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SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES : Contemporary human, despite reaching the peak of development and enjoying significant scientific, advancements, do not seem particularly satisfied and content. The destructiveness of time, the fear of death, and the brevity of life are among the factors that contribute to the emergence of disillusionment and the proliferation of nihilistic thoughts in the modern world.  The constant pursuit of material gains has failed to address deeper existential concerns. Therefore, there is a growing need to explore the profound aspects of life, such as the search for meaning and the quest for personal fulfillment, in order to alleviate existential pains and enhance the overall quality of human existence. In this regard, the main subject and objective of the present research are focused on the issue of life's meaningfulness and human longevity by finding tangible solutions to existential pains, improving the meaning and values of their lives. METHOD AND FINDING : This research, with an Analytical-Descriptive approach to examine the philosophical and existential theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein, particularly focusing on his early philosophy and exploring the constitutive components of meaning from his perspective in human life. CONCLUSION : The results of this research emphasize the importance of two fundamental elements, Aesthetics and Ethics, with a special emphasis on the metaphysical subject's eternal perspective, in creating a meaningful and purposeful life. These two components are considered as the highest means of expressing the real values of life and a solution for overcoming its challenges and difficulties, guiding humans towards a meaningful life.

The key problem addressed in the paper is that of the legal pluralism, more specifically the pluralism of legal systems within one state that pursues the accommodation of religious freedom claims. In its controversial Refah decisions the Strasbourg Court held that the prohibition of the Turkish Welfare Party was “necessary in a democratic society” because its plan to set up a plurality of legal systems was not “compatible with fundamental democratic principles”[1]. This paper tries to inquire into the notion of legal pluralism, tries to test normative assumptions made by the Court in its regard and argues that a “no plurality” approach would be overly simplistic and that a liberal approach would require different degrees of pluralization (some of which already exist to accommodate differences and diversity within a society) to be extended to religion, without however endangering constitutional democracy. <br />It is necessary to point out at least two major theoretical contexts in which this problem should be considered. One is undoubtedly the issue of ‘militant’ democracy: once we assume that constitutional democracy and legal pluralism are incompatible, we give a (part of) definition of democracy, which entitles us to reject any changes proposed to it while retaining the claim to be democratic. If we know what is democracy in a substantive sense, which values it is designed to protect (e.g. secularism or fundamental rights) we can legitimately reject any changes to that vision as a measure protective of such values[2]. <br />Another context that is relevant is the issue of universality and cultural relativism. It first appears when we attempt to define democracy as a substantive notion, which necessarily assumes a value judgement. It also becomes relevant if we mind that the rationale of legal pluralism is the necessity to recognize, respect and tolerate different views and visions of ‘happiness’. In its pure form the idea of relativism and legal pluralism is represented in the classical version of state-centered international law system, where states posses equal and unlimited internal sovereignty[3]. However even within the State any kind and instance of legal pluralism is about the respect and tolerance of the different normative values and views. Only straightforward consensus on all the rules and values as universal can justify total rejection of legal pluralism. <br />The paper will start by an attempt to clarify the understandings of legal pluralism in social sciences and law. The second part will try to construe a liberal argument in favor of advancing legal pluralism to a certain degree, basing on the individual right to freedom of religion and conscience. Instead of relying on the ‘collective rights’ argument, it rather believes that individual rights provide a sufficient basis for this claim, as far as religious life and consciousness are deemed an important part of individual personality and self-determination. The third part tries to balance the claims of legal pluralism by considering arguments against such a model of society. <br /><br clear="all" /> <br /> <br />[1] Case Of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) And Others v. Turkey, <em>(Applications nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98) </em>Judgment, 31 July 2001 [hereinafter <em>Refah (1)</em>] paras 70-71;<em>See also </em>Case of Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey <em>(Applications nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98), </em>judgment, 13 February 2003, [hereinafter <em>Refah(2)</em>] paras 98 and 119. <br /> <br /> <br />[2] See <em>infra</em>, text accompanying notes 35-39. <br /> <br /> <br />[3] See <em>infra</em>, note 8, text for the note 25 and page 14.

This study aims at investigating the factors effective on poverty as one of the notable socioeconomic problems in Iran. To overcome the limitations of the prior research, the present study makes use of a multilevel model so as to simultaneously analyze the individual-level (personal characteristics) and macro-level (economic and institutional characteristics) factors. The provincial household budget data are obtained from Statistical Center of Iran and regional-national accounts of 2014 are used to explore the individual and institutional factors that might influence the poverty status of a family. Comparing the individual and institutional effects within the analytical process revealed that the model can empirically make it clear which of the two levels has the highest effects on poverty likelihoods in poor families. The study results indicate that none of the institutional and macro-level variables affects the poverty occurrence or eradication likelihoods and, in the meantime, the majority of the individual level variables, including the number of family members, employment status, age and education level of the family head are found strongly and significantly associated with poverty occurrence likelihood in a household.