درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

Understanding of the interplay between IP rights and competition law in the context of technology transfer in the Iranian oil industry is a point that is discussed in this article. While intellectual property rights enjoy a historic record and appropriate rules in this regard, the competition rights in Iran are taking their initial steps. This imbalance stems from the root of the formation of the legal system of oil in Iran based on contractual frameworks over time. The point to be made in this article is that technology transfer can be expected to take place when the type and purpose of technology transfer have already been defined by legal organizations in relation to the relevant industries. Also, the general targeting in the upstream laws alone cannot meet the legal requirements for the transfer of appropriate technology. Therefore, when even one of the mentioned factors does not exist, one cannot expect constructive interaction in the above-mentioned legal systems.

the formation of the current legal system is a function and is influenced by a basic element called time. An element that influences not only the formation of the legal system, but also its evolution.so, the legal system in the Iranian oil industry began with a contract and not with the legislation of a law. In relation to the term "contractual framework", it seems necessary to explain that the contractual framework refers to the criteria which give the contracts such a feature that it distinguishes that contract and similar contracts from other contracts concluded in that field. What were these contracts? How did they form the legal system of the Iranian oil industry? What has been their impact on technology transfer in the oil industry? These are some of the questions that will be addressed in this work. Disappointment with the framework of previous agreements (concession agreements), along with socio-political contexts such as the nationalization of the oil industry, led to a re-examination of this industry's contract frameworks in the light of past experiences, better future benefits and national independence and sovereignty. But how successful it was, that is another matter. Because the oil companies did not simply want to transfer the maximum benefits to the countries with oil resources, and used the dependence of those countries to their industry as a tactic against this trend as much as possible. Therefore, the structure of contracts governing the oil industry should be considered as a result of this conflict of interests.

In financial markets, the main component of risk management is liquidity risk. Asset and Liability Management (ALM) strategy is concerned with managing all risks. Asset and liability management seeks to manage liquidity risk, which refers to both the liquidity of markets and which assets can be translated into cash. The liquidity is importantly affected by the management of banks’ balance sheets. This paper contributes to the discussion by focusing on liquidity and asset and liability management by providing a theoretical framework to examine how the ALM could be reduced the liquidity risk in banking. We investigate the effect of ALM indicators on liquidity risk. We measure liquidity risk, and ALM with indicators approach, using financial statement in 2006-2018 and panel data approach. The results indicate that if asset and liability management improves, liquidity risk decrease and if the ratio of capital adequacy increases, the bank can better cover liquidity risk, and so increasing in capital adequacy will reduce liquidity risk. Deposit per shareholders increases the liquidity risk of banks. Interest rate increases liquidity risk. When profitability increases, liquidity risk will increase. The relation between liquidity risk and profitability is positive.