Aristotle

The concept of time, its existence, ontology, and epistemology are considered as a pivotal philosophical issue from the ancient Greek time up to now. Aristotle explicitly deals with this subject. His notion of time can be also seen in Avicenna’s writings. This point have arisen many questions and discussions concerning that whether Avicenna as a commentator of Aristotle simply narrates Aristotle’s view, or he elaborates and develops Aristotle’s idea and presents his own view. The aim of this paper is to study this issue and discuss about the viewpoints of some Muslim scholars who believe that Avicenna’s idea is not fundamentally different from that of Aristotle. In addition, we study the viewpoints of those who believe that although Avicenna uses the same structure as Aristotle did, his specific considerations make his theory of time distinctive. The paper elaborates that, in some senses, there are at least two differences between these two philosophers: regarding the derivative / non-derivative conceptions of time, and regarding the divisibility / indivisibility of time.

This paper considers Aristotle’s distinction between the cause of being and the cause of coming to be. It is intended to show that Aristotle is able to unify both kinds of causes on the basis of the idea that a thing’s substance is its end. He is not confused about the cause of being and of coming to be, as it might seem in several passages. The paper’s focus is on Metaphysics Zeta 17. In contrast to David Charles’ interpretation, my reading of this chapter puts weight on the fact that the end is said to explain both coming to be and being. According to this reading, Zeta 17 is a clue to understanding the unification of both causes in Aristotle.

According to traditional philosophical literature, Akrasia is defined as acting against one’s best judgment. Philosophers have considered Akrasia as synonymous with the weakness of will. However, Holton considers these two phenomena to be distinct and argues that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. This study seeks to show that these two phenomena – unlike Holton's claim – are not distinct, but the accounts of Akrasia and weakness of will take two approaches to explain the reasons behind quitting actions: (1) in terms of its relationship to the agent; and (2) in terms of its relationship to the action. The researcher attempts to show that Holton's interpretation of the weakness of will refers to the second perspective whereas Aristotle approaches it from two perspectives. However, on duly analyzing the elements put forward by Holton, we can see them to be consistent with those of Aristotle.

Aristotle is more concerned with sensory perception and experience than philosophers before him, treating it as a kind of knowledge. It seems that the role he assigns to senses in knowledge acquisition does not qualify him as an Empiricist, although it does for some commentators. Now we should see if there is sufficient ground for the attribution of Rationalism to him. Now can we attribute Rationalism to him? And if yes, then in what sense and to what extent is he a Rationalist? To answer the question, I begin by considering components of Rationalism (and those of Empiricism, for that matter), that is, innate ideas and intuition, and then discuss Aristotle’s position regarding these components given his various works, particularly the last chapter of his Posterior Analytics and with the focus on nous. Since there have been different interpretations of this chapter of Posterior Analytics, I deal with exegeses by commentators such as Jonathan Barnes and their claims as they concern my claim in this paper.

In different parts of Metaphysics , Aristotle presents different (and apparently, conflicting) views on the nature and subject matter of the discipline in question. These different characterizations led to wide-ranging interpretations of the relation between metaphysics and philosophical theology. Muslim Philosophers adopted two different views. Al-Kindi and al-Farabi (in some of his works) endorsed the view that metaphysics is the same as theology as far as its subject matter is the First Cause (God) and it deals essentially with incorporeal entities. After Avicenna, however, a second view became dominant according to which metaphysics has a broader realm that embraces theology as its most noble part. The rationale behind this view is that the subject matter of metaphysics is “being qua being”, or unconditioned existent, in its broad sense so that philosophical theology can be taken as discussing some of the proper accidents of the unconditioned existent. This view requires that metaphysics cannot be a secular discipline and should be totally consistent with theology. It also provides us with a certain interpretation of what is usually called “Islamic philosophy.”

With regard to the essential role and function of topos / place (in comparison with time) in the thinking, acting and speaking of the ancient individuals, it is possible to analyze the inscribed speeches of ancient Persian kings according to their conceptions of topos or place. For reaching to this aim Darius' inscriptions in Behistun (DB) will be chosen and they will be analyzed within an appropriate heuristically Aristotle framework.

In his Nichomachean ethics, Aristotle has introduced Friendshiop (philia) as a civic virtue higher than justice. After Aristotle, Latin and Iranian thinkers articulated on the notions of “Amiticia” and “Dusti” as equivalent to Aristotel’s philia. In the modern times, while justice was regarded as legal system protecting individual rights, Friendship was reduced to a personal concern and was confined to private sphere of life. In recent time once again friendshiop has entered the intellectual melieu both in Iranian and German culture. In this paper three models of Friendship, namely Phronetic, Erfanic, and Phenomenological, are analysed, and, according to what these models pertain to, it is suggested that as regards convergence, it can be brought about by Friendship more than by Justice.

