مطالب مرتبط با کلیدواژه

free will


۱.

Self-, Social-, or Neural-Determination?(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی پاییز ۱۳۹۸ شماره ۲۸ 95-108

کلیدواژه‌ها: Mind free will self-determination Damasio Libet Dennett

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Human “free will” has been made problematic by several recent arguments against mental causation, the unity of the I or “self,” and the possibility that conscious decision-making could be temporally prior to action. This paper suggests a pathway through this thicket for free will or self-determination. Doing so requires an account of mind as an emergent process in the context of animal psychology and mental causation. Consciousness, a palpable but theoretically more obscure property of some minds, is likely to derive from complex animals’ real-time monitoring of internal state in relation to environment. Following Antonio Damasio, human mind appears to add to nonhuman “core consciousness” an additional narrative “self-consciousness.” The neurological argument against free will, most famously from Benjamin Libet, can be avoided as long as “free will” means, not an impossible event devoid of prior causation, but an occasional causal role played by narrative self-consciousness in behavioral determination. There is no necessary incompatibility between the scientific and evolutionary exploration of mind and consciousness and the uniquely self-determining capabilities of human mentality which are based on the former.
۲.

Plantinga on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی پاییز ۱۳۹۸ شماره ۲۸ 247-261

کلیدواژه‌ها: foreknowledge free will determinism inconsistency providence divine knowledge

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In each one of the well-known Abrahamic religions, notably Islam, Christianity and Judaism, there are two important doctrines which seem to be inconsistent, but nonetheless some religious philosophers like Plantinga try to show that there is no conflict between them. The first doctrine is that God is Omniscient and He has foreknowledge of all that will happen in the future and thus all human actions are determined in His knowledge. The second doctrine is that human beings have free will and they are responsible for all of their voluntary actions. The problem is that if all future actions of a person are determined in divine knowledge, it is impossible for him to change his future and so he is not free. This article will assess some of the solutions given to the problem and it will focus on Plantinga's solution to the problem and then it will unravel some defects of his solution. At the end of this article, a new solution to the problem will be given, in which the free will of human being is confirmed while the nature of divine knowledge is regarded ambiguous to the extent that its changeability or unchangeability is left unknown.
۳.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Moral Responsibility (In Defense of Muslim Philosophers’ Approach)(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی پاییز ۱۳۹۸ شماره ۲۸ 275-290

کلیدواژه‌ها: foreknowledge moral responsibility free will Frankfurt principle of alternative possibilities (PAP)

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تعداد بازدید : ۳۱۲ تعداد دانلود : ۲۶۸
According to most Muslim philosophers, the Divine foreknowledge, on the one hand, is so inclusive that encompasses each and every minor and timed action of moral agents, and because of the perfection of God in essence and attributes, any defects in His essence and attributes including any errors in His foreknowledge are impossible. On the other hand, these philosophers, like other defenders of free will, claim that significance of any kind of free will and responsibility of a moral agent depends on their access to alternate possibilities (PAP (and, consequently, their ability to do and not to do an action simultaneously. This paper aims to deal with this highly debated and rooted question that whether these two views are essentially in conflict with each other. To answer this pivotal question briefly based on a modified version of Frankfurt cases and Muslim philosophers’ definition of free will, we attempt to defend their initial approach to eliminating the conflict between Divine foreknowledge and free will or moral responsibility and show that, firstly, this infallible knowledge is contingent on the agent’s voluntary action and, secondly, despite the principle of alternate possibilities, moral responsibility of the agent does not depend on the person’s avoidance of the forthcoming action.
۴.

The Essence and Origins of Action in Mulla Sadra’s Philosophy of Action

نویسنده:
منبع: تأملات اخلاقی دوره اول تابستان ۱۳۹۹ شماره ۲ 109 - 127

کلیدواژه‌ها: free will Voluntary Actions Philosophy of Actions Sadrian Philosophy

