مطالب

In some point of view, neither Michel Foucault nor Ibn Khaldun are considered philosophers in the conventional classifications, but both are very  important in intellectual and, of course, in philosophical contexts, especially for those who are interested in the deep study of human life from the perspective of political thought.The main concern of two thinkers, one in the 14 th century, the other in the 20th century, is the issue  of power, although neither of them provided a precise definition of it. In this article, an attempt has been made to show the place of power and domination in the political thought of both thinkers by examining the thoughts of two thinkers. And in search of an answer to this question, how did Asabiyyah and industry of religion in Ibn Khaldun's thought and social control through self-technology and discipline in Foucault's thought lead to the expansion of the domination of power? This article is written by analytically comparing the opinions of two thinkers based on Ibn Khaldun's most important book called Muqaddimah and Foucault's late works

The problem of personal identity among others may stem from the following question—what does be the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist of? The diachronic problem of personal identity raises question on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time. The synchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterize a given person at one time. To answer these questions, John Locke discarded the soul and the body as necessary and sufficient substances for personal identity over time. He accepted consciousness as the only criterion for personal identity; the only thing capable of remaining the same and preserving personal identity through change. Though Locke’s argument is somewhat clear and coherent but what remains vague and incoherent is embedded in the question—what exactly is consciousness? How and why should it be the basis or criterion for the determination of personal identity? Using the method of critical analysis, I argue that Locke’s choice of consciousness as the determinant of personal identity, though quite novel, is incoherent and vague. Secondly, Locke had already presumed and anticipated clearly though fallaciously the very thing he wishes to substantiate. I therefore conclude that Locke’s argument is just another way of trying to escape but inadvertently prolonging the difficulty of apparently articulating a distinction between the psychological approach and physiological approach to the problem of personal identity. However, in my submission, I propose the concept of the “other” as alternative approach— a sort of an extrinsic-intrinsic approach to the problem of personal identity.