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A proper understanding of the teacher's status in the context of technology, especially new technologies such as artificial intelligence, requires an analysis of the philosophy of evolution of technology (nature and aims of technological developments) on the one hand and its relationship with the pedagogy and teacher on the other. In other words, the teacher's activity as a main factor in pedagogy has been a function of the philosophy of technological developments throughout history, and a proper understanding of this activity also requires a precise understanding of the nature and aims of technological developments. Accordingly, here we first refer to the stages of technological evolution and its meaning and functions, and then we discuss the impact of these stages of evolution on the role and activity of the teacher in the pedagogical process. The question that this article wants to answer is whether artificial intelligence, as the last stage of technological evolution that wants to replace the teacher in pedagogy, can replace it or not, and if not, what is the solution for the teacher and artificial intelligence to be able to function simultaneously?

This paper revisits the famous 1922 debate between Einstein and Bergson on the nature of time, outlining its central philosophical and scientific points of contention and re-evaluating them in light of developments in quantum physics. Einstein’s conception of time is that of an objective, measurable, and relative dimension within a static four-dimensional “block universe.” In contrast, Bergson conceives of time (durée) as a qualitative, continuous, and creative flow of consciousness that resists reduction to quantitative measurement. The emergence of quantum mechanics, particularly the Heisenberg time–energy uncertainty principle, introduces new complexities that challenge this dichotomy. Quantum features of time, such as intrinsic uncertainty, the indeterminacy of precise moments, and the relational role of the observer, undermine the deterministic framework of classical and relativistic physics and appear, at least superficially, to resonate with Bergson’s critique of spatialized, discrete conceptions of time. However, a closer examination reveals that quantum time remains a quantitative, physical construct distinct from Bergson’s qualitative durée. Drawing upon modern theories such as loop quantum gravity (as articulated by Carlo Rovelli and Lee Smolin) and the insights of contemporary philosophers, this study argues that neither a purely physical nor a purely philosophical approach can, in isolation, account for the multifaceted nature of time. Rather, a comprehensive understanding requires a synthesis of both, recognizing them as complementary perspectives on a single underlying reality.

The aim of this paper is to examine both the potential and limitations of Hegelianism in contemporary epistemology. To achieve this, the paper first explores Robert Brandom's interpretation of Phenomenology of Spirit in his 2019 work, Spirit of Trust. In this context, Hegel is positioned as a precursor to the holistic, historical, and social dimensions of belief, as well as a critic of the empiricist intuitions prevalent in modernity, aligning with the framework of American inferentialism. This section demonstrates that it is possible to discuss the constitution of concepts without invoking sensations or immediate knowledge. The paper then turns to the reception of Brandom’s proposal by scholars such as Richard Rorty and Slavoj Žižek, who concurs that Brandom falls short in maintaining a radical stance toward empiricism, and highlight the ethical and political challenges inherent in Brandom’s neo-Hegelian inferentialism. In this section, it becomes evident that Brandom’s concept of the Hegelian absolute and his notion of remembrance cannot be reconciled with a conception of reality as negative and contingent, a view that assumes progressiveness—something Žižek, in contrast, succeeds in recognizing within Hegel's philosophy.

This paper examines the political philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (AI) through three distinct approaches: optimistic positivist scientism, critical middle ground, and phenomenological pessimism. The central issue addressed is the ethical and political implications of AI, specifically how it influences governance, social structures, and human autonomy. The research questions explore how AI can be understood in terms of its potential and risks, how different political philosophies interpret its role, and what governance models can mitigate its negative consequences. The methodology adopted is a comparative analysis of key thinkers and their contributions to the debate on AI. The framework includes positivist, critical theory, and phenomenological perspectives, with a focus on how these paradigms inform the understanding of technology and its societal impact. Key theorists discussed include Francis Bacon, Karl Marx, Yuval Harari, Jürgen Habermas, Martin Heidegger, and Hannah Arendt, each offering a unique viewpoint on the nature of AI and its implications for governance and human existence. The findings highlight three divergent views: the optimistic positivist approach sees AI as a tool for progress, advocating for technological innovation and global governance; the critical middle ground emphasizes ethical oversight and regulation to prevent social inequality; and the phenomenological pessimism warns of AI’s potential to undermine human freedom and autonomy, leading to a dystopian, technocratic society. The study concludes that while AI offers significant potential for improving human life, it also raises profound challenges that require careful regulation, ethical consideration, and a commitment to preserving democratic freedoms.

