مطالب مرتبط با کلیدواژه
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۱۰.
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۱۳.
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Hegel
حوزه های تخصصی:
Much recent discussion of the epistemology of religious belief has focused on justification of belief in the existence of God. Religious belief, however, includes much more than belief in God. In this paper, it is argued that the justification of belief in God is best seen in the context of other interrelated religious beliefs and practices. Philosophers of religion argue about whether religious belief requires evidence and on the sorts of arguments that have been presented. In this paper, a dialectical approach to the justification of religious belief is suggested that draws upon Hegel, Peirce, and W. E. Hocking. Rational reflection on the nature of experience that provides the solution to the problems of skepticism and solipsism in the Hegelian tradition, a tradition self-consciously developed by both Peirce and Hocking. If reason itself is only manifest in social exchanges, then the rationality of religious belief cannot be a private affair restricted to the subject of experience; rather it is the process of communicative interactions in accord with the overlapping norms of those who participate in them. Finally, some implications of this approach for the problem of religious diversity are sketched.
Philosophy and The Human Inheritance in a Post-Western World(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
حوزه های تخصصی:
The dissolution of the Western-dominated Postwar Order, and the Eurocentric myths that sustain it, presents a unique opportunity to ponder an old question posed by every new generation: How can philosophy, which Islamic and ancient Greek learning traditions have long defined as the pursuit of “wisdom,” resume its millennial civilizing role? This paper looks beyond passing political events to reconsider why philosophy was viewed in this role. As different as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Khaldūn, Mullā Ṣadrā, Hegel and Heidegger are from each other, they all approached the question of civilization philosophically by way of the fundamental question of beingness (mawjūdiyya) and existence (wujūd). Moreover, they strove for “completeness” of thinking with the “practical,” where, however, they resisted the temptation to reduce man to his practical or biological functions. Given the magnitude of the present challenges we all face, no dialogue across cultural boundaries can ignore the caution with which philosophical tradition has laid out the terms of this completeness in being.
The Historical study and gradual change of Art with the emphasis on theory of End of Art in Hegel's Thought(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی پاییز ۱۳۹۹ شماره ۳۲
303 - 315
حوزه های تخصصی:
In Hegel's view art is not just an artistic creation. Art is an introduction to liberation. Today, Hegel's philosophy is a substitute for many challenging issues, and also an obsolete for past points, Hegel interprets works of art with key elements of his philosophy such as "absolute", "freedom" and "consciousness." Hegel divides the history of the transformation of art into three periods of symbolic, classical, and romanticism. But Hegel also mentions classical architecture and romantic architecture, which in fact transforms architecture into an artistic service which come from other types and are not considered independent. This paper examines art and architecture in Hegelian thought and explains the types of art and architecture and their meanings in the eyes of this philosopher. Absolutely undergoes three steps in the process of self-consciousness-art, religion, and philosophy. Art, as the first step of this Trinity, brings absolute liberty directly into the sensible thing. This is a logical necessity and opens the way for ultimate self-awareness of the soul. Hence, epistemic beauty is worthwhile. This view towards beauty or a beautiful issue is an epistemological phenomenon and unmatched in the history of philosophy. The beauty of value is equal to consciousness. Or at least as a prerequisite for knowledge.
The Rise of the "Other" and the Fall of the "Self": from Hegel to Derrida(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی پاییز ۱۴۰۰ شماره ۳۶
228 - 244
حوزه های تخصصی:
Since time immemorial, due to its metaphysically grounded perspective, western philosophy has not been able to detach itself from the egoistic outlook, and thus, the interaction with the "other” had no role in this philosophy. The world has always been interpreted from the perspective of "self" ignoring the "other". Reviewing this mode of thought from Ancient Greece to Modern Age, one can reveal a kind of repression and forgetfulness of "alterity" and difference which Levinas has well highlighted in his philosophy. The very foundation of this egoism can be traced back to the Socratic slogan "know yourself”. In the same spirit, a kind of self-centered moral philosophy has been developed, the clear example of which is Kant's ethics. In line with Hegelian tradition of recognition, contemporary thinkers have redefined ethics and politics and acknowledged the constitutional dependence of the “self” on the "other." Based on the coordinates of their thought as well as the historical condition of their own time in the formation of subjectivity, these thinkers have criticized the neglect of the “other”. Hegel's role in underlining the importance of the vital status of the “other” is unique. Hegel bridges all post-Hegelian currents on the concept of “Other”. Then, in the present essay, we seek to show that since Hegel’s time up to Derrida, we have been witness to the rise of “Other” and the fall of “Self”.
