Ayala (American philosopher and biologist) has presented new theories on the evolutionary ethical explanations. Due to the large scope of Ayala’s discussion on evolutionary ethics, only some of his theories will be reviewed in this paper after mentioning Ayala’s theoretical foundations about the formation of moral sense and moral norms. Following Darwin, Ayala distinguishes the moral sense and the moral norms accepted by the human community. Therefore, he believes that the biological-natural processes lead to the evolution of the human mind; this growth and development in the mind results in the moral sense in the human. On the one hand, the norms and ethical systems of any human society have been emerged due to the cultural evolution in that country. Hence, cultural evolution is the foundation of Ayala’s ethical pluralism theory. As such, Ayala advocates the objectivity of moral values and Kantian subjective morality. He rejects the dependence of the moral sense on evolutionary mechanisms such as group selection and relative selection since he, like Kant, regards human rationality as the only reason for justifying moral sense. In this paper, Ayala’s theories on ethical pluralism and the role of cultural evolution in the formation of moral norms are discussed and criticized. Ayala’s success in establishing a universal normative ethical system will be approached skeptically; however, his biological explanation of the origin of moral sense can be considered as a Kantian account of morality.
In this interview, which took place in July 2020, Muhammad Asghari, an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tabriz, asked eleven questions (via email ) to Professor Susan Haack, a distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of Miami. This American philosopher eagerly and patiently emailed me the answers to the questions. The questions in this interview are mainly about analytic philosophy and pragmatist philosophy.This interview was conducted via personal email between me and Professor Susan Haack in July 2020. This interview, which Professor Hawk eagerly accepted, includes eleven questions about her biography and roles of various philosophers in her thought and finally about the influence of the philosophy of pragmatism on her thought. Of course, it goes without saying that the Haack's book Philosophy of Logic in Iran has been translated into Persian and he has published two articles in the quarterly journal of Philosophical Investigations (University of Tabriz) and I also have translated one of her articles into Persian. What was most interesting to me was the influence of pragmatism on Haack's thought that Charles Sanders Pierce, among classical American pragmatists, had as much influence on this philosopher's thought as John Dewey had in Rorty's thought. Here I thank Professor Susan Haack for answering my questions patiently and eagerly.
In this paper, the attributes of Jesus as the second person of Trinity in Christianity and Muhammadan Reality in Islamic Theosophy were compared. The term ''Muhammadan Reality'' in Islamic Theosophy refers to transcendental and divine being of Muhammad rather than his human and historic existence. According to this research, both Jesus and Muhammadan Realities have divine attributes. They are lights of God, the Word or the Pen of God, the creators of the word, omniscience, omnipotent, omnibenevolent as well as the intermediaries between God and humans. In this study, it is demonstrated that what happened to Jesus in Christianity, it has also happened to Muhammad in Islamic theosophy with some differences. The influence of Greek philosophy, especially Platonic, in ascribing these attributes to Jesus in Christianity and Muhammad in Islamic theosophy is undeniable. There is a strong temptation among the scholars of both religions, Islam and Christianity, to extend Jesus and Muhammad to the level of divinity and godhead.
The coronavirus pandemic has had some unexpected benign effects (including a large drop in air pollution and levels of nitrogen oxides in UK and elsewhere, and a smaller drop in global carbon emissions), which raises the problem of how to sustain and build on these unexpected gains. These gains could easily be lost when economies and road transport return to something like their previous condition. But if governments and industries are inspired to reduce automobile emissions to match the levels of the spring of 2020, gains such as these could become recurrent, and many more lives could be saved. Further, if (with greater effort) carbon emissions could remain reduced, then future generations could be saved from sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and even from the spread of tropical diseases. Such a prevention of disease would be an ironic but welcome gain from a pandemic.
