درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

This paper is an empirical attempt to investigate bilateral trade flow between Iran and Russia. To this end, we used statistical analyses on macroeconomic series over the period of 1991-2017. Results revealed that there is a significant statistical difference in terms of exports between Iran and Russia, and that there has always been a buyer-seller dialogue between the two countries. According to the Export-Import Similarities (EIS), Iran and Russia represented low potential complementarity between the years 2001 and 2017, which indicated that there is more trade competitiveness rather than trade complementarities between the two countries. Results from the statistical tests of Friedman and Kruskal-W revealed that the service sector has played an important role in creating value in Russia’s economy. In addition, there is a statistical significant difference with respect to Iran’s exports to Russia in terms of Iran and Russia’s sanctions and Russia’s membership to WTO. During the sanctions imposed by the West, when Russia and Iran’s GDP always decreases, they find each other as regional allies and try to strengthen their bilateral economic relationship. However, there is an obvious lack of diversity in Russian and Iranian export supplies and the volume of bilateral trade between them is not expected to increase in the future. Russia and Iran have failed to establish adequate economic, technical and educational ties and there is no active economic diplomacy between them. As a result, developing a clear program for the promotion of bilateral trade is a strategic priority, which must be operationalized by politicians.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been engaged in heated rivalry and conflict in the Middle East. These two regional powers are both major oil-exporting countries; in major foreign policy issues, therefore, oil is used as an important tool to pursue goals. Iran and Saudi Arabia have a long history of differences on oil policies, but one of the most severe differences emerged in 2011-2016, along with escalating tensions between the two countries in the region, which heavily shaped oil market trends in this period. In an attempt to analyze these oil market trends, the main question addressed in this article concerns Saudi Arabia’s decisions to use oil as a weapon against Iran in 2011-2016. The article reveals that the perception of expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East drove Saudis to resort to oil as weapon against Iran in 2011-2016. However, restrictions on the use of this tool led Saudi Arabia to withdraw from most part of this policy, especially in the oil market. The article uses neoclassical realism approach and illustrates Saudis’ direct and indirect use of oil weapon against Iran, and analyzes the outcomes of this offensive oil policy for the two countries in particular, and for the international oil market in general.