The monotheistic religions that valorize love typically believe that their love for God should be extended to God's creatures and, in particular, to one's fellow human beings. Yet, in practice, the love of the Christian or Muslim or Hindu monotheist doesn't always extend to the love of the religious other. Precisely how, then, should the adherents of the major monotheistic religions respond to the obvious diversity of these religions? The arguments of philosophical theology largely depend on what John Henry Newman called our "illative sense" or faculty of informal reasoning. Even the most fully developed illative sense can vary from one person to another, however. As a consequence, Christian, Muslim, and Hindu monotheists are unlikely to fully agree on matters of philosophical theology. I argue that this precludes neither mutual respect, though, nor a rational adherence to the philosophical and theological views of one's own tradition.
Moral realism is the doctrine that some propositions asserting that some action is ‘morally’ good (obligatory, bad, or wrong) are true. This paper examines three different definitions of what it is for an action to be ‘morally’ good (with corresponding definitions for ‘morally’ obligatory, bad, or wrong) which would make moral realism a clear and plausible view. The first defines ‘morally good as ‘overall important to do’; and the second defines it as ‘overall important to do for universalizable reasons’. The paper argues that neither of these definitions is adequate; and it develops the view of Cuneo and Shafer-Landau that we need a definition which is partly in terms of paradigm examples of morally good actions, which they call ‘moral fixed points’. Hence the third and final definition is that an action is morally good if it is ‘overall important to do because this follows from a fundamental universalizable principle, belonging to a system of such principles which includes almost all the moral fixed points; when a suggested fundamental principle is one which would be shown to be very probably true by the exercise of reflective equilibrium over many centuries’.
The current Cyber-ethics in Western societies (and its followers in other societies) have been compiled based on secularist presupposition. This presupposition has different principles in comparison with the Islamic attitude which can lead one to take a different approach toward ethical problems. This paper is an attempt to propose principles of Islamic cyber-ethics upon which we can prepare answers for the problems of cyber-ethics, having evident characteristics of an Islamic approach that are distinguished from secularist answers. After a prefatory study on the background of the Islamic attitude to ethics, these characteristics will be propounded under four categories: fundamental and content components, spiritual components, legal components, and penal components. Under these categories, themes such as giving importance to agent goodness, the basic difference in one’s goal of living an ethical life, the relation of reason and revelation, and the basis for the legitimacy of the penal justice system will be discussed. Needless to say, this paper does not seek to prepare arguments for this model, and such arguments can be discussed in other philosophical investigations.
The dissolution of the Western-dominated Postwar Order, and the Eurocentric myths that sustain it, presents a unique opportunity to ponder an old question posed by every new generation: How can philosophy, which Islamic and ancient Greek learning traditions have long defined as the pursuit of “wisdom,” resume its millennial civilizing role? This paper looks beyond passing political events to reconsider why philosophy was viewed in this role. As different as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Khaldūn, Mullā Ṣadrā, Hegel and Heidegger are from each other, they all approached the question of civilization philosophically by way of the fundamental question of beingness (mawjūdiyya) and existence (wujūd). Moreover, they strove for “completeness” of thinking with the “practical,” where, however, they resisted the temptation to reduce man to his practical or biological functions. Given the magnitude of the present challenges we all face, no dialogue across cultural boundaries can ignore the caution with which philosophical tradition has laid out the terms of this completeness in being.
The Coceivability of a Disembodied Personal Life Beyond Death Based on David Lund’s Views(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
As science focuses exclusively on the physical, it seems to assume that the brain has a key role in the origin if not also the constitution of our consciousness; and thus the destruction of the brain, the nervous system, and the body makes it pointless or even absurd to think of any personal consciousness after death. But one need not be convinced by this. However, any effort to investigate a possible post-mortem life depends on forming a coherent conception of what such a life could be. Can we speak, without incoherence or contradiction, of a person continuing to exist after death in a disembodied state? Our concern in this study lies here. Based on Lund's view, we will present and defend an argument that one can conceive of a self who is fully embedded in the natural world and deeply embodied in a physical organism, and yet could have a rich variety of experiences in an afterworld encountered after death. In this theory, the close association of the mental and the physical is due to a causal connection - a connection that fails to establish that the physical brings the mental into existence and is compatible with theories that the source of consciousness is not in the brain (e.g., the transceiver or filter theory).
Reflections on Jennifer Saul's View of Successful Communication and Conversational Implicature(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
Saul (2002) criticizes a view on the relationship between speaker meaning and conversational implicatures according to which speaker meaning is exhaustively comprised of what is said and what is implicated. In the course of making her points, she develops a couple of new notions which she calls “utterer-implicature” and “audience-implicature”. She then makes certain claims about the relationship between the intersection of those two notions and successful communication and also about the difference between conversational implicature and the intersection of utterer and audience implicatures. Finally, she tries to figure out the role and importance of conversational implicature in communication. Her claim on this issue is that conversational implicature plays a normative role in communication. In this paper, I will introduce her views on the above issues and critically engage some of them. I will show that her identification of successful communication with the intersection of utterer and audience implicatures is wrong. I will then show that her views on the difference between conversational implicature and the intersection of utterer and audience implicature run to several problems. Finally, appealing to what she says in Saul (2010) I try to make her claim about the normative character of conversational implicature more accurate.
No doubt, Gottlob Frege and A. J. Ayer are considered to be among the most prominent contemporary philosophers. Insofar as one of them has revolutionized the linguistic domain while the other has influenced the domain of ethics in a diametrical fashion. Ayer’s theory of emotivism is regarded as one of the most controversial moral theories in the past century. We believe that Frege, as a linguistic philosopher, has influenced emotivism in the methodological, logical, semantic, and epistemological domains. The emphasis on two fundamental principles of “compositionality” and “contextuality”; “the existence of mathematical concepts independent from mind”, “empiricism and verificationism” are all variables upon which emotivism is clearly dependent. The latter claim can be substantiated via analysis of the works of Ayer and particularly his “Language, Truth, and Logic” as well as his assertion in the introduction to this book concerning his debt to Frege. Among the most significant results of this essay, one can refer to the demonstration of the point that what constitutes the identity of the theory of emotivism is influenced by the “general line of linguistic analysis” in the aforementioned four domains.