After 2014 Russia is seen powerful enough again to influence the Mediterranean region and change the passive defensive policy, practiced after the USSR’s dissolution, for active one. Analysis of attempts to squeeze Russia out of the Black Sea region shows the main strategies elaborated in the early 2000s by the leading US thinktanks. After 2014 Russia is seen powerful enough again to influence the Mediterranean region and change the passive defensive policy, practiced after the USSR’s dissolution, for active one. Analysis of attempts to squeeze Russia out of the Black Sea region shows the main strategies elaborated in the early 2000s by the leading US thinktanks. Authors give the geopolitical landscape of the region: 26 countries are classified into powers (actors) and objects for the realization of national interests of the former. Special attention is paid upon Turkey, Greece, Israel, France, Italy and Spain (with Gibraltar issue). The processes and balances that define Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean region are seen in interconnection with the intentions of military and political leaders of the region detached on the basis of the geopolitical methodology. A variant of the “Russian balance” is offered as prospective to realize Russia’s national interests in the region.