The main challenge of present paper is analytical comparing the “Criterion of Valid Cognition” from viewpoints of Epicureanism and Charvaka (Lokayata) philosophy, the largest exponent of Indian materialism,. The new findings of the research show that the whole construction of ontology, ethics, and infidelity of Charvaka is logically based on its epistemology. In this philosophy, any intangible existence is denied, and the only knowledgeable subject-matter is assumed to be the material world. So here firstly, the acquisition of the truth is possible solely by sensory instruments, and secondly, every ‘should’ and ‘should not’ that it is in contrary to the principle of material pleasure is negated. It can be said that the Charvaka’s philosophers consider Cognition as the ‘true and perceptible belief, but not reasonable one’, and they intensely questioned the validity of Inference, Testimony and Analogy. In contrast, the Epicurean philosophers seem to agree with the definition of Cognition as the ‘true and justifiable conviction’. In spite of believing in the originality of matter and regarding the ‘clarity of sensory perception’ as the criterion of truth, Epicureans consider also Inference, General Concepts and Emotions as the resources of cognition. Epicureanism’s epistemology is entirely rational, but that of Charvaka is irrational, empirical, contradictory, sense-based and contrary to Reality.
The question of what is the soul is one of the fundamental questions in philosophical psychology and the answer to it, along with other psychology questions, has been and is one of the most important and first concerns of philosophers. Among the philosophers, Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi have offered a novel view of the identity of the soul in comparison with their predecessors. In order to know the identity of the soul, Ibn Sina mentions the experience of human beings suspended in space in some of his works, and Suhrawardi, while expressing and modifying Ibn Sina's experience, speaks of other experiences. Through this research, it becomes clear that the efforts of the two in recognizing the soul are not the same, because Ibn Sina comes into existence in the experience of a human suspended in space, which is a hypothetical experience, and Suhrawardi in the experience of liberation from the body and experience in sleep and wakefulness. There are some realities and not assumptions about oneself that both views have been interpreted and evaluated in this article.
The main objective of human beings as absolute entities is related to our urge for survival, because in a material sense we are not self-supporting, but completely dependent on what nature offers us. In earlier times survival instincts meant that we lived as hunters, guided by our functional antennas (hunger, thirst, fatigue, sexual feelings, etc.). Today, this activity can be described as economically motivated, basically including everything that can be assumed to be serviceable, so it must therefore be construed very broadly – not merely providing in our primary needs, but everything else that is necessary for this. As our human society becomes more complex and more prosperous, secondary activities to attain the primary necessities of life become more comprehensive. In our present day and age they are even so multi-faceted that we can now expect to be occupied with such activity for perhaps the greatest part of life, possibly even without being truly aware of it on a daily basis.
This article tries to find a way out of the epistemological problem and the self-body question in Cartesian dualism in light of Mulla Sadra Shirazi's philosophy. There are possibilities in Sadra's thought which make achieving this objective possible. The argument develops in three steps to bring into focus the subject, the object, and knowledge. Concerning the subject, Mulla Sadra's philosophy demonstrates that self/soul and body are unified through modal boundedness (tqyid-i al-sha'ni) which is called existential objectivity in which the self-body duality makes no sense. In his discussion on the object, Shirazi points out that philosophical truths such as necessity, causality, oneness, and so on are unified to the external being and the objective reality in an integrative way (taqyid-i al-indimadji) having existential objectivity. Regarding knowledge, Mulla Sadra emphasizes the existential character of knowledge rather than its essentiality. Therefore, the existence or the existential unity between the knower, the known, and the knowledge overcome the self-body and self-external world cleavages. Because of its unity with the body, the self is present in the external world and perceives the world or the external facts, and then some ideas of the external worlds will appear in mind.
Considered the second face of Illumination philosophy after the Shaykh al-Ishraq Suhrawardi (1154-1191), Muhammad Ibn Mahmud Shams al-Din al-Shahrazuri (d. after 1288), in most part, hold fast to Suhrawardi’s illuminationist doctrines. As a case study on celestial bodies, the allegiance may well be at question level.The nine celestial spheres and sublunary world held managed by ten separated intelligences. Suhrawardi depicted the celestial spheres in his allegorical works. Suhrawardi usually speaks of eleven symbols, for instance, eleven mountains in “The Red Intellect” and the eleven layers of a basin in “The Sound of Gabriel’s Wing”. But the eleven celestial bodies, including ether and zamharir rule out Divine Pedestal (al-kursi) and Divine Throne (al ’arsh) of Muhyiddin al-Andalusi. Surprisingly, in his mystic work called Kitab al-Rumuz wa-l-Amthal al-Lahutiyya fil-Anwar al-Mujarradat al-Malakutiyya, Shams al-Din al-Shahrazuri nor except in passing has considered the celestial bodies. In al-Rumuz of Shahrazuri, the number of celestial beings has not been mentioned. Speaking of Divine Pedestal (al-kursi) and Divine Throne (al ’arsh) of Ibn Arabi, Shahrazuri does not consider zamharir and ether.
