درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

Historical maps are one of the most important sources for studying the historical geography of lands, borders of dynasties and territories, historical names and border changes. also, by studying historical maps, one can discover the geographical vision and view of people throughout the centuries and in different societies, and in this way achieve a correct understanding of concepts such as the world, geography, territorial boundaries and things like these. on the other hand, the researcher of Iranian history, especially the researcher of the Safavid era, is bound to refer to various maps that have been drawn about the geographical boundaries of Iran. by studying the elements and data included in the historical maps, one can get a visual understanding of the borders of Iran's territory and the correct recording of specific geographical names. the map of the "Etats du Grand-Seigneur en Asie : Empire de Perse, Pays des Usbecs, Arabie et Egypte" was drawn in the first half of the 12th century AH/18th CE by the efforts of two of the most prominent European cartographers of that era, namely Gilles Robert de Vaugondy and his son Didier Robert de Vaugondy. Vaugondies were prominent cartographers in the 17th and 18th centuries whose scientific activities were largely acknowledged in the French court and across Europe, and European rulers tended to acquire maps and geographical globes developed by the Vaugondies. Now the question is, how did a European cartographer describe the geographical area of Iran in the early 18th century? Did he look at the territory of Iran from a dynastic lens or did he consider it as a whole unit? Adopting a descriptive-analytical approach and qualitative methodology, the present study strives to outline the domain of Iran in the late Safavid period based on the information provided on the map drawn by Gilles Robert de Vaugondy and Didier de Vaugondy. Analysis of obtained data unveils that Vaugondy, alike his contemporaries, regarded Iran as a unit and distinct geography. The image that he provided of the boundary of Iran also aligns with Persian texts of the given era.

This article presents documents on the aftermath of a diplomatic affair from 1705, which was engineered by Safavid Iran’s grand vizier Muhammad Mumin Shamlu and which was the last of his undertakings to reorient relations with the Ottoman Empire. It was a part of his policy played out as several faits This article presents documents on the aftermath of a diplomatic affair from 1705, which was engineered by Safavid Iran’s grand vizier Muhammad Mumin Shamlu and which was the last of his undertakings to reorient relations with the Ottoman Empire. It was a part of his policy played out as several faits accomplis unfolding at the same time and aiming to embitter Ottoman-Safavid relations, which had reached a formal alliance over the last decade. Starting out under the guise of a religious gift-giving, this initiative from the Iranian capital Isfahan to Prophet Muhammad’s shrine in Ottoman-controlled Medina first slighted the Ottomans’ lordship rights in the Hejaz and therefore became blocked by the Ottoman authorities in Medina as well as the digninaties in Constantinople. But soon, it grew into a subject of diplomatic correspondenceand thenbecame entangled in a robbery reaching out to Mecca and Baghdad, whose prosecution spread further to Constantinople, Cairo, Damascus, and the eastern Mediterranean waters. Even after the affair was put to rest, Ottoman-Safavid dealings did not heal from the harm done by Muhammad Mumin Shamlu’s succesive thrusts to undermine the cooperation of the 1690s.The peace outlived Beygdilli-Shamlu’s term as grand vizier, but he succeeded in downgrading it from an official brotherhood to a bare state of nonaggression. accomplis unfolding at the same time and aiming to embitter Ottoman- Safavid relations, which had reached a formal alliance over the last decade. Starting out under the guise of a religious gift-giving, this initiative from the Iranian capital Isfahan to Prophet Muhammad’s shrine in Ottoman-controlled Medina first slighted the Ottomans’ lordship rights in the Hejaz and therefore became blocked by the Ottoman authorities in Medina as well as the digninaties in Constantinople. But soon, it grew into a subject of diplomatic correspondenceand thenbecame entangled in a robbery reaching out to Mecca and Baghdad, whose prosecution spread further to Constantinople, Cairo, Damascus, and the eastern Mediterranean waters. Even after the affair was put to rest, Ottoman-Safavid dealings did not heal from the harm done by Muhammad Mumin Shamlu’s succesive thrusts to undermine the cooperation of the 1690s.The peace outlived Beygdilli-Shamlu’s term as grand vizier, but he succeeded in downgrading it from an official brotherhood to a bare state of nonaggression.

In the sixteenth century, the strategic region of the Caucasus had a set of political, economic, transportation, and religious benefits for both the Safavid and Ottoman governments that led the two powers to compete for profound influence and attention in the region. During this period, when some weak and unstable kings such as Ismail II and Muhammad Khudābanda came to power, lack of strength and better performance caused the Ottoman government to grasp the most of the opportunity to extend their influence over the Caucasus. This study aims at investigating the geographical location of the Caucasus considering the Safavid diplomatic policies and the challenges between the Safavids and the Ottoman Empire through analyzing historical data and library studies. Descriptive data analysis has been considered as the method utilized for this research. The research findings indicate that the ineffectiveness of Safavid foreign policy at this time and the consequence of this policy would have an inevitably negative impact on maintaining and controlling the Caucasus. As a result, this policy would provoke the Ottoman invasions, leading to the occupation of some parts of the Caucasus.