درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

In American history, the ‘Black body’ has been commodified both during the slavery era and in the contemporary period whereby the private management of prisons has partly resulted to mass Black incarceration. The abolition of slavery some 150 years ago is still fairly recent compared to the 400 years it was practiced: thus some of the heinous treatments by slave owners were carried over into the criminal justice system, causing the police, jury, judges, etc., to treat Black people unequally and unfairly compared to their White counterparts. From the ‘proceedings of the rebellious negroes’ in the slavery era to the racialized media coverages of police brutality against Black people, Black protests, treatment of criminal suspects, etc., the American mass media have been identified as playing a major role in the maintenance of the deep racist structures that perpetuate mass Black incarceration. This paper links up some historical practices against Black people with the contemporary racist practices in order to show that slavery is still functionally alive in America and manifests concretely through the justice system: this paper aims at amplifying the ongoing debates toward obliterating the remnants of slavery in America.

An individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for the law. Martin Luther King, Jr. Abstract The following paper will present the theory and possibilities of implication of the phenomenon of civil disobedience understood as one of the most powerful and most effective tools of democratic society when it comes to implementing the necessary and indispensable changes required for the improvement of the political domain and the social public sphere.   In the first part I will present the narrow but orthodox and widely discussed definition of civil disobedience presented by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice (1971). Given such a definition, as well as the major conditions under which the actions undertaken in the name of civil disobedience can be justified, I will focus my analysis on two major aspects of the discussed notion.   Firstly, I will discuss civil disobedience, which is in its essense an unlawful act, paradoxically expresses the highest respect for the positive law by the person performing the civilly disobedient act through one’s submission to the judgment of the law which is an object of one’s protest. This way, civil disobedience presents itself as the phenomenon which, not having a legal recognition (not being legalized), holds super-legal force required to impose the changes on the unjust legal system or on the particular unjust regulation.   Secondly, I will point out that civil disobedience, as a public act performed by the people (the subjects of the particular law), expresses the will of the people and, therefore, it can not be used (by themselves) in the ways contradictory to their best self-interest but always supported by the “the commonly shared sense of justice” (Rawls). From this premise I conclude that the universal human rights, as thier supporters claim, are one of the main ends of the political activism in the recent decade and should be advocated in the civilly disobedient manner.   In the last part I will contrast the Rawlsean definition with a much broader and more relevant understanding of civil disobedience when it concerns today’s globalizing world. In this world, the nation-states cease to be the only political actors when confronted with the transnational public sphere, and, therefore, the understanding of civil disobedience as a transversal arena of public dissent presented by Roland Bleiker (2000) is more appropriate. In this definition civil disobedience becomes, not only a political instrument of particular subjects of a particular society, but it also becomes a tool for the international mobilization of means and of people in the name of presenting and imposing the respect for the universal human rights despite the national borders and societal paradigms. 

This paper advances a framework for the evaluation of Sharia (Islamic law) with respect to the modern notion of international human rights law. The paper argues that certain universal standards of human rights and freedoms, as understood and formulated in international human rights documents, lack precise equivalents in Islamic law, and some generally-accepted principles of Sharia contradict corresponding principles of international human rights law. Sharia's response to the idea of human rights and traditional interpretation of Islamic law are hard to reconcile with international human rights norms and standards. It is also argued that the application of Sharia, public and criminal law in particular, is problematic and results in deficiencies and hardship in Muslim societies. This paper contributes to the debate on Islamic reformism and human rights in arguing that Sharia's contradiction of universal human rights norms cannot be avoided, and that traditional mechanisms of reform within the framework of Sharia are inadequate for achieving the necessary degree of reform. It is suggested that, based on a cross-cultural dialogue and intellectual debate, an essential and primary reform should define the objective foundations of human rights in reason and human dignity, not on Sharia criteria and qualifications.