being

This paper considers Aristotle’s distinction between the cause of being and the cause of coming to be. It is intended to show that Aristotle is able to unify both kinds of causes on the basis of the idea that a thing’s substance is its end. He is not confused about the cause of being and of coming to be, as it might seem in several passages. The paper’s focus is on Metaphysics Zeta 17. In contrast to David Charles’ interpretation, my reading of this chapter puts weight on the fact that the end is said to explain both coming to be and being. According to this reading, Zeta 17 is a clue to understanding the unification of both causes in Aristotle.

The concept of anxiety occupies a crucial position in early Heidegger’s writings. Most prominently, it appears in Being and Time (1927) and “What is Metaphysics?” (1929) as a structurally central concept. After 1920s, Heidegger began to use the term much less frequently, leading some scholars to suggest a change in Heidegger’s view of the significance of the concept of anxiety. In this essay, we argue that central to the understanding of the role of anxiety in Heidegger’s thought is the fundamental difference between Heideggerian and psychological anxiety. This distinction is crucial as it is directly connected to the idea of the ontological difference, i.e., the difference between the ontical and the ontological, between beings and the Being of beings. Psychological descriptions of anxiety remain at the level of the ontical and, therefore, fall short of comprehending the ontological meaning of Heideggerian anxiety, which is one of Dasein’s basic possibilities of Being. Equipped with such an ontological understanding, we argue that the concept of anxiety remained central to Heidegger’s thought, early and late alike. We also suggest that Heidegger’s less frequent use of the term anxiety after “What Is Metaphysics?” could possibly be associated with his recognition that its terminological similarity with psychological anxiety may become a source of misunderstandings. Moreover, in the last section of the essay which functions as an addendum, we engage with Freud’s analysis of the uncanny and examine its relation to Heidegger’s Being-not-at-home. We argue that although Freud’s analysis of the uncanny does, in a sense, open up horizons beyond the reach of empirical psychology, his quasi-scientific quest for causal explanation ultimately remains within the framework of an ontical analysis.

Parmenides' Poem, though expressed in an allegorical manner to the extent that it has been preserved and handed down to us, without at!} doubt, shows his in-depth and profound insight into the question of Being. After a concise representation of his thought, the main purpose has been to show that, with regards to 'The Wcry of Truth" and Parmenides disregard for the realm of sense perception, tno different approaches mcry be accounted for. One mcry be that of an ana/ytz'cal/y• oriented mind to read through and understand Parmenides perplexing scryings, and the other mcry pertain to someone ivho tries to see through and contemplate upon the existing Fragments in pursue of a much deeper meaning, not necessarily that of a discursive mind.

The aim of the present research is to investigate the relation between phenomenology and language, and to comprehend the cognitive experience by reading a literary work or an aesthetic text. It also addresses the process of pure perception and visualization of an object in the mind and the relation of body to the world within the phenomenal field. The present study delves into John Berger’s A Painter of Our Time (1958) in order to examine the painterly process of expressing an array of human sensations and experience of the world, eventually revealing the truth. The phenomenological philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty enables an intersubjective interaction between “body”, “experience”, language and “perceptual world”. This study thus seeks to address the mechanics of the painter’s mind, exploring the root of being and eventually explaining his style and mute meaning. Focusing on whether visualizing, reading, and thinking through a work of art in a text, could provide an aesthetic experience of the text ultimately brings an aesthetic judgment of a work of art based on the knowledge gained through the literary text. Consequently, the readers, positioning themselves in the synesthetic and experience of the text, develop a new visual and aesthetic experience of the world.

In this article, an attempt has been made to analyze the issue of time in education. First, to explore the nature of this concept, the distinction between the temporality of Being [Temporality] and the temporality of beings [temporality] which were distinguished by Heidegger, is discussed. Second, it’s indicated that the moment of vision is the authentic state of falling and one of the six temporal states. Considering the movie “Enemy at the Gates” this moment is explained the temporality of Being, preparations can be made for this moment in education. Third, it is argued that preparing for the moment of vision contradicts the elements of inauthentic education, i.e non-temporal goal and transcendence and speed- based orientation. finally, preparing for the moment of vison in education is a kind of lingering and soaking in the classical texts passing through the paths-experienced in encountering the texts. As a result, the moment of educational vision means time is no longer Newtonian-Aristotelian time. The mentioned moment, has fullness, and its fullness is caused by existentials and being-in-the-world of the learner and the teacher. 

At the Le Thor Seminar in 1969, Heidegger characterises his thinking as taking the form of what he calls a ‘topology of being’ (Topologie des Seins) and as thereby giving a key role to place (topos, Ort/Ortschaft). Much of my work over the last 25 years has been devoted to exploring how such a topology is indeed present in Heidegger’s thinking, both early and late, and so to showing how place figures in that thinking – to showing, in effect, how the questioning of being is also the thinking of place. The aim here is to provide a summary introduction to the topology that this exploration has aimed at uncovering, but to do so in a way that is focussed on the early work, especially Being and Time. To this end, the discussion proceeds through an explication of the topological elements that are present in the form of key terms and ideas such as facticity, questionability, being-in, existential spatiality, and there-being or Dasein. There is also a brief exploration of the way the term Dasein figures in German philosophical discourse prior to Heidegger in ways that are not only reflected in Heidegger’s early work, but also draw directly upon that term’s topological connotations.

Hans-Georg Gadamer, in his work Truth and Method, raises a controversial and thought-provoking argument regarding language and its relation to Being. He states that “Being that can be understood is language.” Despite his subsequent efforts in some works following Truth and Method to elucidate what he considers to be self-evident in the meaning of this expression, various interpreters have continued to derive various interpretations from it. Some have focused on its ontological dimension within Heideggerian context, while others have emphasized its epistemological aspect within the Kantian tradition. In this paper, we aim to clarify the meaning of the Gadamer’s expression and explore the grounds and reasons for the emergence of conflicting interpretations, while also referencing such interpretations and relying on a descriptive-analytical approach based on Gadamer’s relevant texts. Overall, it seems that the ambiguity in Gadamer’s position regarding language and its relation to being boils down to the fact that he seeks to reconcile Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective with his own philosophical hermeneutics. Thus, Gadamer sometimes emphasizes on the being itself and sometimes on our linguistic understanding of being.