The Challenges of Higher Education in Nigeria Vis-À-Vis Hegel’s Model of Development: a critical analysis(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی زمستان ۱۴۰۱ شماره ۴۱
87 - 101
This work takes a critical and cursory look at the term ‘education’ as well as the challenges of higher education in Nigeria. The paper explicates these issues from Hegel’s model of development. It argues that education is imperative for the development of any nation and underscores the relevance of man to his social-cultural milieu. It insists that the current problems or challenges bedeviling higher education in Nigeria is a systemic one, especially given the long, total neglect by the Nigerian political institution. The article concludes that Hegel’s view of society as containing intrinsic or inner contradictions; exemplified by the dialectic of history—portrayed by the triadic movement could not be sustained when x-rayed vis-à-vis the enormous problems plaguing higher education in Nigeria. However, the view of the paper is that though the challenges are not insurmountable, determined and pragmatic efforts must be made by all stalk-holders to address the ills bedeviling Nigerian education sector.
Fichte’s Role in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Chapter 4(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی زمستان ۱۴۰۲ شماره ۴۵
11 - 28
حوزه های تخصصی:
In this paper I return to the familiar territory of the Lord-Bondsman "dialectic" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in order to raise the question of the relation of Hegel's use of the theme of recognition there to Fichte's. Fichte had introduced the notion of recognition in his Foundations of Natural Right , to "deduce" the social existence of humans within relations of mutual recognition as a necessary condition of their very self-consciousness. However, there it also functioned as part of a solution to a problem within the work on which the theory of rights was meant to be based, the earlier Foundation of the Complete Wissenschaftslehre of 1794-5. In Hegel's classic account in chapter 4 of the Phenomenology we find recognition offered as a solution to a problem within an account of "self-consciousness" that has a number of clearly Fichtean features. But I suggest that to the degree that the lord-bondsman episode there expresses any "theory of recognition", it is not Hegel’s own theory but rather his interpretation of Fichte's , a theory of which he is critical. Freed from this misleading assumption that the "lord-bondsman dialectic" represents something deep about Hegel's own philosophy, we might then be more able to get clearer about Hegel's actual views about recognition and the role it plays in his own philosophy.
Toleration and Mutual Recognition in Hybrid Globalization(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
مطالعات بین المللی سال ۲۰ پاییز ۱۴۰۲ شماره ۲ (پیاپی ۷۸)
51 - 80
حوزه های تخصصی:
We are witnessing a new phase of globalization that can be characterized as hybrid. This conceptualization follows the concept of hybrid warfare and essentially encompasses the tense process of ongoing globalization and simultaneous local and regional resistance to it. As a result, identities worldwide are becoming uncertain, fluid (Zygmunt Bauman), or even dissolved. This process of dissolution leads to fragmented identities, held together with difficulty by age-old ideologies - or by violence. An alternative way of securing identity in this process of dissolution is the mutual recognition of the world's civilizations, which tolerance necessarily presupposes. Tolerance, however, also implies drawing the line at what is not to be tolerated. It is precisely in a process of mutual recognition that differences must not be overlooked. For example, tolerance is understood as a right in the liberal understanding, but as a task and duty in Islamic thinking. But we must not stop at the differences. In this respect, a perspective of tolerance as a process is developed here and clarified with the concept of an ascending cycle. The concept of Mulla Sadra, the important Islamic philosopher, contains the seeds of a concept of tolerance that is indispensable for intercultural dialogue and preserving identity.
"Death Must Have Become Terrifying": The Social Conditions of Anxiety
منبع:
The Iranian Yearbook of Phenomenology, Volume ۲, Issue ۱, ۲۰۲۳
105 - 128
حوزه های تخصصی:
While Hegel would agree with existentialist philosophers that anxiety testifies to an existential condition, applying to any human being as such, he believes that the experience of anxiety is shaped by social and cultural institutions and changes over history. The paper offers a reconstruction of Hegel’s account of the social conditions of anxiety. While my focus is the modern period, I use Hegel’s comments on death in previous epochs—and especially in ancient Greece—to bring out the peculiarity of modernity. In the first half of the paper, I discuss the nature and conditions of anxiety. In the second half, I trace Hegel’s critique of a common way to avoid—of flee from—anxiety in modernity, which results in social isolation, boredom, and emptiness. As long as the modern individual is only an economic actor in civil society, she is prone to anxiety. To confront her finitude, Hegel argues, she must endorse her political affiliation, namely, be an active and sacrificing citizen of the state.
