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Gilles Deleuze, the notable post-modern philosopher, in his two-volume cinematic books Cinema 1: movement-image (1986) and Cinema 2: time-image (1989) recognizes two major periods in history of cinema (classic and modern) in terms of representing movement and time respectively. Referring to various films of modern cinema especially post-war European cinema like Italian neorealism, Cinema2 speaks about the possibility of direct presentation of time in cinematic works. Explaining Deleuze’s theories and his two formulations of direct presentation of time as ‘pure optical situations’ and ‘sheets of the past’, in this essay we try to give an analysis of the two most important films of Iranian history of cinema: Still Life (1974) and Prince Ehtejab (1974). Finally, we will conclude that these films are not mere representation of preexisting philosophical concepts, rather in contrast to linguistic thought, they provide some kind of visual and non-linguistic philosophical meditations of time, cinema of time

That falsity is a defect in belief can be captured with a prohibitive norm holding that truth is the necessary condition for permissibility of belief. Furthermore, such a formulation avoids the difficulties encountered in earlier literature that offered prescriptive norms. The normativity of belief thesis is widely discussed in the literature. I criticise bi-conditional formulation of the norm of the normativity of belief thesis which holds that truth is both the necessary and sufficient condition for the permissibility of belief formation. I argue that the part which holds that truth is the sufficient condition for the permissibility of belief formation is redundant. The argument follows from clarifying the key ideas at stake in the normativity of belief thesis, namely, that false belief is a defect and that the normativity thesis is supposed to distinguish the concept of belief from other cognitive attitudes and the slogan that belief aims at truth.

Ibn Tufail as a scientist as well as an artist exposes the issues of human anatomy, autopsy, and vivisection and, thereby, could be regarded as a SciArtist. SciArt might be defined as a reciprocal relation between art and science. Followings are the kinds of these interactions: artistically-inclined scientific activities,science-minded artistic activities, and intertwined scientific and artistic activities. In their fictional treatises, Avicenna, Ibn Tufail, and Suhrawardi are traditional avatars of SciArt. This paper frames an account of SciArt, suggesting in detail Ibn Tufail’s work as a prototypical example, while Avicenna and Suhrawardi go beyond the scope of this paper. An instant of intertwined scientific and artistic activities strongly captivates the attentions to Ibn Tufail, describing human anatomy, autopsy, and vivisection in his Treatiseof Hay Ibn Yaqzan. Recognized as the first philosophical story, Hay Ibn Yaqzan depicts the whole philosophy of Ibn Tufail by the story of an autodidactic feral child a gazelle raised whom in an island in the Indian Ocean.

Kant's demystification is meant to put away any metaphysical and revealed elements from ethics and religion. Kant, fulfilling this, first argues that metaphysical questions of reason, from theoretical aspect, have no certain answers. In practical reason, he establishes his moral foundations, based on own human being without any referring to metaphysical bases. In fact, Kant places human being as the base, legislator and finally the end of ethics, so that the totality of morality is depended on itself him/her and there is no moral reality out of our humanly understanding. Kant, then, by confirming the necessity of rational religion, believes that the age of revealed religions have been expired, since they were belonged to the childhood age of human being’s reason, while in Kant’s rational religion, this is human being’s subjective intellect that defines the nature and function of God. Therefore, for Kant’s moral and rational religion, there is no credibility for affairs like miracles, blessings and prayers, since they indicate religious misguidance. In Kant’s rational pure religion, the religion is relied on human being’s pure reason in which his/her reason is the only criterion of religious beliefs. Therefore, for Kant, religion means recognizing our duties as divine judgments, and that such religion pertains to our mundane life not for worshiping God in order to get his satisfaction or benefitting his grace. In short, Kant’s religion and morality are totally depended on our humanly and earthy rationality and understanding, and that there is no mystery out of our humanly willing. So the mysteries that are claimed by revealed religions are meaningless, since our reason, itself, determines the nature, function and virtues of God, moral axioms and religious beliefs.