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According to Sadrian philosophers, human beings’ voluntary actions are movements born of the effect of recognizing their perceptive faculties concerning outside matters and this effect forms through the intention or will that rises in a person’s soul. The starting point of human action is the point of the formation of the immaterial aspect (the soul) in a human being. According to this perspective, the origins of human actions are cognizance, desire, and will. In a human being’s voluntary and involuntary actions, it is the soul that is in motion. This substantial motion of the soul is part of the great substantial motion design that is progressing in the whole of the natural world and that which belongs to it. The motion of the essence of the soul is also necessary and perpetual and its goal and ultimate beloved is God; however, a human being’s voluntary action is another substantial motion which forms within this necessary motion of the soul and can intensify the perpetual motion and revolution of the soul towards its real object of love so that it may attain the perfection worthy of it through this intensification or can throw a person into a whirlpool of decline. The ultimate goal of human beings’ voluntary actions is to arrive at the closest level of closeness to God that has two aspects: 1) possessing the most intense knowledge concerning all existents and the levels of the world and 2) abstraction of essence and action from matter. All motions in creation happen through God’s grace and, therefore, a human being’s voluntary actions are all performed through the help of God’s eternal grace without affecting man’s free will.
۵.

Making Sense of a Free Will that is Incompatible with Determinism: A Fourth Way Forward(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی سال بیست و سوم پاییز ۱۴۰۰ شماره ۳ (پیاپی ۸۹) 5 - 28

کلیدواژه‌ها: free will incompatibilism libertarianism agent-causal Event-causal non-causal determinism

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For a half - century, I have been developing a view of free will that is incompatible with determinism and, in the process, attempting to answer the Intelligibility Question about such a free will: Can one make sense of an incompatibilist or libertarian free will without reducing it to mere chance, or mystery, and can such a free will be reconciled with modern views of the cosmos and human beings? In this paper, I discuss recent refinements to my earlier writings on such a view, refinements developed in recent years in response to the large critical literature on my views in the past several decades. My view has usually been designated an event-causal (EC) view of libertarian free will and distinguished from non-causal (NC) and agent-causal (AC) libertarian views. But I was never happy with this designation of my view as “event-causal” and did not use it myself in earlier writings. In this paper, I explain why I now reject it altogether. I have come to believe that to avoid numerous misunderstandings in current debates about free will, we must distinguish four different kinds of libertarian theories, not merely three: in addition to non-causal (NC), agent-causal (AC), and event-causal (EC) theories, we need to add a fourth kind, which might be called an agent-causal/event-causal (AC/EC) theory. My view has always been of this fourth kind. It represents what I call in the title of this paper the “fourth way forward” for making sense of an incompatibilist free will.
۶.

Free Will versus Determinism - As Determined by Radical Conceptual Changes(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی سال بیست و سوم پاییز ۱۴۰۰ شماره ۳ (پیاپی ۸۹) 29 - 50

کلیدواژه‌ها: Categorial frameworks Complex systems determinism free will Historicist philosophy laws of nature

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My objective in this article is to question whether the problem of free will can, within our current conceptual system, be framed coherently. It is already widely recognized that a mental faculty, the will, needed to initiate action, no longer fits with current thought. However, we can still ask whether human decisions and actions are determined by something other than the agent. So the important question is whether we still have a cogent concept of determinism . The two prevalent alternatives are a closed set of deterministic laws of nature, and a simple distillation of the principle of sufficient reason: all events must have a cause. I first provide examples showing that philosophical concepts come and go as categorial frameworks change. The modern concept of deterministic laws of nature was developed during the latter half of the modern period and is now being called seriously into question. G. W. Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason could only be justified in theological terms, which most contemporary Western scholars reject. I end with an inadequate account of a dawning worldview based on complex adaptive systems theory, in which most human actions are best described in terms of non-necessitating propensities .
۷.

Creation, bugs, and emergence(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی سال بیست و سوم پاییز ۱۴۰۰ شماره ۳ (پیاپی ۸۹) 93 - 112

کلیدواژه‌ها: emergent dualism Cartesian dualism animal consciousness materialism causal closure argument from reason unity-of-consciousness argument free will common sense.

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An argument is presented, based on a common-sense interpretation of an everyday experience, for emergent dualism as the best available account of the origin of the human mind/soul. Emergent dualism is superior to subjective idealism in that it honors the common-sense conviction that the things we encounter have a real, physical existence, separate from our mental perceptions of them. It is superior to materialism in that it allows for our mental states to have real, physical effects, distinct from the effects of the physical states that accompany the mental states. It is also superior to materialism in allowing for a real, unified self that is not merely a collection of physical particles. These features allow emergent dualism to provide a foundation for libertarian free will; belief in such free will is another deliverance of common sense that cannot readily be reconciled with materialism. Emergent dualism is superior to standard varieties of dualism in giving a plausible account of the minds of non-human animals. Perhaps surprisingly, emer gent dualism is superior both to traditional dualism and to standard varieties of materialism in combining readily with theories of biological evolution, in which natural selection promotes both the physical and mental development of complex organisms.
۸.

