neuroscience

This paper analyses social cognition by considering the analytic philosophy of mind, neurophenomenology and social neuroscience. Many social neuroscientists rely unconsciously on different philosophical answers to the question "how do we understand each other?". Consequently, we will compare the principal philosophical and experimental approaches to social cognition that have been proposed so far and join them in an integrationist account by taking into consideration the direct embeddedness of social interactors. First, the "theory theory" (T.T.) affirms that mindreading consists in inferring the other's mental state by observing his behaviour from a third-person perspective. A neural network called the "mentalizing system" (M.E.N.S.) underlies mindreading activities.Second, the Simulation Theory (S.T.) assumes that social cognition involves simulating the mental states of the other. The neural substrate for the simulatory activities is the "mirror neurons system" (i.e., M.N.S.). Both TT and S.T. are fastened to the "observer paradigm" since the experimental set-ups involve detecting the brain's activity of a participant observing or simulating someone else's movement, and intersubjective dynamics are not at play. Finally, the 2nd person approach invites to consider the other as the one who is directly intervening on our perception and is responsible for the meaning we assign to his mental states (cf. Schillbach et al., 2013). Consequently, Schilbach et al. (2013) have established an experimental setting that is "minimalist and naturalistic" because it focuses on basic kinds of embedded interactions such as mutual gaze. This paper argues that the philosophical theories underlying those approaches do not conflict with each other, but they highlight different moments of social interaction in real life. Indeed, their neural substrates partially overlap. Hence, we want to establish in which order these three moments of social interaction occur. We hold that a realistic phenomenology must consider second-person interactions as the beginning of a realistic phenomenology.

Neuroscience and its attendant subdisciplines, including, so it supposes, philosophy, hold that there is nothing more to self and society than what is in the brain. Yet two centuries have not resolved the philosophical objections to such claims, much less resolved the binding problem that would link mind and brain, or arrive at a general, materialist explanation of consciousness. Just as ideological and economic blinders beset this discipline, so they limit philosophy to account for the nature of this ‘thinking organ’ – what that means and if it can even exist. Taking the work of Hegel, Heidegger, Deleuze, neuroscientific results, I consider the phenomenology of the organ. I argue that an understanding of this object requires distinguishing concepts such as function and activity, capacity and regulation, surface and recognition. Results show that the ability to arrive at a thinking organ as organ is uncertain but worth the pursuit for the services done to science and ethics.

This paper bridges contemporary neuroscience theories and Hegelian philosophy, centering on Karl Friston’s Free Energy Principle (FEP). Neuroscience models like the Bayesian brain hypothesis and predictive coding depict the brain as a predictive machine, echoing Hermann von Helmholtz’s concept of unconscious inference, where perception is shaped by prior knowledge. The FEP, rooted in information theory and statistical physics, suggests organisms minimize sensory surprise through unconscious and active inference, providing a model for behavior and explaining the purposiveness of biological systems. Some scholars assert that Georg W. F. Hegel’s view of living beings in his Philosophy of Nature aligns with the FEP, portraying them as purposive and enactive systems. This paper extends this idea, proposing that Hegel’s 'System of Science' in the Phenomenology of Spirit functions as a free energy-minimizing system. It discusses predictive coding and the FEP, establishing criteria for a system that minimizes free energy, and applies these criteria to Hegel’s work. The paper argues that the dialectical narrative in the Phenomenology operates as a reflective system driven to minimize logical or conceptual free energy, ultimately advancing the spirit towards absolute spirit. This Hegelian predictive model generates expectations essential for dialectical progression.