Martin Heidegger claimed that German Idealism, especially the thought of Hegel, had brought to light a deficiency in the entire rationalist tradition of philosophy, which, when exposed as clearly as Hegel had, meant that the tradition could no longer credibly continue. He went on to argue that the implications of this deficiency had spread far beyond academic philosophy, were manifest in the daily life of the modern West, contributing to a historical world dominated by the technological predation of nature, conformism, thoughtlessness and a degraded cultural life. The tradition, he said, had “culminated” in the thought of Hegel; that is, the deficiency and its implications had finally become clearest in his system. The question raised in this article is whether Heidegger meant to charge that Hegel had simply neglected a question (“the meaning of being”) which he should have raised, or whether that neglect renders suspect the many other issues Hegel raises.

The present article seeks to critically examine the process through which philosophy of education emerged in modern Iran. Philosophy of education may be approached either implicitly or explicitly. This study primarily focuses on the explicit form of philosophy of education as an academic discipline, while also briefly considering its implicit forms—both before and after the establishment of the Dār al-Funūn—in order to shed light on the background that made the explicit discipline possible. The method employed is historical and philosophical analysis. The findings indicate that, due to the country’s overall backwardness, not only the implicit philosophy of education during the period of modernization but also the emergence of its explicit academic form by its founders developed in a state of intellectual passivity toward modern Western philosophies of education. The major orientations in Iranian philosophy of education have stemmed from three Western sources—German, Swiss, and American. The German orientation was introduced by Mohammad-Bāgher Hushyar; the Swiss orientation by Gholām-Hossein Shokuhi; and the American orientation by Ali Shari ‘atmadari. Without committing a fallacy of anachronism, these founders’ views are criticized. It may nonetheless be argued that their passive orientation prevented them from a critical engagement with the Westen perspectives and thus hindered the development of a philosophy of education suited to Iran’s own context. It appears that such an effort must proceed critically at the center of a triangle whose three sides consist of Iranian culture, Islamic culture, and modern culture. For my part, I have sought to contribute to this endeavor by offering a critique of pragmatist and constructivist approaches and, at the same time, by advancing an interpretation of Islamic culture grounded in an account of human agency. This approach to human agency leads—ontologically, epistemologically, and anthropologically—to a form of constructive realism, and axiologically to transformative traditionalism. Based on its own conceptual space, it places certain educational guidelines at the forefront, such as the notion of asymmetric interaction, which is distinct from both the traditional teacher-centered view and the modern learner-centered view.

This article interprets design not merely as a technical activity but as a site for the realization of ethical life in Hegel’s sense. Its theoretical framework builds on Hegel’s tripartite ethical model, right (recht), morality (moralität), and ethical Life (sittlichkeit), to show how design experience, when situated in institutional roles, mediation of value tensions, and practices of mutual recognition, contributes to the actualization of freedom and responsibility in the social sphere. Methodologically, the study adopts an interpretive–analytical approach, drawing on a close reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and major commentaries, brought into dialogue with contemporary literature on design ethics. Findings indicate that the legal and institutional structuring of design, while necessary as the formal ground of freedom, remains insufficient unless complemented by the internalization of responsibility at the individual level and its further embedding within social and professional institutions. Only through this progression can design approach what Hegel conceptualized as “freedom realized in the world of human institutions.” The analysis further reveals that ethical tensions, arising from conflicting stakeholder demands or gaps between individual ideals and institutional realities, are not peripheral but constitutive drivers of moral reflection in design practice. Yet the same institutional structures that enable recognition and accountability may also impose constraints that limit the scope of freedom’s realization. The study concludes that design can serve as a formative arena of ethical life, where freedom, duty, and mutual recognition are historically and socially shaped and reinterpreted. This reframing provides a conceptual foundation for future research on how design experience both reflects and shapes moral life within diverse institutional contexts.