The Relation of Causal Necessity and Free Will in The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence “When our pen reached this point, it shattered to pieces”(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی سال بیست و سوم پاییز ۱۴۰۰ شماره ۳ (پیاپی ۸۹) 113 - 136

کلیدواژه‌ها: free will Intention desire casual necessity Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī Muḥaqqiq Naini

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The relation of causal necessity with free will has been a source of great debate in the history of philosophy and theology. However, in recent years, it has also been discussed in the science of Usul al-Fiqh. After explaining the compatibility of causal necessity with free will, Ākhūnd Khurāsānī speaks of the 'shattering of his pen.' Two interpretations have been given for this statement. Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī considers the theory of compatibility that Khurāsānī presented as being correct. However, he interprets the 'shattering of the pen' to be a reference to another matter, i.e., the problem of the recompense of an agent in the case where causal necessity is accepted. His explanation of the aforementioned compatibility and the permissibility of the recompense of sinners has been evaluated in this article. On the contrary, Muḥaqqiq Na'ini considers the 'shattering of the pen' to be a reference to the problem of the conflict between causal necessity and free will. He says that aside from the popular preliminaries of free will, such as knowledge and intention (which are the products of causal necessity), there is a need for something that he calls 'talab'-a noetic action that stems from the governance of the soul. He considers this talab to fall outside the scope of causal necessity. This paper seeks to examine the views of these two illustrious students of Ākhūnd Khurāsānī so that the various Usuli dimensions of this discussion can be clarified.
۹.

The Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی سال بیست و سوم پاییز ۱۴۰۰ شماره ۳ (پیاپی ۸۹) 137 - 156

کلیدواژه‌ها: free will moral responsibility libertarianism luck

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This article articulates and defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will (LFW). It begins by defining the conception of free will at issue and then goes on to present versions of the luck objection which is often made against theories of LFW. It is argued that the sort of indeterministic weightings model of LFW which has been defended in the recent literature by Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe (2005, 2008) and John Lemos (2018, Ch.5) has the resources to answer such luck objections while possessing virtues which some other libertarian views lack. According to the indeterministic weightings model of LFW, in making undetermined free-willed choices between two courses of action, A or B, the reasons for choosing each option don’t come with pre-established evaluative weights. During the process of deliberation, the agent assigns weight in an undetermined way to the reasons for each option and this typically leads to the choice of the option that has been assigned a greater value. In the paper, it is not only argued that this theory can resolve worries about luck but also that the view has virtues which certain other libertarian views lack, as such the view is contrasted with the modest libertarian models of LFW from Daniel Dennett (1978) and Alfred Mele (1995) as well as Robert Kane’s view (1996, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2019).
۱۰.

The Free Agent, Luck, and Character(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی سال بیست و سوم پاییز ۱۴۰۰ شماره ۳ (پیاپی ۸۹) 173 - 192

کلیدواژه‌ها: free will free agent possible alternatives causality character luck desire

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Whether we are free agents or not and to what extent depends on factors such as the necessary conditions for free will and our definition of human agency and identity. The present article, apart from possible alternatives and the causality of the agent regarding his actions, addresses the element of inclination as a necessary condition for free will. Therefore, an analysis of these conditions determines that even though in some circumstances the range of alternatives the agent can choose is very limited or the agent chooses an action without having the inclination to choose it; however, this does not make the agent forced; rather, free will has levels and every individual possesses a certain extent of it in different conditions. Just the fact that the ultimate choice is made by the agent himself and has voluntarily performed the act himself ultimately is sufficient for being free. As a result, even though the influence of external factors on human actions cannot be disregarded; however, because the action is ultimately not outside his control, accordingly, there is neither such a thing as a compelled agent and nor are our actions left to luck. The character of the agent that is voluntarily formed through our actions plays a determinant role in our choices and actions due to the epistemic and motivational components they possess.
۱۱.