From Function to Surface: Phenomenology of the thinking organ
منبع:
The Iranian Yearbook of Phenomenology, Volume ۲, Issue ۱, ۲۰۲۳
232 - 257
حوزه های تخصصی:
Neuroscience and its attendant subdisciplines, including, so it supposes, philosophy, hold that there is nothing more to self and society than what is in the brain. Yet two centuries have not resolved the philosophical objections to such claims, much less resolved the binding problem that would link mind and brain, or arrive at a general, materialist explanation of consciousness. Just as ideological and economic blinders beset this discipline, so they limit philosophy to account for the nature of this ‘thinking organ’ – what that means and if it can even exist. Taking the work of Hegel, Heidegger, Deleuze, neuroscientific results, I consider the phenomenology of the organ. I argue that an understanding of this object requires distinguishing concepts such as function and activity, capacity and regulation, surface and recognition. Results show that the ability to arrive at a thinking organ as organ is uncertain but worth the pursuit for the services done to science and ethics.
مولفه های موثر در برساخت هویت سرزمینی در عصر هخامنشیان مبتنی بر اندیشه پادشاهی فره ایزدی در چارچوب دیدگاه پدیدارشناسی روح هگل(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
آمایش سیاسی فضا دوره ۶ زمستان ۱۴۰۲ شماره ۱ (پیاپی ۲۱)
89 - 104
حوزه های تخصصی:
نگاه غیرتعمیم گرا به هویت سرزمینی و وابسته دانستن آن به اندیشه های سیاسی در سالیان اخیر در مطالعات جغرافیای سیاسی انتقادی مورد توجه قرار گرفته است. در این راستا مبدا اولیه وابسته دانستن مفهوم هویت سرزمینی به دولت؛ به اندیشه های هگل باز می گردد. از نظر وی هویت سرزمینی صورت عقلانی اندیشه برساخت شده توسط دولت در روی زمین می باشد که در هر جابه جایی از تاریخ شکلی از این پدیدار ظاهر می گردد. در این راستا اندیشه سیاسی رهبر فره ایزدی یکی از عناصر مهم در ساخت هویت سرزمینی در عصر هخامنشی بود که در طی آن رهبران سیاسی برگزیده خدا بر روی زمین دانسته شده و در سایه وجودی او امکان شکل یابی انسجام اجتماعی و تداعی یک قلمرو سیاسی میسر گردید. در این پژوهش کوشش گردیده با روش تحلیل محتوای متون تاریخی مولفه های موثر در برساخت هویت اجتماعی در عصر هخامنشیان در چارچوب دیدگاه پدیدارشناسی روح هگل تبیین گردد. یافته های تحقیق بیان گر آن است که برساخت آگاهی نسبت به جایگاه پادشاه در عصر هخامنشی حاصل یک سنتز تاریخی بود که تفسیر سنتی از پادشاهان مقتدر جای خود را به پادشاه منتسب به اهورمزدا می دهد. این مشروعیت قدسی قادر گردید جمعیت نامتجانس تابع حکومت هخامنشیان را در قالب یک هویت مشترک یکپارچه نماید. ضمن اینکه غیریت سازی ژئوپلیتیکی هخامنشیان با حکومت های پیرامونی به ویژه دولت- شهرهای یونانی جلوه ای از تعارض اندیشه پادشاه فره ایزدی با اندیشه های معارض بود که در برساخت انسجام سرزمینی مردم ایران موثر بود.