to explore his Nietzsche's early and later response to nihilism and pessimism focused on reading I.This essay is focused on Nietzsche’s unique reading of the Pandora myth as it appears in Human, All Too Human and develops an interpretation of Hope, the most profound evil of the many evils released by Pandora infecting the human condition, as it might be understood in relation to Nietzsche’s analysis of the ancient Greeks in The Birth of Tragedy. In reading this early work of Nietzsche, modes of comportment that fall under two specific categories are considered: Passive Nihilism-Pessimism of Decline and Active Nihilism-Pessimism of Strength as understood by Nietzsche in the late compilation of his notes published as The Will to Power. Ultimately, this essay explores the artistic responses to the bleak and pessimistic conditions of the Greeks’ lives found in the Apolline art in the Homeric Greeks and the tragic-art of the Greeks, which Nietzsche argues is the ultimate expression of art as the merging of the “aesthetic” principles of the Apolline and Dionysiac. These aesthetic responses are elucidated in and through the comparison to modes of existence that impede the spirit’s optimal, flourishing development, specifically, as expressed through Christianity and “Socratic optimism” in the superior power of human reason.
W. V. Quine borrows the principle of charity from Neil Wilson, but modifies and enriches its content to fit into his naturalistic philosophy and epistemology. While Wilson ties this principle to the notion of truth, Quine’s attempts in finding a ground for it lead him to the concept of common rationality shared by all human beings, which is ultimately what makes communication, as the basis of our social life, possible. According to the paper's argument, three other expressions, that is, the principles of psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection, which Quine uses in the contexts akin to that of the principle of charity, are not but different terms for one basic idea. Given the ties between the principle of charity and rationality, Quine's wide use of the principle and its affiliated notions proves that rationality is a central, often neglected, idea in his philosophy. The paper begins with an introductory account of the brief explanation Wilson gives of the principle of charity. Then it spells out four concepts or principles of charity, psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection showing how these four notions or principles basically express the same thing. Examining the relation of these last three principles with the principle of charity and rationality, the paper's main objective is to highlight the centrality of common rationality in Quine's philosophy, despite the common view that Quine is purely engaged with semantical aspects of Language.
The present article explains and analyzes the impact of Suhrawardi's eschatology on Mulla Sadra's philosophy and Sadra's critical evaluation of it. In this research, we have tried to explain and analyze Mulla Sadra's critiques of Suhrawardi's thought about identity, celibacy, self-occurrence, self-survival, and post-mortem souls, and in general, relatively clear pictorial resurrection from Suhrawardi's position in the philosophical system. Let's present Sadra. In this research, we first try to explain and analyze Suhrawardi's eschatology theory in the form of concepts such as the abstraction of occurrence, survival of soul, and finally the state of soul after departure from the body, and then the effect of Suhrawardi's resurrection on Mulla Sadra's thought. We explain and at the end of Mulla Sadra's critiques of Suhrawardi we evaluate and show that most of Mulla Sadra's critiques on the most important issues of Suhrawardi's eschatology do not seem logical. Here, too, we have tried to provide the reader with a fairly accurate analysis of this subject by remaining faithful to the texts of both philosophers and using the opinions of the commentators and experts of these two thinkers.
Sadra and Heidegger share a common fundamental concern, i.e. the retrieve of the question of Being. Their whole philosophical career in one sense has been devoted to the accomplishment of this single task. They belong to different philosophical traditions and have lived in different worlds and have had different spiritual and intellectual ideals. However, their ontological concern have numerous points of similarity and can be comparatively assayed. The mystical dimension of the philosophical discourses of these two philosophers of the Truth of Being is one of the significant comparative issues that can be studied in view of a certain set of mystical concepts. One of the key mystical concepts is Yaqzah or mystical awakening that refers to the existential awareness that occurs in the mystic following a Divine enlightenment. The current essay seeks to comparatively study the mystical relevance of the notion of Being-Mindfulness of Sadra and Heidegger in view of the mystical concept of Yaqzah. It has been shown that despite undeniable differences we can discern significant similarities in both notions and take a constructive step for more integrative understanding of human condition as a whole.
