by the prisoner before the transfer and after the transfer.

Background and Theoretical Foundations:  Moscow believes that the West's approach to Ukraine is carried out with two methods of expanding the European Union, known as the Eastern Partnership Program and encouraging Ukraine to join NATO. Therefore, the Russians believe that if Kyiv joins the European Union, other countries of the former Soviet Union will gradually leave the Kremlin's sphere of influence. Ukraine joining the European Union will not only border Russia with NATO, but will also reduce Russia's influence. In this regard, Moscow wants a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and therefore will not tolerate a pro-Western country that is a member of NATO. Methodology: The research method is descriptive-analytical, which was collected and conducted through the study of library documents. Result: The research hypothesis can be proposed in this way that the interaction between Iran and Russia, taking into account measures such as the permanent and official presence of Iran in the ports of the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, greater convergence between Tehran and Moscow in solving the legal consensus of the Caspian Sea, the maximum benefit of the route of the Caspian Sea in the transit of goods in the North-South corridor can be realized. With the experiences they had learned from the past, this time the Russians came to the field with a more aggressive model against the actions of the West and NATO, and with military intervention and a show of power, they are trying to change the geopolitical game in their favor. Western reaction against this action caused increased pressure and intensified sanctions against Russia. Russia seeks to play an effective role in global equations and to improve its position in the international system and economic growth while expanding its sphere of influence. In this regard, it needs organizational and political cohesion for its benefit and in line with its defended values at the regional and global level. Nevertheless, the war between Russia and Ukraine can highlight Iran's status as a regional power. Conclusion: In the interaction of the balance of power in the relations between the great powers following the Russian military attack on Ukraine, creating a buffer zone between Russia and NATO can contain opportunities and threats for the countries of the region, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran and its foreign policy. Therefore, Iran, as an intermediate power in the world, should pursue a policy based on a positive balance, seeking to make the most of the current gap created in the relations between Russia and the West, for its interests and national security. On the other hand, because the Russians are self-interested and have a realistic and pragmatic policy, they consider an independent and powerful Iran a geopolitical supplement to developing their influence and future. The cooperation between Tehran and Moscow in the last two decades has been going on in various dimensions, despite some inadequacies, and has continued, especially much more so in the fields of security and defense. The secret of Russia's renewed emphasis on naval power is that this country is seeking to gain its share of power in the international system. In the meantime, countries like Iran, which have an important position in the relations between Russia and the West, are affected by international competition, whether they like it or not. In the meantime, Iran can catch the opportune chances that are present in naval strategy and operationalize its natural potential. Operationalization of the opportunities can be realized for Tehran by formulating maritime strategy solutions and bilateral interaction with Moscow. Therefore, it is clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran with interaction and agreement with Russia and the permanent and official presence of the Iranian naval fleet in the sea ports Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea ports, and also by more convergence with Russia in solving the legal consensus of the Caspian Sea, can increase the development of its maritime transit cooperation. The sale of Russian oil and gas through the Caspian Sea, the maximum benefit of the Caspian Sea route in the transit of goods in the North-South Corridor, can also be another achievement of Iran in using the opportunity of the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine in this region