Hegel’s Internal Engine – Free Energy Minimization at Play in the Phenomenology of Spirit(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی پاییز ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۸
81 - 94
حوزه های تخصصی:
This paper bridges contemporary neuroscience theories and Hegelian philosophy, centering on Karl Friston’s Free Energy Principle (FEP). Neuroscience models like the Bayesian brain hypothesis and predictive coding depict the brain as a predictive machine, echoing Hermann von Helmholtz’s concept of unconscious inference, where perception is shaped by prior knowledge. The FEP, rooted in information theory and statistical physics, suggests organisms minimize sensory surprise through unconscious and active inference, providing a model for behavior and explaining the purposiveness of biological systems. Some scholars assert that Georg W. F. Hegel’s view of living beings in his Philosophy of Nature aligns with the FEP, portraying them as purposive and enactive systems. This paper extends this idea, proposing that Hegel’s 'System of Science' in the Phenomenology of Spirit functions as a free energy-minimizing system. It discusses predictive coding and the FEP, establishing criteria for a system that minimizes free energy, and applies these criteria to Hegel’s work. The paper argues that the dialectical narrative in the Phenomenology operates as a reflective system driven to minimize logical or conceptual free energy, ultimately advancing the spirit towards absolute spirit. This Hegelian predictive model generates expectations essential for dialectical progression.
Whether Hegel is a Pantheist? Spinoza in Hegel’s Pantheism(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی پاییز ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۸
133 - 146
حوزه های تخصصی:
Does Hegel embrace pantheism? He faced accusations from his orthodox peers who adhered to Pantheism, a phrase that was commonly associated with atheism during his day. This study presents a counterargument to the assertion made by several contemporary orthodox contemporaries that Hegel is pantheistic. Hegel can be classified as a semi-pantheist. The manuscript is divided into three distinct sections. In the initial segment, I examine pantheism as posited by Spinoza, the pioneering contemporary pantheist whose contributions exerted a profound influence on other German thinkers, including Hegel. In the subsequent part, an examination of Hegel's pantheism will be conducted through an analysis of the concept of God or the Absolute. In the third section, an analysis is conducted on Hegel's notion of the features of the Absolute, and a comparison is made with Spinoza's God or Nature in order to ascertain if Hegel can be classified as a pantheist. It is believed that Hegel has a dissenting stance towards conventional pantheism, particularly that of Spinoza. Therefore, it can be inferred that Hegel's pantheism differs from Spinoza's. Hegel can be classified as a semi-pantheist.
Panentheism versus Pantheism in the East and West with Special Reference to Shankara and Ramanuja's Views: an overview(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی پاییز ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۸
161 - 172
حوزه های تخصصی:
Panentheism and pantheism represent one of the most profound, even startling parallels across the world’s great metaphysical traditions about which the present article seeks to explore and carry out a comparative study of certain Eastern and Western philosophers with special reference to the views of two chief exponents of Advaita Vedanta of Indian philosophy, Shankara and Ramanuja. Both these terms, touch on the relation of God and the universe with the difference that the former seems to be rigid, motionless, and abstract and lacks a kind of religious fervor in its approach, while the latter is presumed to be concrete and palpable and seeks to reconcile philosophical thinking with the demands of religious feelings as well. God in pantheism is compared to the God of Spinoza, the Neutrum of Schelling, and Shankara's concept of indeterminate Brahman. In contrast, in the West Hegelian Absolute, and Ramanuja's qualified Brahman in Indian tradition, both are accredited with panentheism in which a personal God, identity-in-and-through-difference, has all auspicious qualities. Though these philosophers are from totally different temperaments and cultures, their philosophical method has certain similarities that have been examined in this work.
Hegel, the Greeks and Subjectivity: the origins of modern liberty and the historical justification of liberalism(مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
منبع:
پژوهش های فلسفی پاییز ۱۴۰۳ شماره ۴۸
381 - 417
حوزه های تخصصی:
Commentators oft cite the rather grand claim that for Hegel there was no concept of individual personality, subjectivity nor personal autonomy in Ancient Greece. Hegel’s claim is either taken as orthodox and making sense in the Hegelian historical system as a whole and so little discussed; or is flatly ignored as the worst kind of metaphysical obfuscation; a response a little too comfortable for liberal thinkers. Neither reaction is entirely satisfying. Not enough attention has been paid to it, especially for the vast majority of social and political thinkers who would find it at least contentious, so the present paper aims to assert its significance both for Hegelian politics as a whole and to pay enough attention to it in order to make it very difficult for those who find it a contentious statement to continue to ignore it. One wants to ask what it might mean for one’s self-understanding to be so radically different that, as a human being, I understand myself as first and foremost (and perhaps completely) not as a subjective individual. It is conceptually very difficult to be a self-conscious individual -- in even a minimal sense -- without some idea of being an atomic, individual unit. It is the claim of the following argument that a full understanding of this distinction, between ancient and modern self-understandings, would lead to a revision of Hegel’s liberal credentials, though not entirely for liberal reasons.