A priori

The a priori is the basic characteristic ofKant's theory of knowledge. Formaliz/ng the a priori, Kant appears to distinguish the a priorifrom the postriori and qffirms its purity. He insists that the a priori is prior to the a postriori and stqys independent!Jfrom it. The overall objectiue of this paper is, boueier; to present and to support this idea that the a priori, even prior, can be defined l?J its relation to experience; ifthe a priori is prior to the a postriori, and ifits validity is not depended on the a postriori, it is still not ivithout mry relation with it. The main thesis I u;iflfoll01v here is that the a postriori could be called the root of the a priori: the a priori has its principle in the a postriorijust because it is given to it. The a priori is given in the experience. Instead of conceiving the a priori as a formal or logical cond Ition of ol?Jectiviry, it uould be considered as immanent in the objea and apprehended during the very act of experience, although known implicit!J before experience occurs. If the a priori is indeed given in experience, we are not constrained to restrict it to the formal conditions of oijectiviry. However, before proceeding to substantiate this thesis, I 1vill reiien. Kant's analysis of the a priori quick/y. Then, I willpresent the main thesis and its proof to deformalize the a priori and implant it in the a postriori domain.

kripke bas proposed a number of counteretxamples to the classic thesis, which ays that the class of necmary fropositions roincidn with the cla1ss of a priori ones. These counteretxamples involve some necessary a posten'ori trutbs as well as contingent a priori ones. Om cfbis exmnplu far the loller is the 1ta11dard metre example. In thi1 paper, after presenting a brief sketch of Kripke'1 proposal, I'll exan,ine the main ohjution1 to it and argue !hat all of them co,t!d be replied to. At the end, ho,vever,argue that the standard metre example enjoy1 much Im philosopbical significance than it appears to,and,considering the sprit,it of the clauic tbesis, it faill to rif,1tt tbiI tbesis.

According to Kant, the lack of progress in metaphysics is due to the fact that philosophers tried to solve metaphysical problems without examining the limits of our reason, and the outcome of these endeavors has been a dogmatic metaphysics fraught with contradictions and tensions. Then, after examining the types of cognition, he concludes that in order to determine the limits of reason's capacity, one must answer the question: “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” Some contemporary Islamic philosophers have sought to answer this question inspired by the teachings of Islamic philosophy. One solution involves resorting to conceptual relations that make the synthetic a priori judgments possible, while another solution is to deny outright the a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic distinctions of cognition. In this paper, using a comparative-analytical method, I demonstrate that these two solutions are unsuccessful. The proposed alternative is to consider the possibility of such propositions as fundamental and in no need of further explanation. This suggestion seems to be simpler and fully consistent with the teachings of Islamic philosophy.