HélèneCixous, the renowned contemporary philosopher and feminist, provides such a heretic account of femininity which transcends the feminist social or political movements. She believes that “the female” can create a new identity for itself, when keeps its distance from the masculine symbolic order. Of course, this has nothing to do with the absence of women in the cultural realm, rather the problem is that if the female aspects of human being are not to be eliminated, a new ontology is required to sustain it in a pointlessness situation, so that it can always resist the conventional perceptual patterns. In other words, the female can only make its identity and the nature of rationality dynamic, when it injects the strangeness in the masculine order. This means keeping a position on the margins of history, while also infusing the feminine energies into the symbolic body. In this research, we try to show that for Cixous, emergence of the new is dependent both on some kind of feminine otherness and the marginality. This can be realized by various dismantling tools such as women’s writing and polyphonic identities. Finally we make it clear that through the female otherness or being on the margins, the feminine can provide a way of thinking about those realities which have not been thought up so far in the symbolic rationality, or have always been rejected as the unthinkable.
« Dieu, c’est la solitude des hommes » rétorque, dans Le diable et le bon dieu, le noble capitaine Goetz au modeste curé Heinrich. La phrase fait mouche autant que problème dans la bouche d’un personnage qui ne croit plus au ciel, à l’instar de l’auteur qui lui donne le jour. En cherchant à élucider cette formule énigmatique, on tente ici de reconstituer, à travers toute l’œuvre de Sartre, le puzzle de la solitude, le philosophe tenant à son sujet un discours cryptique à l’aune duquel se mesurent un athéisme méthodologique double autant qu’une anthropologie phénoménologique trouble.
Based on Aristotelianism, philosophies in Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and traditional phenomenology, Martin Heidegger and late Max Scheler, shared a conceptual understanding of the soul. The plant’s soul – a worldly stage of the individualization of universal creativity - unfolds via the animal towards the human and beyond. The Phenomenology of Life philosophy (Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka) enmeshed the ontopoiesis of the vegetative beingness into the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive, thereby overcoming the discommunicative hierarchization of the soul. An eco-cosmological following of „the plant’s“ ontopoiesis will have to base its understanding not only on the communicative creativity of „the plant“ but on its inseparable interwovenness into the web of life, thereby also taking into consideration newest botanical studies which brought to light insights into so far unknown „intelligence“ of plants.
Kant’s method on moral philosophy follows his general way of philosophizing, i.e. transcendental method. That is to say, he discovers formal conditions of moral action through the transcendental analysis rather than focusing on non-rational motivations. However, it would seem to be the case that his concept of the human being as “the end-in- itself”, “the kingdom of ends”, should be understood within a Kantian big picture which is the practical aspect of human existence. Firstly, I elucidate Kant’s idea of the kingdom of ends which is the idea of the humanity as end in itself with respect to moral dimension; secondly, I clarify its political dimension and, to some extent, its legal implications; thirdly, I delineate its religious implications; finally, the kingdom of ends is considered within Kant’s philosophy of history where I evince its final sense. Therefore, Kant’s practical philosophy is taken to be accounted as a comprehensive whole based upon the kingdom of ends, although it is not a systematic whole similar to Hegelian system.
In this paper, I argue for a new solution to Mary’s puzzle in Jackson’s famous knowledge argument. We are told that imprisoned Mary knows all facts or truths about color and color vision. On her release, she learns something new according to B-type of materialism and according to property dualism. I argue that this cognitive improvement can only be accounted for in terms of what Schellenberg has recently called “capacitism,” namely the claim that that experience is constitutively a matter of discriminating and singling out particulars by employing perceptual capacities. Of course, I am not claiming that knowing the phenomenal character is simply the possession of abilities, let alone that the phenomenal character is a sort of know-how. That is why my claim is not affiliated with Lewis and Nemirow's ability hypothesis position. I take for granted here a sort of property-representationalism, according to which the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on the cluster of properties that the respective experiences represent. On her release, Mary acquires those perceptual abilities on the basis of which she learns to discriminate all shades of color. And after applying her old physical concept RED to the shade of red, she comes to know what it is like to experience red (propositional knowledge).