Free Will as a Fundamental Basis of Moral Action According to Mulla Sadra and Kant(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: International Journal of Ethics and Society, Vol ۵, No ۱, (۶-۲۰۲۳) 13-19

کلیدواژه‌ها: free will ethics practical reason happiness Mulla Sadra Kant

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Introduction: In this comparative research, while discussing free will as the basis of moral action, Mulla Sadra's and Kant's views were examined. In examining Mulla Sadra's views, his fundamental approach in relation to free will and the fruit of practical reason, i.e. the attainment of transcendental agency, has been considered as the main paradigm. Material and Methods: The research method is logical analysis on the use of library texts. Conclusion: From the comparison of these two theories, it can be concluded that Kant's theory has led to humanist ethics due to benefiting from the essence of human knowledge and using elements such as independence of will. Because according to Kant, man has a true identity and is free from all external and transcendental factors. According to him, independence of will is the highest principle of morality. Mulla Sadra's theory is an epistemological-divine theory and his epistemological basis is also rooted in the beyond. From his point of view, although man is a creator, but he is really the same as belonging, needing, and connecting with the origin of existence, that is, God, and Mullah Sadra's upward course is based on the movement of his essence, the originality of his existence, its skepticism, and the connection of man with the holy intellect and the active intellect, and finally it shows communication with God; that man has no independence from himself and his whole existence is mortal in the existence of the Almighty. Kant considered will and free will as the most fundamental bases, while Mulla Sadra considered theoretical reason to be the basis of human knowledge
۱۲.

Haji and the Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی سال ۲۵ پاییز ۱۴۰۲ شماره ۳ (پیاپی ۹۷) 101 - 118

کلیدواژه‌ها: free will libertarianism Indeterministic weightings luck John Lemos Isthtiyaque Haji

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In recent work, I defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (Lemos, 2018, Ch. 5; 2021; 2023, Ch. 6). On this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. In basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. In a recent article, Ishtiyaque Haji (2022) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. I argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position.
۱۳.

Kant’s Humanism: A Loophole in the Principle of Sufficient Reason(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی تابستان ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۷ 29 - 48

کلیدواژه‌ها: Kant free will humanism Principle of Sufficient Reason

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I consider the principle of sufficient reason (henceforth, PSR) as it functions in both Leibniz and Kant. The issue separating these thinkers is a modal status of absolute contingency, which is exempt from PSR insofar as it is neither logically necessary, nor does it necessarily follow from the given causal series. Leibniz’s ambitious metaphysics applies PSR even to God’s choices, which, since they must rest on a reason that makes sense of them, necessarily tend to the creation of the best of all possible worlds. Through PSR, the exercise of human freedom represents the unfolding of a concept God already has chosen, with an eye to the best possible world aligned with the universal intelligibility enjoined by PSR. PSR, in Kant’s critical period, is not a principle of being, but one of mere experience, since any extension of thought beyond possible experience can yield no knowledge. Human agency, for Kant, has an intelligible aspect that is beyond possible experience. Since PSR is only a principle of experience for Kant, the agent in its intelligible aspect is not subject to it. Human free will introduces a special modal category of absolute contingency. Kant provides impetus for a humanism that makes the absolute freedom of the human will a competitor with the sovereignty of God, and also liberates the human will from contemporary ideologies that would subordinate it to natural determinism or group dynamics.
۱۴.

A Kantian Solution for the Freedom of Choice Loophole in Bell Experiments(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)

نویسنده:
منبع: پژوهش های فلسفی تابستان ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۷ 189 - 202

کلیدواژه‌ها: Bell’s inequality Big Bell test free will Kant Agency

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Bell’s theorem is based on the assumptions of local causality and measurement independence. The last assumption is identified by many authors as linked to the freedom of choice hypothesis. In this sense the human free will ultimately can ensure the measurement independence assumption. The incomplete experimental conditions for supporting this assumption are known in the literature as “freedom-of-choice loophole” (FOCL). Although there is no consensus among the scientists that the measurement independence is linked to human choices, in a recent paper, published in a prestigious journal, signed by more than a hundred authors, this assumption was seriously taken for the first time in an experiment known as Big Bell Test (Abellán et al. 2018). Using photons, single atoms, atomic ensembles and superconducting devices, this experiment was performed in five continents, and involved twelve laboratories, adopting human choices to close the FOCL. Nevertheless, the possibility of human freedom of choice has been a matter of philosophical debate for more than 2000 years, and there is no consensus among philosophers on this topic. If human choice is not free, this solution would not be sufficient to close FOCL. Therefore, in order to support the basic assumption of this experiment, it is necessary to argue that human choice is indeed free. In this paper, we present a Kantian position on this topic and defend the view that this philosophical position is the best way to ensure that Big Bell Test can in fact close the loophole.