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An underlying theoretical point of this paper has been that if fundamental commitments and the questions of cultural identity that they bring with them (What is an X?) are understood in terms of functional analyses of the kind I have tried to give in the case of Islamic identity today, then there is scope to see these commitments as susceptible to various criticisms in the particular context of a conflict in which they might figure.  All this seems to me to offer far more scope and interest to moral philosophy than Williams allows it, even after granting to Williams the validity of the central role he gives to the idea of fundamental commitment and the validity of his critique of traditional moral philosophy. <br />  The paper has studied the question "What is a Muslim?" in the dialectic of a conflict arising out of a concern for Islamic Reform.  The conflict is one that arises because of moderate Muslims' fundamental commitment to a doctrine which contains features that are often effectively invoked by the absolutists whom moderate Muslims fundamentally oppose.  If a full analysis of the commitment reveals its defensive function which have disabled Muslims from a creative and powerful opposition to the absolutists, and if, moreover, this function of the commitment is diagnosed as itself based on a deep but common philosophical fallacy, it should be possible then for moderate Muslims to think there way out of this conflict and to transform the nature of their commitment to Islam, so that it is not disabling in that way. <br />The question of identity, "What is a Muslim?", then, will get very different answers before and after this dialectic about reform has played itself out.   The dialectic, thus, preserves the negotiability of the concept of identity and the methodological points I began with, at the same time as it situates and explains the urgency and fascination that such questions hold for us.

At a time when religion has assumed a particular potency in shaping and defining inter-community and inter-state relations the world over, the need for evolving alternate understandings of religion to creatively deal with the fact of religious pluralism has emerged as a pressing necessity. This is an issue for concerned and socially engaged believers in all religious traditions. This paper deals with how, contrary to widely-head stereotypical notions, Islam can be interpreted to promote inter-faith dialogue and amity between followers of different faiths. This discussion centers on the work of a noted Indian Muslim scholar-activist, Asghar ‘Ali Engineer, seeing how he deals with the primary sources of Islam in order to develop an Islamic theology of pluralism and social justice. Given the fact that in many parts of the world today conflicts involve Muslims and people of other faiths, Engineer’s creative approach to the Qur’an offers us an alternate way of imagining Islam and Islamic rules for relations between Muslims and others.

At a time of terrorist actions, the civil wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq as well as the caricatures of the Prophet and Pope XVI’s speech about violence in Islam, it is urgent for the Islamic academic community to speak about a major issue: the notions of peace and war in Islam.<br /> This paper will explore and analyze these notions, putting an emphasize on Islam as a religion of peace promoting human rights and humanitarian values; the author will of course approaches and presents the explanations as to why Islam is a religion of violence, only to dismiss these arguments. There are indeed authors presenting Islam as a religion of violence that carries deep inside the seeds of hatred, racism and many other values that are against human rights. These authors are usually Orientalists. This paper will explain who and why these theories are wrong. Then there are extremist groups presenting distorted interpretations of Islam as to justify massive killings (terrorism, WMD, suicide attacks); the author of the paper will take few examples as to explain how these movements rely on distorted and nihilist views of Islam.

Human rights and religion can very often be seen as reinforcing one another. Therefore, religion plays a primordial role in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. For example, moral imperatives like “do not take any human being's life” or “you shall not steal” can be found in all major religions of the world, and have acted as an inspiration for the fundamental laws made by man. <br />None the less, religious laws can also contradict man-made laws and human rights treaties. Just to take one example, according to the Christian faith it is impossible for a woman to become a priest, while multiple human rights treaties clearly prohibit discrimination between the sexes. <br />It is precisely in such contentious matters that the national State will often intervene, granting preferential treatment to either religious laws or man-made treaties. The State, however, when it does interfere, has to do so in a very careful way, for one fundamental right is the right to religious freedom. The State will therefore frequently have to try to strike a balance between this right and other human rights concerned. <br />One regional convention safeguarding both religious rights like freedom of religion and religious practice, as other fundamental rights, is the European Convention of Human Rights, which we will explore in this paper. States that are members of the Council of Europe and parties to this convention will have to try to find a balance while being watched by an observant European Court of Human Rights. Thus the task of finding a balance between these rights has in Europe ultimately been given to the European Court, and its case-law is especially illuminating on the very relation between these rights. Looking at this jurisprudence will enable us to find out how the relationship between religious rights and other fundamental freedoms is perceived in the European Human Rights system. One essential question that arises, is in what manner and to what extent the Court allows for limitations and exceptions on/to other human rights when it comes to religious matters. For example, can one’s personal freedom be limited in order to preserve someone else’s religious beliefs? Does the European Court deviate from its normal course of action when faced with religious cases? Does such a religious context constitute “special circumstances” that allow for a different treatment, and if so, can this be justified? And on the other hand, what are the ultimate boundaries that other human rights put on religion, religious rights and traditions? Where is the line drawn? <br />The purpose of this study is to explore the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in search of an answer to this fundamental question. Rather than solely concentrating on the right to freedom of religion of article 9 ECHR, this paper will focus more on those other human rights contained in the Convention when they seem to conflict with the said right to religious freedom, and in a broader scope, with other religious rights, laws and practices. The jurisprudence of the Court, which seems to take a very nuanced position in such matters, will be examined. A study of this case-law will not only be helpful to explore the status of religious rights as compared to other fundamental rights, but may also be a source of inspiration for the international human rights system to promote concord between the different religions. Studying the way in which the European Court handles such cases will also lead us to new ideas on how to implement human rights in different religious cultures, while respecting diversity and religious freedom. In sum, exploring this human rights system will provide answers to the above posed questions, which shall lead us to new ideas on the tremendous important right to be protected in one’s religious freedom.