The proximity of philosophy and literature has been endured since the dawn of time, both holding their stand among the critical thinkers from the ancient age to the modern time. A wide range of schools and thoughts have come to the stage of philosophy, one of the last ones being the Frankfurt School, whose notions target the social life of human beings and their interpersonal connections, which have been affected by the tragic events of the twentieth century. Jurgen Habermas, as the prominent figure of the Frankfurt School, turns down the challenging thoughts of his peers and expands the theory of “Communicative Action” through which he propounds the essentiality of reason and the importance of a constructive interaction among people with different social classes using a common and practical language. The post-war literature and specifically drama of absurd being known with significant figures like Samuel Beckett found a widespread prominence not only in the field of literature but also extended toward other fields like philosophy. In this analysis, through the works of Samuel Beckett, known as the predecessor of the absurdist drama, the dichotomy of ideas between the death of communication posited by Beckett and the efficiency of language supported by Habermas have been investigated.
The present study aims to investigate the effect of Zen Buddhism philosophy and language's ideology in the forests and trees in the Sohrab Sepehri's. In some of poems, Sepehri has used the basic concepts of Zen Buddhism, including purity and the core of the relationship between vision and nature. The purpose of this paper is to study of the intellectual context and process of Zen Buddhism philosophy on the Sepehri's poems. In the search for this problem, the key concepts and categories of Zen Buddhist philosophy are first outlined and then analyzed in order to represent this attitude in the depiction of trees and forests as manifestations of nature in the selected poems of Sepehri. The present study was conducted using descriptive-analytic method. The current research showed that Sepehri used the forest and trees as symbolic myths in expressing Zen Buddhism's mystical thoughts in his poems. The forest and tree used as a symbol to describe the main components of Zen Buddhism, such as knowledge, escape from dichotomy and subconsciousness, in the "The Sound of The Water feet " and the «The Green Volume«. The present study showed the tree's position in Sepehri's poems has a high correlation with Zen Buddhism. The findings of the present study indicate the direct effect of Zen Buddhism's attitude on the Sepehri's poems particular emphasis on nature and tree.
To explain Mulla Sadra’s viewpoint of the relationship of practical wisdom and Sharia, one needs to turn to the explanation of human soul and its perfection (happiness). It should be mentioned that the nature of practical wisdom and its principles are specified based on the definition that is offered of happiness. According to Mulla Sadra, true happiness lies in human soul’s acquisition of rational truths and becoming a subject to the divine forms and the highest possible state for it is understanding divine presence; this is considered to be the ultimate goal of Sharia and divine laws. In fact, Mulla Sadra introduces practical wisdom to be part of Sharia and this is why Sharia and practical wisdom are thought by him to be pursuing the same objective. Generally speaking, relationship of Sharia and practical wisdom is envisaged as an extension of the “mode of absolute generality and specificity”; because according to Mulla Sadra, practical wisdom, as the act of teaching the method of advancement of the stations and stage of God-wayfaring and path of servitude, is part of Sharia. One may seek for the cause of this in the richness of Islamic doctrines in the domain of practical wisdom and explanation of its patterns in religion and Sharia; however, richness of Islamic doctrines and Sharia does not make us needless of the explanation and presentation of effective solutions for application of practical wisdom. This is in fact exactly what Mulla Sadra has neglected in this area.
In Hegel's view art is not just an artistic creation. Art is an introduction to liberation. Today, Hegel's philosophy is a substitute for many challenging issues, and also an obsolete for past points, Hegel interprets works of art with key elements of his philosophy such as "absolute", "freedom" and "consciousness." Hegel divides the history of the transformation of art into three periods of symbolic, classical, and romanticism. But Hegel also mentions classical architecture and romantic architecture, which in fact transforms architecture into an artistic service which come from other types and are not considered independent. This paper examines art and architecture in Hegelian thought and explains the types of art and architecture and their meanings in the eyes of this philosopher. Absolutely undergoes three steps in the process of self-consciousness-art, religion, and philosophy. Art, as the first step of this Trinity, brings absolute liberty directly into the sensible thing. This is a logical necessity and opens the way for ultimate self-awareness of the soul. Hence, epistemic beauty is worthwhile. This view towards beauty or a beautiful issue is an epistemological phenomenon and unmatched in the history of philosophy. The beauty of value is equal to consciousness. Or at least as a prerequisite for knowledge.
