In Avicenna’s view, the practical intellect plays a basic and foundational role in producing moral action. By investigating this notion in the framework of Avicenna’s philosophy, we find that he regards perception and cognition as the main functions of the practical intellect. However, he considers this perception as particular, introducing it as different from the particularity of imaginary and estimative cognitions (animal perceptive faculties). This difference makes the action produced by an animal essentially different from the action produced by the practical intellect. This view, however, is contrary to the views of some other philosophers and theologians who disagree with him on the perceptive function of the practical intellect and maintain just a motivational function for it. In addition, Avicenna enumerates the following as other roles of the practical intellect in producing moral action: motivational and incentive function; dominance over motivational and inclinative (to or against) faculties, etc and being served by them; serving the speculative intellect and purifying, completing and refining the speculative intellect in the realm of the practical intellect. Many other points have also been mentioned in this regard within this article. Overall, the central role of the practical intellect in producing moral action in Avicenna’s view gives rise to other discussions regarding moral action as well, in a way that those discussions are based on, or lead to it directly or indirectly.
