ارائه تحلیل مضمون استقرائی جهت مفهوم سازی و ارزیابی رخداد مکانیزم مقاومت در افشاء اخبار بد (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
هدف: هر بازار سرمایه ای بر اساس بنیان گردش اطلاعات بنا نهاده شده است که باعث افزایش قدرت تصمیم گیری سرمایه گذاران بازار می شود. مدیران عامل شرکت ها در یکپارچه سازی افشای اطلاعات و ارتقای سطح قابلیت های اتکایی آن نقش بسزایی را ایفا می نمایند، که بسته به ویژگی های فردی یا اجتماعی و فرهنگی، انگیزه های افشای اطلاعات به خصوص اطلاعات منفی شرکت به بازار متفاوت است. هدف این پژوهش ارائه تحلیل مضمون استقرائی جهت مفهوم سازی و ارزیابی رخداد مکانیزم مقاومت در افشاء اخبار بد است. روش: در این پژوهش از تحلیل مضمون جهت شناسایی مضامین پژوهش در بخش کیفی، از تحلیل دلفی جهت تعیین حد اجماع نظری و تحلیل بازنمایی سیستمی جهت تعیین محرک ها و پیامدهای سیستمی مقاومت مدیرعامل در افشاء اخبار بد در بخش کمی استفاده شد. یافته ها: نتایج در بخش کیفی طی ۱۱ مصاحبه انجام شده و ۲۲۳ کد باز، از ایجاد ۲۶ مضمون پایه؛ ۶ مضمون سازمان دهنده و ۳ مضمون فراگیر حکایت دارد. نتایج در بخش کمی مشخص ساخت مهمترین محرک و پیامد در مضمون فراگیر مقاومت مبتنی بر بینش مدیرعامل در افشاء اخبار بد، ترس از دست دادن جایگاه مدیرعاملی و عدم توانمندی مدیرعامل در شناخت نیازهای اطلاعاتی ذینفعان است. از طرف دیگر محرک و پیامد مهم مقاومت مبتنی بر عملکرد مدیرعامل، وجود استانداردهای ضعیف حسابداری در افشاء اخبار بد و عدم تناسب نیازهای اطلاعاتی ذینفعان با فرهنگ مطلوبیت اطلاعات بود. در نهایت مشخص شد، دو مضمون منبع کنترل بیرونی و عدم خودباوری مدیرعامل در افشاء اخبار بد، محرک اصلی در مقاومت ناشی از علل روانشناختی محسوب می شود. نتیجه گیری: از آنجایی که افشاء اخبار منفی در سطح شرکت های بازار سرمایه معمولاً با تبعات و پیامدهای منفی از جانب بازار مواجه می شود، لذا احتمال بروز مقاومت مدیرعامل در افشاء اخبار بد معمولاً افزایش می یابد و این موضوع می تواند به موقع بودن گزارشگری مالی را با اختلال شفافیت اطلاعاتی مواجه نماید.Framework of Inductive Theme Process to Conceptualize and Appraisal the Occurrence of the Inertia Mechanism in Disclosing Bad News
Objective: Quality is considered as one of the most significant hidden layers of financial performance disclosure at the level of the capital market, which can have a significant impact on the overall performance of the capital market depending on the disclosure capacities and analytical power of investors and shareholders. Therefore, since companies are an open system and communicate with their environment, in case of not disclosing news on time, even disclosing bad news, this communication is generally one-way and according to the CEO's wishes and needs, it is selectively disclosed and the field of facilitating resistance It is strengthened in the functions of managers. Every capital market is based on the flow of information, which increases the decision-making power of market investors. Firms CEOs play an important role in integrating information disclosure and improving its level of reliability, which depending on individual or social and cultural characteristics, the motivations for disclosing information, especially negative company information to the market, are different. In fact, CEOs may refuse to fully disclose information to market stakeholders because of perceptual errors rooted in the form of individual self-perceptions of market stakeholders. The purpose of this research is Presenting CEO's Inertial Self-Concept Model in Not Reflecting Negative News to The Capital Market. Method: The methodology of this study was exploratory from the point of view of the developmental result and based on the type of objective and qualitative and quantitative basis was used to collect the data. The statistical population in the qualitative part was university experts and in the quantitative part financial managers of capital market companies. This research, which is developmental in terms of the methodological criteria of the result, and in terms of the qualitative data type criteria, is based on two thematic analyzes to identify the themes of the research in the qualitative part; Delphi analysis was used to determine the limit of theoretical consensus. Results: In line with the nature of the research, thematic analysis has been used in the qualitative part. In order to determine the themes related to managers' resistance in disclosing bad news, theme analysis has been used in the qualitative part. Thematic analysis is considered as the executive process of content analysis, which analyzes the basics and concepts of the present topic through simultaneous content analysis in similar studies and conducting interviews to determine its dimensions. The basic idea of content analysis is to put the content components of past researches based on theme analysis. A theme is a pattern found in the data that at least describes and organizes observations and at most interprets aspects of the phenomenon. In this research, the typology of thematic analysis based on the style of Atrid-Sterling (2001) is used. The structure of this analysis includes three dimensions emphasized below as the basis of the analysis. It was also determined that the two themes of the CEO's external control source in disclosing bad news and the CEO's lack of self-confidence in disclosing bad news are the main drivers in the self-concept of resistance caused by psychological causes, which causes the message of the CEO's perceptual errors in disclosing bad news and its reflection on the capital market. Conclusion: Based on the statistical findings, it should be stated that the pattern of systemic representation shows that the negative insight of the fear of losing the position of the CEO in the disclosure of bad news is considered as a motivating and influencing theme for not reflecting negative news to the capital market, which is an important consequence of the inability of the CEO to recognize The information needs of the stakeholders. In the analysis of the obtained result, it should be stated that the negative insight of the fear of losing the position of the CEO in the disclosure of bad news is considered as the main driver in not reflecting the negative news of the companies to the capital market, which can be the result of the inability of the CEO to recognize the information needs along with have In fact, as it was determined in this research in the analysis of system representation, the existence of personal vision schemas of the CEO is a stimulus to create the fear of losing the position. In other words, managers with this insight try to avoid all the events that may damage the position of the CEO. This avoidance is actually the protection of opportunistic interests, which has always been emphasized in agency cost theories and rational choice theory. The presence of this insight in the CEO makes him avoid any change and response to the information needs of the stakeholders, which means disturbing the balance and stability of his position by maintaining the existing conditions.
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