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My study is about the Islamic reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and their compatibility under the regime of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT). It is focused in the substantive reservations invoking Shari’a Laws entered by some Muslim countries to the central articles of the Convention which are, therefore, impermissible as incompatible whit the object and purpose of the Convention. I highlight the paradox of maximizing the Convention’s universal application at the cost of compromising its integrity and how substantive reservations to the CEDAW provisions, tolerating discrepancy between states’ laws and practice and the obligations of the Convention, pose a risk to the achievement of the Convention’s goals. I also question if the compatibility criterion of the VCLT is effective in view of acceptance of some substantive reservations of a derogatory nature I consider that the “object and purpose” test is subjective, the practice by the objecting states is not uniform and that looking at those which are (or are not) the objecting states in respect of a particular reservation, it is evident how political or extralegal considerations intervene when states evaluate the compatibility of reservations. I especially focus on the paradox of the objections to a reservation which have the same effect as an acceptance when the objecting and reserving states are still maintaining treaty relation. Therefore, there is no difference in the legal effects of a reservation accepted and one objected without opposing the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving state. I further analyze how reservations invoking Shari’a Law entail conflicting norms (freedom of religion and equality rules). Recalling the view of the “balancing of interest” I argue that it could be a reasonable approach, but in practice it is difficult to find some sort of equilibrium not prejudiced against women. I then analyze if these reservations are suggestive of a wider ideological conflict between women’s rights enunciated in Islam and the ones formulated under the human rights treaties, and how they are representative of the women’s situation in the reserving states. I question what are the motivating factors behind the decision to reserve and if the reservations should be seen in the broader political and socio-economic perspective of domestic and international context? I then ask if the States ratify the Convention affording its objectives as a real commitment or if they only do so at political opportune moments? I consider that is not Islamic religious beliefs, but evolving political situations which are the determinant factors in making these kinds of reservations. I finally analyze the work of the CEDAW Committee considering its efforts disappointing as many of the new Muslim states parties did not pay attention to the criteria set out by the Committee, continuing  to enter either very general reservations or reservations to specific substantive articles. The new states parties with a predominantly Muslim population referred to the Islamic Shari’a Law as prevailing over the Convention without mentioning any specific articles, clearly not following the Committee’s recommendations in the formulation of impermissible reservations.

One of the major challenges for a civilization - and a parameter for assessing it - is how it treats those who do not belong to that civilization. The dichotomy between “we” and “them” is made variously across civilizations. In the past, interactions across civilizations are less voluminous and less intense.  But things have changed. The world has become a global village. Yet, it remains very pluralistic in terms of religion, culture, ethnicity, and language. The diversity of the contemporary world is due to the existence of concurrent civilizations on the world, each with its distinct culture, world view and values. Western culture, Islamic culture, oriental culture and African culture are some of the more prominent cultures today. Globalization is not without its problems. For one thing, the world is being pressurized into become a mono-cultural environment patterned after western culture. This position is not because of any inherent superiority of western civilization to the other civilization but because of the cultural invasion of the world by the west.   Information flow is the world has been essentially one way - from the west to the rest. The quest for peace in the modern world must therefore address how the diverse cultures of the world are accommodated, first within specific civilizations and secondly in the world at a global level particularly within the context of the United Nations. The past offers a good lesson for the future. This paper looks at how three civilizations – Islamic, African, and western - in their pristine historical and modern forms - have approached otherness. Islamic civilization emerged from a multi-ethnic and multi-religious environment.  The Islamic approach is one of tolerance and respect for otherness in spite of the full conviction of the rightness of its religious creed and way of life.  Islam recognizes the freedom of religion for non-Muslims and expresses this in a comprehensive and complete manner. It does not impose its laws or culture on them but grants social, cultural and judicial autonomy to these strangers within its borders. This attitude which was in the past is still observable in some modern Islamic countries such as Iran. African culture is a very diverse affair. The common traits amongst Africans include their warm treatment of strangers and their respect for the cultural independence of other peoples.  The attitude of western civilization contrasts with the attitudes of Islamic and African civilizations.  The West has consistently pursued a policy of domination of other peoples based on its perceived superiority over them. This attitude, for which various ideological and intellectual justifications have been advanced in defense of, remains in contemporary times, a constant source of friction and tension. It is suggested that models provided by Islamic and African cultures be used as a basis for modern interaction by persons belonging to different cultures.

Selective adaptation describes the process by which international legal rules are contextualized to local conditions. The institutional and cultural contexts for selective adaptation involve a process by which non-local institutional practices and organizational forms are mediated by local norms. This process can be illustrated by reference to the local implementation of international human rights regimes.<br /> Selective adaptation is made possible by ways in which governments, elites, and other interpretive communities express their own normative preferences in the course of interpretation and application of practice rules. Selective adaptation depends on a number of factors, including perception, complementarity, and legitimacy. Perception influences understanding about foreign and local norms and practices. Originally a principle of nuclear physics, complementarity describes a circumstance by which apparently contradictory phenomena can be combined in ways that preserve essential characteristics of each component and yet allow for them to operate together in a mutually reinforcing and effective manner.

An underlying theoretical point of this paper has been that if fundamental commitments and the questions of cultural identity that they bring with them (What is an X?) are understood in terms of functional analyses of the kind I have tried to give in the case of Islamic identity today, then there is scope to see these commitments as susceptible to various criticisms in the particular context of a conflict in which they might figure.  All this seems to me to offer far more scope and interest to moral philosophy than Williams allows it, even after granting to Williams the validity of the central role he gives to the idea of fundamental commitment and the validity of his critique of traditional moral philosophy. <br />  The paper has studied the question "What is a Muslim?" in the dialectic of a conflict arising out of a concern for Islamic Reform.  The conflict is one that arises because of moderate Muslims' fundamental commitment to a doctrine which contains features that are often effectively invoked by the absolutists whom moderate Muslims fundamentally oppose.  If a full analysis of the commitment reveals its defensive function which have disabled Muslims from a creative and powerful opposition to the absolutists, and if, moreover, this function of the commitment is diagnosed as itself based on a deep but common philosophical fallacy, it should be possible then for moderate Muslims to think there way out of this conflict and to transform the nature of their commitment to Islam, so that it is not disabling in that way. <br />The question of identity, "What is a Muslim?", then, will get very different answers before and after this dialectic about reform has played itself out.   The dialectic, thus, preserves the negotiability of the concept of identity and the methodological points I began with, at the same time as it situates and explains the urgency and fascination that such questions hold for us.