The rule of contraposition was used by Aristotle and later popularized during the medieval period in both Arabic and Latin logics. In this paper, we investigate the role of Aristotle and ancient commentators on developing the subject. We show that although Aristotle had used contraposition (on conditionals and indefinite affirmative categorical propositions), Proclus was the first to apply it to universal affirmatives and Philoponus was the first to name the rule. The latter used the rule on possible propositions too, which yielded to Simplicius’ thorough objections. We have found no ancient logician who could apply the rule to quantified categorical propositions except universal affirmatives, nor have we encountered any ancient logician who thoroughly investigated the rule with regard to all kinds of modal propositions. It seems that these developments occurred in later stages of the history of logic.

We use the term “good” in two contexts: as the most general term of evaluation, and to refer to the final ends of life and action. I start from the question what evaluative and final goodness have to do with each other. Do we use the same term because when we talk about final goods, we are evaluating ends and lives? If so, how do we go about doing that? Most things are evaluated with respect to their fitness to perform their function, but ends and lives do not have functions. I contrast three theories of the final good: the intrinsic value theory, the hedonist theory, and Aristotle’s account, which identifies a being’s final good with its well-functioning, a form of evaluative goodness. Aristotle’s theory suggests an illuminating relationship between evaluative and final goodness: a conscious being has a final good when she functions by having conscious states that track, and so enable her to pursue, her functional or evaluative goodness. It is therefore the nature of an animal to have a final good, and there are such things as final goods because there are animals. This theory explains the existence of final goods without any metaphysical appeal to intrinsic values.

What is learning after all? Being the cornerstone of educational psychology, this question has not lost its appeal since there still is no consensus over it. What makes providing a careful definition of learning important is that such definitions carry important pedagogical implications which might not be equally beneficial. This theoretical paper, therefore, has tried to define learning by a novel interdisciplinary approach through connecting educational psychology to philosophy. It has started with the dilemma of a lack of consensus over the definition of definition itself and the necessity for holding a theory of definition. Consequently, Aristotle’s definition theory has been chosen. To be impartial, it has been contrasted with that adopted by Karl Popper- Aristotle’s major critic. Then, mainstream leaning definitions have been investigated. Their inadequacy has been attributed to their non-adherence to a tenable definition theory. The paper recommends a framework for learning definition studies established by adopting Aristotle’s definition theory and other points discussed. Such a framework constitutes guidelines for future studies. These guidelines give future definition studies direction and coherence and allow us to move away from idiosyncrasies reflecting personal bias and, as such, they can direct us towards developing a consensual definition.

Although Shapin in his book claims a freedom from anachronism, it is not without anachronistic orientations. He cannot hesitate, at least occasionally, to represent the sciences of the Middle Ages as teleological, mythic, non-experimental, non-mechanical knowledge and strongly under the influence of the religious discourses. It seems he is not able to hesitate about a comparison between modern mechanical science and ancient sciences. This comparison, I believe, usually leads to underestimate the premodern sciences, at least for the young readers. In some places, Shapin follows a completely partial approach. He presents the rivals of the modern science in seventeenth century as a vulgar knowledge, which leads the reads to see no difference between ancient sciences and the vulgar knowledge of the nature. Although Shapin is aware of the rhetoric of those times, he never tries to represent a pure image of the scientific-mathematical knowledge of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

There has been a close interaction between post-Islamic Iranian philosophical, ethical, as well as political wisdom and Greek philosophy especially Platonic and Aristotelian trends of thought. Muslim Philosophers such as Farabi and Ibn Rushd have been among the major interpreters and commentators of the works of great Greek philosophers particularly Aristotle’s. Hence Aristotle was given the title of "the First Teacher” and Farabi that of “the Second Teacher". A main topic of discussion among Muslim scholars has been the great work of Aristotle, the Nichomachean Ethics, which addressed the author's son. The Arabic version of this book had a great impact on the ethical and civil heritage of Muslim scholars, since there was some closeness between those precepts and the Islamic ones. The present article discusses traces of this impact.

One of the influential topics in Islamic philosophy is the issue of "active intellect". This term has entered Islamic philosophy from Aristotle's philosophy and some interpreters of Aristotle's works. Islamic philosophers interpreted this issue in the context of their philosophical system and by expanding its concept from the field of natural and industrial (artistic) phenomena to the field of epistemology; they gave it a significant role. These philosophers have presented two types of arguments to prove the active intellect. Some of these arguments are formulated based on the theory of the nine spheres and according to the principle of causality. These arguments attemt to prove efficient causes for the existence of spheres and introduce ultimate causes for their rotational movements. Arguments of the second category also attempt to prove active intellect by relying on principles such as "every event and contingent needs an efficient cause" and "lacking a thing, it is not given to it". In this article, these arguments have been examined and finally, it has been concluded that the arguments of the first category are vulnerable and invalid due to the invalidity of their basis (planetary theory); and the arguments of the second category can only prove non-material and efficient cause or causes, provided that their premises are true, not the active intellect, i.e., the tenth intellect.