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This contribution focuses on Heidegger’s critique of the vulgar nationalism contained in the Black Notebooks (1931-1938), and it follows the rejection of ideologisms that many of his works entail. According to Heidegger’s juridical reflection, “freedom is the ground of the inner possibility of correctness” with which external ideologies such as that of nationalism are avoided. This suggestion contrasts with Heidegger pro-Semitic orientation, testified by his rector’s speech in 1933, but is in line with the distance Heidegger sets between both the moral and the epistemological-ontological world, supported in his writings since the Marburg lectures (1923-1928). In the type of society, Heidegger figures out individuals live together in the πόλις by ek-sisting into the truth of being and by understanding the assignment of those directives that must become their laws and rules. These principles can’t be merely something fabricated by human reason, because they are a) the expression of social thinking made upon a juridical and normative framework close to liberalism. According to Heidegger, humanity is conceived to be free-in and able to choose the avoidance of totalitarian regimes voluntarily, as well as of eternal values supporting ideologies. With the freedom-in concept Heidegger b) solves the problem of coercive violence caused by the restriction of the ought to (i.e. the obligations that come from ideologies) towards the Being, to show the significance of ἦθος in which Dasein is placed. The choice to be in the ἦθος c) provides an explanation based on Heidegger’s critique of technology in his post-Turning writings. This critique clarifies why a national socialist ideology, making use of such technical instruments and supporting ethical materialism, is not in line with the political ontology Heidegger promotes in his writings.

If we have libertarian free will, then it is plausible to believe that the occurrences of certain physical events have irreducible and ineliminable mental explanations. According to a strong version of (metaphysical) naturalism, everything in the physical world is in principle explicable in nonmental terms. Therefore, the truth of naturalism implies that libertarian choices cannot explain the occurrences of any physical events. In this paper, I example a methodological argument for the truth of naturalism and conclude that the argument fails. I then consider additional concerns raised against the reality of libertarian freedom. First, I examine the claim that if a physical event E is not causally determined to occur by another physical event, then there is no way to account for the difference between E’s occurring randomly and E’s being causally determined to occur by a mental event. Second, I consider the assertion that the affirmation of libertarianism is a mind-of-the-gaps version of the God-of-the-gaps objection to a divine explanation of a physical event. Third, I take up the question of whether the inability of libertarians (or anyone else) to pinpoint precisely where the initial physical effects of libertarian choices occur is a good reason for rejecting libertarianism. Fourth, I examine the claim that belief in the existence of the soul or immaterial mind is the result of an explanatory hypothesis to account for how libertarian free choices can causally produce physical effects. Fifth, I look at the traditional objection to substance dualism from the impossibility of causal interaction between a soul and its body.