Nowadays, although our aesthetic ideas are based on modern theories and perspectives that have pervaded the art, the root of western tradition of art dates back to Greek and Roman art tradition. Theory of form in art tries to emphasize the materiality of artistic object, though in later theories, it has been more flexible and proposes issues such as content and function, as well as attributing concepts such as composition, color, technique etc. to the artwork. Plato by proposing mimesis theory and expanding its scope considered a pattern and framework for attitudes and thoughts in static arts such as painting, literature and dynamic performance arts such as drama and music, and managed to regulate and organize them. For Plato, in this process, ēthos functions as a determinant factor. This present study is an attempt to discuss this question with descriptive-analytical approach: “will artistic form in Plato's theories be important after proposing the representational attitude toward art?” The results demonstrated that Plato's samples of beauty, in addition to descriptions and implications about the features of artistic form in some conversations can be considered equal to artistic form and due to the reflective theory in its revolution process, artistic form development into transcendence ethical form.
Early Muslim philosophers, theologians, logicians and experts in jurisprudence understand knowledge as “firm true belief supported by evidence”. They consider conjectures as a kind of ignorance, the domain of certain knowledge confined in necessary truths; and the domain of uncertain knowledge limited to contingent facts. From their definitions and postulates, we can conclude that they took “having appropriate source” as the criterion of knowledge. For this reason, they included the qualifications “firm” and “immutable” in their definition of knowledge in lieu of distinction between the definition and the criterion of knowledge and separation of cognitive characteristic features of beliefs from the non- cognitive ones. Their approach in epistemology is externalistic but it accommodates foundationalism and fallibilism while evading epistemological relativism. In this approach, knowledge is defined as true belief with proper source. Having proper source is a criterion for knowledge which is not explicitly stated but is implied by different qualifications introduced by them. A source of belief is proper iff it bears a causal relation of some sort to the state of affairs the belief depicts.
یک رابطه بسیار نزدیک بین زبانشناسی و فلسفه وجود دارد. در طول تاریخ، این دو حوزه تاثیرات بسزایی بر روی هم داشته اند. زبانشناسان همواره تلاش کرده اند تا معنی کلمات را از جهات مختلف بررسی کنند. به همین منوال، فلاسفه همیشه کوشیده اند تا کلمات و معانی آنها را در بافت های پیرامونی و زبانی متعدد بکار ببرند. با توجه به اینکه کلمات و عبارات، تنها ابزار و وسیله فلاسفه برای انتقال افکار و عقایدشان می باشد، آنها کلمات و عبارات را با دقت بسیار بالایی انتخاب و بکار می گیرند. زبانشناسان نیز می کوشند تا این کلمات و عبارات را از جنبه های گوناگون از جمله ساختواژشناسی، معناشناسی و منظورشناسی بررسی کنند. در این مقاله، سعی بر آن است تا کلمات و معانی آنها از منظر معناشناسی و منظورشناسی بررسی شود. در این راستا، برخی مفاهیم کلیدی که نقش بسزایی در فاسفه دارند مانند معنای صریح (معنای هسته ای) و معنای ضمنی (معنای مضاعف، احساسی و نگرشی) مورد بحث و بررسی قرار می گیرند. همچنین، برخی روش های مهم دیگر برای بررسی متون فلسفی بر اساس پیش فرض، انسجام دستور زبانی و انسجام معنایی مورد کنکاش واقع می شوند. امید است که این مقاله بتواند هم برای زبانشناسان و هم برای فلاسفه مفید واقع شود.
Although for a couple of centuries empiricism was prevalent in physics circles , the development of various schools of philosophy of science, during the second half of the twentieth century, made it clear we do not encounter nature with empty minds and that scientists always use some assumptions in their scientific work. In this article. We argue that metaphysical assumptions play an important role at various stages of science activity. But these assumptions are usually taken from various schools of philosophy or religions. Monotheistic religions can provide such principles. Thus, metaphysics works as a bridge between science and religion.